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T HERE were no dramatic developments in the law of corporations during
the survey period, but several legislative innovations and judicial refine-
ments occurred that deserve comment. This survey will first consider the new
legislation, followed by a discussion of two areas of corporate law affected both
by new statutes and cases, and will conclude with an examination of the more
noteworthy cases decided during the survey period.
I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In General. Only a few laws regarding corporate or related enterprises were
passed during the regular legislative session; of these, two can be categorized
as general in nature. One statute amended the Texas Business Corporation
Act (TBCA)1 to permit triangular mergers and is discussed in more detail in
Part IV.* The other clarified the meaning of "person," as used in the Texas Se-
curities Act,3 to overcome the result of a recent case narrowly construing the
term.4 The clarification is treated in Part III,' along with other Texas securities
law developments.
Among the new laws passed only one, the triangular merger amendments
to the TBCA, was sponsored by the Committee on Revision of Corporation
Laws of the State Bar's Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law."
Another of the Committee's proposals designed to clarify some aspects of the
muddled law of corporate guaranties in Texas was introduced, but died in com-
mittee.' The two measures were the only ones viewed by the bar committee as
* B.A., J.D., Baylor University; LL.M., New York University. Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Texas.
ITEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 1.01-11.01 (1956).
2 See text accompanying notes 76-144 infra.
3 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-1 to -39 (1964).
'Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. v. Flowers, 465 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont),
rev'd, 472 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1971).
5 See discussion at text accompanying notes 146-84 infra.
'Drury, Amendments to Corporations Laws, 33 TEX. B.J. 961 (1970); Section on Cor-
poration, Banking and Business Law, State Bar of Texas, Report of Committee on Revision
of Corporation Laws, 34 TEX. B.J. 519 (1971).
'The proposal would have amended Texas Miscellaneous Corporations Laws Act, TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06B (1962), by eliminating the present language that
validates guaranties only among parent, subsidiary, and affiliated corporations in a 100-
percent stock ownership relationship. The proposal provided instead that any corporation
may "make guaranties respecting contracts, securities and other obligations" of others if the
guarantor corporation can reasonably be expected to benefit therefrom, directly or indirectly,
with the judgment of the directors to be conclusive on the question Gf corporate benefit in
the absence of fraud. However, guaranties for the benefit of officers and directors would
still have been prohibited. H.B. 390, 57th Tex. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971).
The validity of corporate guaranties has been a troublesome problem in Texas mainly
because the Texas courts tend to see the transaction as one in which the corporation pledges
its credit for another without receiving any direct benefit, even though some indirect benefit
such as promoting customer or employee goodwill might be gained. As a consequence, the
weight of Texas authority regards a corporate guaranty as an ultra vires transaction subject,
however, to the limitations on use of the ultra vires defense spelled out in TEX. Bus. CORP.
AcT ANN. art. 2.04 (1956), which effectively preclude the corporation or the other party
to the transaction from successfully raising the issue. Cooper Petroleum Corp. v. LaGloria
Oil & Gas Co., 423 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 436 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1969), discussed in Amsler, Corporations, Annrkal
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needing immediate enactment, pending completion of a comprehensive review
the group is making of the TBCA and the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation
Laws Act8 to determine if the corporation laws of Texas should be changed in
light of statutory developments elsewhere.9 The TBCA was hailed as a prime
example of modern corporate legislation when adopted in 1955, literally bring-
ing Texas out of the stagecoach era." Since then a seemingly endless process
of corporation law revision elsewhere has produced a number of innovations
that are worth considering. For example, while the TBCA was among the first
statutes regulating stock transfer restrictions and shareholders agreements as a
means of recognizing some of the problems of the close corporation, several
states now have much more comprehensive provisions that liberate the closely
held enterprise from many of the strictures and formalisms Texas still requires
of all corporations." Hopefully the Committee's current labors will result in a
much-needed revision of the TBCA, but this must await comment in a future
Annual Survey.
Professional Associations. Although technically not a corporation, the profes-
sional association comes as close to one as the medical profession, whose mem-
bers alone can form such an association in Texas," can make it-at least for
federal income tax purposes. Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service has
thus far refused to play along, despite its grudging acceptance of most organi-
Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 98, 103 (1969); Empire Steel Corp. v. Omni Steel Corp.,
378 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in 43
TEXAS L. REv. 792 (1965), and3 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING
& BUSINESS LAW, Nov. 1964, at 1. For a more detailed discussion of the corporate guaranty
problem see Slover, Enforceability of Guaranties Made by Texas Corporations, 10 Sw. L.J.
134 (1956); Comment, The Guaranty: A Dilemma for Corporate Managers, 23 Sw. L.J.
872 (1969); Comment, Ultra Vires Under the Texas Business Corporation Act, 40 TEXAS
L. REV. 677, 688 (1962). And see Pearce, Corporate Guaranties-A Rationale for Enforce-
ability, 5 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSINESS LAW, Jan.
1967, at 1.
8 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 1302-1.01 to -5.19 (1962).
' See Drury, supra note 6, at 961.
"
0 See Shepperd, Stage Coach Law, 13 TEx. B.J. 595 (1950). The title refers to the cir-
cumstance that under the pre-TBCA statutory law Texas corporations were limited to a single
purpose which had to be chosen from among those enumerated in ch. 205, § 1, [1961]
Tex. Laws 408; thus a bus company had to be incorporated under subdivision 66: "to estab-
lish and maintain a line of stages." There were enough other archaic provisions in the old
Texas corporate law to amply justify the characterization given. See Bailey, Need for Re-
vision of the Texas Corporation Statutes, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1951); Belsheim, The Need
for Revising the Texas Corporation Statutes, 27 TEXAS L. REv. 659 (1950).
"See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. §5
608.70-.77 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100-11 (1971). For example, why should
Texas still insist on having three incorporators or require at least a three-man board of
directors for the one- or two-man business that chooses to incorporate? For a general treat-
ment of the developing trend in close corporation legislation see F. O'NEAL, CLOSE COR-
PORATIONS §§ 1.13-.114c (2d ed. 1971); Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966
DUKE L.J. 875, 946.
"TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. M-551 (1970). Section 3 of the Texas Professional Asso-
ciation Act, TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528f (Supp. 1972), limits its application to
professional services which by law cannot be performed by a corporation. Since all other
professionals except physicians, surgeons and other doctors of medicine (who are expressly
excluded) may incorporate under the Texas Professional Corporation Act, TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528e (Supp. 1972), the attorney general has properly ruled that after
Jan. 1, 1970, the effective date for the Professional Corporation Act, the TPAA applies only
to individuals licensed by the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners. See Hall, Gissel &
Blackshear, Professional Incorporation in Texas-A Current Look, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 84,
96 (1970).
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zations of doctors, lawyers, and other professionals formed under state profes-
sional association or corporation acts as entities taxable as corporations." As
detailed in last year's Survey, 4 a Texas professional association (along with
those organized in Illinois and Pennsylvania) "may or may not" qualify for
classification as a corporation in a given instance."
In an obvious effort to make the resemblance so striking that not even the
Service can fail to discern a corporate being, a new section 25 has been added
to the Texas Professional Association Act (TPAA). That section makes the
TBCA applicable to professional associations except to the extent it conflicts
with the TPAA, which takes precedence." Professional associations are to have
the same powers, privileges, duties, restrictions, and liabilities of business cor-
porations except as enlarged or restricted by the TPAA."' Section 24 of the
TPAA, which made the statutory and common law of partnerships applicable
to associations formed under the TPAA, and which probably led the Treasury
to hedge on the Texas professional association in Revenue Ruling 70-101,"
was deleted.
To further assure the presence of another corporate attribute deemed im-
portant by the Service," a new section 24 was substituted which, while pre-
serving individual liability for malpractice or other wrongful acts in providing
professional services, makes the association (but not the individual members
" The rearguard action of the Internal Revenue Service in refusing to consider pro-
fessional organizations as corporations for tax purposes despite the almost unanimous judi-
cial decisions to the contrary has been dealt with extensively in the literature. For brief
descriptions of the struggle see Hall, Gissel & Blackshear, supra note 12, at 86-92; Ham-
ilton, Corporations and Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 91, 94-96
(1970). The Treasury's initial concession appeared in Treasury Information Release 1019
(1969), followed shortly by a more definitive statement in Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 CuM.
BULL. 278, as amplified in Rev. Rul. 70-455, 1970-2 CUM. BULL. 297.
" Hamilton & Shields, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 88,
104-05 (1971).
"Rev. Ru. 70-101, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 278, 280.
"Ch. 118, § 6, [19713 Tex. Laws 889 (codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
1528f, § 25 (Supp. 1972)).
"Id. The language in the new § 25 is taken almost verbatim from § 5 of the Texas
Professional Corporation Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528e (Supp. 1972).
1 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 278; see Hall, Gissel & Blackshear, supra note 12, at 97, warning
that the partnership provision could raise tax problems. Indeed, the amended "Kintner"
regulations rationalized that any entity, especially a professional service organization, sub-ject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partnerships Act could hardly be treated as
a corporation. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 553. The
Service's restrictive approach was well characterized by Judge Gewin in Kurzner v. United
States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969), where, in refusing to apply the amended regulations,
he commented that not only were the requisite corporate elements defined more restrictively,
but "the real stiletto amongst the fronds was the exclusion of entities subject to a partner-
ship act; the prevalence of such acts ensured the exclusion of most professional groups."
Id. at 105.
"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, T.D. 6797, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 553, lists six major char-
acteristics which distinguish a corporation from other organizations: (1) associates; (2)
conducting a business and dividing the resulting profits; (3) continuity of life; (4) cen-
tralization of management; (5) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property;
and (6) free transferability of interests. An organization seeking to be taxed as a corpora-
tion need not have all of these elements, but more of these corporate characteristics must
be present than not. See 7 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 38.10
(1967). Prior to the Treasury's concession in Revenue Ruling 70-101, the "Kintner" regu-
lations, which still have not been superseded, refused to recognize the professional service
organization as a corporation, despite state laws enabling incorporation or association of
such groups, because it was deemed not to have enough of the required major corporate
characteristics of a business corporation. T.D. 6797, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 553.
[Vol. 26
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other than the tortfeasor) liable for wrongful acts by an officer or employee
acting in the course of his employment." Aside from its tax implications, the
new section, along with the deletion of former section 24, which made part-
nership law applicable to professional associations, represents a substantial
change in the potential liabilities of physicians who belong to medical partner-
ships, and in itself may be a compelling reason to associate under the TPAA.21
Another requisite corporate characteristic, continuity of existence, was likewise
strengthened by requiring the articles of association to provide that no member
of the association shall have power to dissolve the body by an independent act
on his part."2 Formerly inclusion of the provision in the articles was discretion-
ary. Finally, a professional association is forbidden the use of any name which
contravenes the law or medical ethics.23
With the changes thus adopted in the TPAA, Texas professional associations
should now possess sufficient attributes of centralized management, continuity
of existence, and limited liability to be classified as corporations for federal in-
come tax purposes. Although transferability of interests is still somewhat limited
in that shares or units of ownership can only be transferred to persons licensed
to perform the same type of professional service as that for which the associa-
tion was formed,' this provision is found in virtually every professional service
organization statute, including all those now recognized by the Service.' In a
0 Ch. 118, § 5, [1971] Tex. Laws 888 (codified at TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1528f, S 24 (Supp. 1972)).
21Although under § 14 of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act (TUPA), TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (1970), the partnership entity is initially responsible for the
wrongful acts or omissions of a partner acting within the scope of the partnership business,
under § 15 individual partners who themselves are not at fault are, nevertheless, jointly and
severally liable for such acts. Since the TUPA no longer governs, individual liability has
been eliminated for the nonparticipating associates. While this change in the law may well
have been made to provide the limited liability characteristic to enable the association to
be treated as a corporation for tax purposes, a recent court of civil appeals opinion may
also have been responsible. The case suggested that a medical partnership, and by way of
dictum the partners themselves, could be held liable for the act of an individual partner in
alienating the affection of a patient's wife if tacit consent of the partnership could be shown.
Maclay v. Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, 456 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1970), aff'd on other grounds, 466 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1971) (holding partner's act outside
scope of partnership practice; finding any consent inferred from silence or inaction by part-
nership after learning of partner's misconduct insufficient to support vicarious liability; but
agreeing that the partnership should not be given summary judgment because on the record
it might be liable under the theory that it failed to exercise ordinary care in protecting
(a) patients from harm resulting from tortious conduct on clinic premises, or (b) families
of patients from tortious interference with family relations). 466 S.W.2d at 719-20. See
Comment, Piracy on the Matrimonial Seas-The Law and the Marital Interloper, 25 Sw.
L.J. 594 (1971); Note, Partnership-A Duty to Prevent a Copartner from Alienating the
Affections of a Patient's Wife is Owed hy a Medical Partnership to the Families of Its Pa-
tients, 9 HOUSTON L. REV. 152 (1971).2 2Ch. 118, 5 3, [1971) Tex. Laws 888, amending TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1528f, § 8(c) (Supp. 1972). The TPAA already provided for continuity as a separate en-
tity apart from its members for the term of the association or until dissolved by a two-thirds
vote, despite the death, insanity, incompetency, conviction, resignation, withdrawal, transfer,
retirement or expulsion of a member, or the admission of a new member. TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528f, § 8(B) (Supp. 1972).
"
5Ch. 118, § 2, [1971] Tex. Laws 888, amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
1528f, S 4 (Supp. 1972).
14TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528f, § 10 (Supp. 1972).
264 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING § 82.03[2], at
439 (1971), citing applicable statutes. Cavitch notes that in most statutes the limitation
on transfer to a qualified professional is expressly provided; in others it is inferred from pro-
visions requiring a disqualified person to sever his connection with the corporation immedi-
ately or stating that no unqualified person may have an ownership interest in the organiza-
1972]
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recent ruling the Service classified a professional association of doctors or-
ganized under the Pennsylvania law' (regarded as equally suspect with the
Texas Act in Revenue Ruling 70-101) as a corporation, although its bylaws
required that any assignment to an outsider (who must also be a doctor) had
to be preceded by offers to sell to the association and its members."
In light of these developments and in view of the fact both professional
corporations and associations are now largely governed by the TBCA,"8 there
seems to be little reason to continue having two statutes on the subject. Phy-
sicians elsewhere organize under the same professional service corporation
statutes that govern other professions. 9 Surely Texas doctors can do the same.
Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act. One outgrowth of the
late-departed conglomerate craze has been the development of state insurance
holding company legislation. The laws, sought both by insurers and state in-
surance administrators,"0 endeavor to regulate efforts by outside noninsurance
concerns, which are tempted by the liquidity and low return on capital of many
insurance companies, to acquire or gain control of insurers through various
tion. See also id. § 81.03 [4); CCH, PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK 5 4021
(1971). Moreover, in a number of cases which the Government lost in trying to sustain
the revised "Kintner" regulations, the fact that shares in the corporations or associations in
question could only be transferred to other professionals was not deemed critical. See, e.g.,
O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969) (rejecting Government's argument
that shares were not freely transferable because they could only be transferred to other pro-
fessionals permitted to become employees of the corporation, and noting that restrictions on
transfer are not uncommon in closely held corporations); Kurzner v. United States, 413
F.2d 97, 107 (5th Cir. 1969) ("even though the act confines transferability of shares to
professionals and requires approval of a transfer by a majority vote of shareholders, trans-
ferability of the shares of a professional corporation is no more restricted than many-if
not most---closely held corporations"); Holder v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D.
Ga. 1968), a/I'd per curiam, 412 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1969). Since the Service has stated
that a professional service organization will be treated as a corporation in any case arising
in the same state and having facts similar to the cases above cited (and others), Rev. Rul.
70-101, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 278, there is no reason to believe the TPAA's limited transfer-
ability provision should deter a finding of corporate resemblance.
"
0Professional Association Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 12601-19 (1967). Pennsyl-
vania has since adopted a Professional Corporation Law, the provisions of which are ap-
plicable to professional associations which elect to accept its provisions. Id. § 2902-14 (Supp.
1971).
"Rev. Rul. 71-277, 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 422.
1 One consequence of being governed by the TBCA is that a professional association
will undoubtedly have to designate a registered office and registered agent pursuant to arts.
2.09 and 3.02a(10) of the TBCA. See TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. M-551 (1970), so ruling
in reference to professional corporations.
2"Every state (but not the District of Columbia) has adopted professional corporation
or association laws, or both. Aside from Alabama, New Hampshire, and South Carolina,
which only have professional association acts, but under which all professionals can associate,
Texas is the only state in which physicians cannot incorporate. P-H CORP. 1205 (1971);
CCH, PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK 5 4001 (1971).
" The impetus for the legislation has come from the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, which in 1969 adopted model legislation for an Insurance Holding Com-
pany System Regulatory Act (NAIC Model Act), 2 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONERS PROCEEDINGS 738 (1969) [hereinafter cited as NAIC PROCEEDINGS),
reprinted in Miller, Holding Company Regulation, in OPERATING DIVERSIFIED INSURANCE
COMPANIES 7, 20 (1971). Since 1969 at least 31 states have either adopted or were consid-
ering the Act or similar legislation, and, except for New York and Wisconsin, all the statutes
adopted or being considered are based on the NAIC Model Act in whole or in part. Wolke,
Insurance Companies as Parents and Subsidiaries, 1970 ABA INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE
& COMPENSATION LAW SECTION 166 n.1 (hereinafter cited as ABA INSURANCE LAW SEC-
TION]; Report of the 1970-71 Committee on Property Insurance Law, 1971 ABA INSUR-
ANCE LAW SECTION 533, appendix I, at 541.
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means such as tender offers or mergers. The statutes also deal with the recent
trend within the insurance industry itself towards restructuring into holding
company systems, both to fend off outsiders and, somewhat belatedly, to reap
and keep within the family the benefits derivable from diversification and to
obtain more profitable employment of the substantial internal financial re-
sources so coveted by others."5 In keeping with this trend and possibly due to
concern with forestalling yet another crisis of confidence within the Texas
insurance industry through takeovers by corporate raiders or stock manipu-
lators, a comprehensive law regulating the acquisition of control of Texas in-
surers through holding companies and other devices has been added to the
Texas Insurance Code. 2 Named the Insurance Holding Company System Regu-
latory Act (IHCA),"' the statute is a fairly sophisticated piece of legislation in
terms of the control concepts 4 and takeover techniques recognized and some
" Although some conglomerates or large noninsurance corporations have taken over
insurance companies in recent years, the primary movement into holding company arrange-
ments has come from within the industry. Reasons include a desire for diversification, escape
from regulation, better access to capital markets, the demand for "one-stop" or "super-
market" or "department store" financial services, enabling mutual companies to go public
via downstream subsidiaries, and warding off outsiders. For discussion of the insurance hold-
ing company trend and recent legislation see Barger, The Insurance Holding Company: The
Aftermath-Living With the Legislation, 1970 ABA INSURANCE LAW SECTION 185; Den-
enberg, Meeting the Insurance Crisis of Our Cities: An Industry in Revolution, 1970 INS.
L.J. 205, 218; Kemper, Insurance Holding Companies: Economic and Management Factors,
1969 ABA INSURANCE LAW SECTION 323; Miller, supra note 30, at 9; Wolke, Curing the
Cure-Insurance Holding Companies, 6 FORUM 95 (1971); Wolke, supra note 30; Zim-
merman, Antitrust and the Insurance Holding Company, 1969 ABA INSURANCE LAW SEC-
TION 329.
Although internal pressures are the primary reason for the insurance holding company
movement, attempts, sometimes successful, by outsiders to gain financing for various invest-
ment schemes do occur and frequently lead to litigation. See, e.g., SEC v. National Bankers
Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1971); Manney & Co. v. Texas Reserve Life
Ins. Co., 407 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966); Inter-Continental Hotel Corp.
v. Moody, 411 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967), error ref. n.r.e. Such take-
overs are by no means confined to Texas. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 92 S. Ct. 165 (1971); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970);
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
2 Ch. 356, § 1, [19711 Tex. Laws 1334 (codified at TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49
(Supp. 1972) ).
" The Texas statute is an amalgam of the 1969 New York enactment, N.Y. INS. LAW
55 69a-k (McKinney Supp. 1971), and the NAIC Model Act, although more comprehensive
than either.
'Control is defined in terms of the power to direct or cause the direction of manage-
ment and business policies, whether through voting securities or otherwise, except as ex-
ercised because of a corporate office or official position. A presumption of control follows
from ownership of, or power to vote, 10% or more of the voting securities, although the
presumption can be rebutted by showing that control does not exist in fact. However, after
a proper hearing the commissioner can determine that control exists in fact, even in the
absence of the presumption, when an individual or business organization either alone or
pursuant to an agreement exercises directly or indirectly such a controlling influence over
the management or corporate policies of an insurer that recognizing his or its control status
becomes necessary or proper in the public interest or for the protection of policyholders or
stockholders. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-1 (Supp. 1972).
The control definition is taken from § 1 (c) of the NAIC Model Act, although the Texas
act adds the language, indicated above, granting power to find that control exists whenever
a controlling influence is exercised. The NAIC Model Act definition is said to be taken from
the Savings & Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, 12 U.S.C. § 1730(a) (2)
(1971), 12 C.F.R. § 583.26 (1971), in order to gain the benefit of judicial interpretation
of existing legislation and regulation. See Barger, supra note 31, at 188. However, in view
of the considerable difference in language between the NAIC Model Act definition and that
in the cited federal savings and loan legislation, that hoped-for result seems quite tenuous.
In fact, the NAIC Model Act (and Texas) definition of control in terms of ability to direct
management and corporate policies seems to be derived instead from a similar definition
1972]
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of the imaginative administrative procedures" and sanctions ' prescribed.
The Act first enunciates a statement of policy, largely hortatory in nature,
which in essence declares that diversification and expansion into multifinancial
services are in the interests of policyholders and shareholders." It then declares
found in federal securities regulation. See, e.g., SEC rule 405: "The term 'control' . . . means
the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the man-
agement and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by
contract, or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1971). See also SEC rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12b-2 (1971); Trust Ind. Act rule 0-2, 17 C.F.R. § 260.0-2 (1971); Reg. S-X, 17
C.F.R. § 210.1-02 (1971). For a definitive treatment of the meaning of "control" as used
in federal securities legislation and regulation see 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 764
(2d ed. 1961). And see H. SOWARDS, FEDERAL SECURITIES AcT S 4.04[2] (1971); En-
stam & Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LAW. 289 (1968); Som-
mer, Who's In "Control"?--S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAW. 559 (1966); Comment, The Mutual
Fund and Its Management Company: An Analysis of Business Incest, 71 YALE L.J. 137
(1961); Comment, The Meaning of "Control" in the Protection of Investors, 60 YALE
L.J. 311 (1951); cf. Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1958).
Use of the 10% figure as a determinant of control or the lack thereof is probably de-
rived from the insider-trading provisions of § 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78p(a) (1971), and is found in similar regulatory legislation in Texas.
Thus, in TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 1.29 (Supp. 1972) (likewise enacted in 1971 and
commented on in the text at notes 54-59 infra) and 21.48 (Supp. 1972) (regulating in-
sider transactions and insider securities trading) control is defined in terms of direct or in-
direct beneficial ownership of 10% of any class of equity security of an insurer. Article
21.48 is the codification of the Insurance Company Insider Trading and Proxy Regulation
Act, ch. 222, 5§ 1-14, [1965] Tex. Laws 435, enacted in response to the 1964 amendment
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which exempted insurance companies from the regis-
tration requirements of § 12(g) of that Act, provided the state of domicile regulated in-
sider trading in substantially the same manner prescribed in § 16 of the 1934 Act. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g) (2) (G), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1971). See L. Loss, supra,
at 2741-60 (Supp. 1969), for a discussion of the origin and application of the § 12(g)-
(2) (G) insurance securities exemption.
The same percentage is also used in the Texas Banking Code. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 342-401 (Supp. 1972) requires notification be given the Banking Commissioner
whenever title to more than 10% of the outstanding stock of a state bank is transferred, but
there appears to be no provision calling for administrative approval of the transfer. State
banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation must also notify the Federal
Reserve Bank of its district whenever a change occurs in outstanding voting stock that will
result in control or a change of control; however, a change of ownership involving less
than 10% of the outstanding voting stock is not considered a change of control. 12 C.F.R.
§ 250.180 (1971). National banks notify the Comptroller of the Currency of a change. 12
C.F.R. §§ 15.1, 15.2 (1971).
- The statute has detailed provisions prescribing procedures for obtaining, amending,
terminating or disclaiming registration (§ 3); approval of extraordinary dividends or dis-
tributions, and specified transactions within the holding company system (55 4 (c), (d));
approval of acquisition or retention of control of or merger with a domestic insurer (5
5(d)), or disapproval after a public hearing (§ 5(d)); examination of the records of
registrants (5 9); and promulgation of rules and regulations under the act by the State
Board of Insurance (5 11); see text at note 50 infra. Pursuant to 5 17(a), judicial review
of administrative action continues to be governed by TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.04 (1963),
and should the commissioner fail to act or make a determination, mandamus may be sought
from the Travis County district court (§ 17 (c)).
3' A variety of sanctions are available for violations of the act: injunctions (§ 12(a));
prohibition against voting of control securities (§ 12 (b)); sequestration of voting securities
(§ 12(c)); criminal proceedings (fine up to $10,000 for insurer; fine up to $5,000 and
possibly up to two years imprisonment for individuals) (5 13); receivership (§ 14); revo-
cation, suspension, or nonrenewal of an insurer's license (5 15); nullification and restoration
to status quo of unauthorized transactions (§ 16).
3' Pursuant to § 1 (a) insurers should be permitted to: "(1) engage in activities which
would enable them to make better use of management skills and facilities; (2) have free
access to capital markets which could provide funds for insurers to use in diversification
programs; (3) implement sound tax planning conclusions; and (4) serve the changing
needs of the public and adapt to changing conditions of the social, economic, and political
environment, so that insurers are able to compete effectively and to meet the growing public
demand for institutions capable of providing a comprehensive range of financial services."
The policy statement, including the recitation of adverse consequences from the abuse
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that these same interests are or may be adversely affected by acquisitions of
control (a) by persons who would improperly use their power, (b) that would
violate the antitrust laws, (c) would cause the controlled insurer to enter into
unfair and unreasonable transactions with affiliated companies, or (d) would
jeopardize the financial condition of the insurer by payment of excessive divi-
dends.' These potential abuses are regulated as follows.
(1) Registration. Every insurer licensed to do business in the state which
is part of a holding company system 9 must file a registration statement with
the Commissioner of Insurance detailing the nature of its relationship to its
parent and affiliates within the system.' Foreign and nondomestic insurers are
exempt from registration if required to disclose similar information by the laws
of their own jurisdiction and are governed by comparable standards."' Registra-
tion will provide little public disclosure, however, in that the information con-
tained in the registration statement is confidential and may not be made public
without the consent of the insurer unless the commissioner determines publica-
tion is in the interests of the public, shareholders, or policyholders.'
(2) Transactions within the system. Standards are prescribed for material
transactions by registered insurers with their holding companies, subsidiaries,
or affiliates. The standards require (a) fair and equitable terms, (b) reasonable
charges and fees for services performed, (c) clear and accurate records, (d)
equitable allocation of expenses paid and payments received, and (e) proper
regard for the insurer's surplus in terms of its liabilities and financial needs in
paying dividends or making distributions within the system." To that end,
extraordinary dividends," sales, purchases, exchanges, loans or extensions of
credit, investments, reinsurance treaties or agreements, systematic rendering of
services, or other material transactions within the system must either gain the
commissioner's prior written approval or notice must be given the commissioner
of intent to enter into such transactions.' The commissioner may disapprove
any of these transactions if contrary to the act's standards or if the interests
of policyholders are adversely affected."
of control summarized in the text, is taken almost verbatim from a set of alternative
provisions for the NAIC Model Act. 2 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 750 (1969).39TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-1, § 1(b) (Supp. 1972); see note 37 supra.
"
9An insurance holding company system is defined as one which consists of two or
more affiliated persons, one or more of whom is an insurer (§ 2(g)). An affiliate in turn
is defined as a person that directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, con-
trols, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, a person (§ 2(a)). "Person"
includes individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations and other named entities but
does not include a securities broker performing no more than the usual and customary
broker's function (§ 2(i)).
40 TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-1, § 3(a) (Supp. 1972).
1 Id. The section is taken from NAIC Model Act S 4 (a) and is designed to re-
lieve the necessity of registering in other states whose laws "mirror" the model act
type of legislation. See Barger, supra note 31, at 190.
'TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-1, § 10 (Supp. 1972).41 Id., § 4a.
44An extraordinary dividend or distribution is one which, when taken with other
dividends or distributions made within the preceding 12 months, exceeds the greater
of 10% of the insurer's surplus or its net gain from operations, if a life or title in-
surer, or net investment income for other insurers. Stock dividends are not included.
Id. § 4(c) (2); see Barger, supra note 31, at 198.
45TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-1, §§ 4(c)(1), 4(d) (Supp. 1972).
" Id., § 4(d) (4).
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(3) Acquisition or retention of control of or merger with domestic insurers.
No person can seek to acquire control of a Texas domestic insurer (or its
parent unless the latter is primarily engaged in business other than insurance)
by means of tender offers, exchanges, market or private purchases of securities,
mergers or otherwise, without first notifying the commissioner and filing a
statement containing certain prescribed information. This information must also
be sent to the insurer and by the latter to its shareholders. The person seeking
control must thereafter obtain the commissioner's approval of the takeover."
Such approval will be granted unless after a public hearing the commissioner
finds that: (a) after the change of control the insurer's license to write insur-
ance would be affected; (b) the Texas antitrust laws would be violated; (c)
the acquirer's financial condition is such as might jeopardize the financial sta-
bility of the insurer or prejudice its policyholders or remaining shareholders;
(d) the terms of the acquisition are unfair or unreasonable to security holders;
(e) the plans or proposals which the acquirer has for the insurer after the take-
over, such as liquidation, sale of assets, merger, or other material changes
would be unfair, prejudicial, hazardous, or unreasonable and not in the public
interest; (f) the competence, trustworthiness, experience, and integrity of those
taking control are such that the takeover would be against the interest of policy-
holders or the public; or (g) the acquisition or merger would violate any other
Texas law or the laws of other states or the United States.48 No matter when
control is acquired, any violations of the act or other demonstration of untrust-
worthiness by the insurer, its holding company, or controlling person, or by
directors or officers of either, along with any violations of the Texas antitrust
laws, may ultimately result in revocation of the insurer's or an affiliate's certifi-
cate of authority." In addition, nonregistered insurers must provide information
after November 1, 1971, concerning their present control status and notify
the commissioner if it thereafter knows or has reason to know some other
person is seeking its control."
As thus detailed, the Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act
imposes sweeping controls over the acquisition or control of insurance com-
panies by growth-minded enterprises, the proverbial wheeler-dealer, or others.
Undoubtedly a number of problems will arise in its application and adminis-
47Id., 5 5(a)(1).48/d., 5(d).491d., § 5(g). This provision is not in the NAIC Model Act, but is taken sub-
stantially from paragraph 3 of § 69-f of the New York law. N.Y. INS. LAW § 69-f
(McKinney Supp. 1971). Cf. CAL. INS. CODE § 1215.11 (West Supp. 1971) per-
mitting the commissioner to seize the business of an insurer whenever a violation of
the California Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act, CAL. INS. CODE
§§ 1215-1215.14 (West Supp. 1971), threatens its solvency or makes further transaction
of its business hazardous to policyholders, creditors, shareholders, or the public.50TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-1, § 5(h) (Supp. 1972), based on paragraph
5 of N.Y. INS. LAW § 69-f (McKinney Supp. 1971). Nonetheless, certain mergers, con-
solidations, conversions into other legal structures, or total reinsurance takeovers already re-
quiring administrative approval are specifically exempted from the new control procedures.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-1, S 5(f) (Supp. 1972). The provision exempts from all
of § 5's requirements (a) efforts to procure or acquisitions of unissued and non-outstanding
stock, (b) nine specified types of combinations or changes in legal structure already subject
to regulation, and (c) any proposed or consummated acquisition which the commissioner by
order exempts as not affecting or influencing a change of control or because the transaction is
not comprehended within the purposes of § 5.
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tration, both under the Act itself and the comprehensive regulations which have
been provisionally adopted to implement its provisions.5 Some seem certain to
involve the relationship between the Act and federal securities regulation,"2
depending upon the takeover technique used.' No doubt future Annual Surveys
will catalogue these developments.
Prohibited Activities by Insurance Company Insiders. In addition to dealing
with threatened takeovers and abuses within insurance company holding sys-
tems, the legislature also placed a significant limit on the ability of insiders of
an individual insurance company to use its assets as a means of financing other
acquisitions or to reap other benefits from their control. A new article was
added to the Insurance Code"4 that prohibits any director, officer, or controlling
shareholder"' of a Texas insurance company from receiving any payment of
money or valuable thing, directly or indirectly, for his participation in any pur-
chase, sale, or exchange of property or loan made by his company or one of
" On November 24, 1971, the Texas State Board of Insurance adopted a set of
temporary and provisional regulations under the IHCA and held a public hearing on
their continuation or adoption as permanent regulations. To date they have not been
adopted in final form, although there is no reason to believe they will not be. The
provisional regulations are based on a set of model regulations proposed by the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 1055 (1970),
derived in turn from California's and New York's regulatory procedures and forms,
but are much more comprehensive in scope because much of the Act itself has been
assimilated into the regulations. Copies of the regulations may be obtained from the
State Board of Insurance, 1110 San Jacinto, Austin, Texas 78701.
"See 5 L. LOSS, supra note 34, at 2745-60 (Supp. 1969) for a discussion of the
possible conflict between federal and state regulation of insurance company securities.
And see SEC v. National Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), sustaining the paramount-
cy of federal regulation of insurance company securities (as distinguished from in-
surance business) in allowing the SEC to bring an action based on rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971), attacking a merger between two insurance companies
because of improper proxy solicitation.
" Since, as indicated in note 34 supra, Texas has adopted adequate regulatory
legislation to exempt the securities of its domestic insurers from registration under
5 12(g) (2) (G) of the Securities Exchange Act, 12 U.S.C. § 781 (1971), the tender-
offer provisions of that Act, 15 U.S.C. S 78n(d), (e), (f) (1971), should not be
applicable if the tender-offer route is used for the acquisition, inasmuch as those pro-
visions apply only to securities registered under § 12 of the Act. The same would be
true with respect to compliance with the proxy rules authorized under § 14(a)-(c)
of the Securities Exchange Act, 12 U.S.C. § 78N, reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1
to 240.14a-103 (1971), in the event the domestic issuer has to solicit proxies to carry
out a merger, consolidation, or sale of assets, although compliance with the proxy
provisions of the Texas Insurance Code would be necessary. TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
art. 21.48, § 5 (Supp. 1972). However, if the Texas insurer's voting securities are
listed on a national securities exchange, the federal tender-offer and proxy rules would
come into operation since such securities must be registered under § 12(b) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1971). Also, an acquisition handled by an exchange
of securities between the insurer's shareholders and the acquiring company will re-
quire registration of the exchange offer under the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a-77aa (1971), as well as the Texas Securities Act, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
arts. 581-1 to -39 (1964). At the same time it should be noted that the exemption
under § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act applies only to insurance companies, not
to insurance holding companies. 5 L. Loss, supra note 34, at 2746 (Supp. 1969).
However, § 5(c) of the IHCA recognizes the possible impact of federal securities
regulation by providing for alternative filing of documents used for registration under
the 1933 Act or disclosure under the 1934 Act in lieu of the statement called for in
5 (a) of the Act.54 Ch. 301, § 1, [1971] Tex. Laws 721 (codified at TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
1.29 (Supp. 1972)).
'
5 TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.49-1, § 1(a) (Supp. 1972); see discussion of
control in note 37 supra.
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its subsidiaries, or from having any pecuniary interest in any such transaction.
Furthermore, the insurance company may not make any loan for or guarantee
the financial obligation of any of the designated insiders.56 Exceptions are made
for benefits or dividends received by the insider as a policyholder or share-
holder, compensation or participation in fringe benefits as an employee, pay-
ment for professional services rendered beyond the normal duties of employ-
ment, any other arms-length transaction not prohibited by law previously ap-
proved by the Insurance Commissioner, or any other transaction within an
insurance company holding system or otherwise that is not illegal and meets
the test of being "fair and proper.""7 Despite its breadth, the new statute probab-
ly does no more than reflect the current state of law concerning the fiducial
responsibilities of all corporate insiders." On the other hand, because insurance
is a regulated industry, enunciation of the standards in a statute is more likely
to lead to the imposition of administrative sanctions for violations than in the
ordinary corporation managerial misconduct situation. By the same token, a
court may be more inclined to completely negate a transaction which the statute
prohibits, rather than treat it as merely voidable or ultra vires in nature."'
Miscellaneous Legislation. An additional franchise tax was levied during the
legislative session in continuation of the recent legislative practice of making
5 6TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.02A(6), 2.41A(4) (Supp. 1972) similarly
prohibit Texas corporations from lending money to officers and directors, but is silent
on controlling shareholders. In Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415
(Tex. 1965), art. 2.02A(6) was held to be a limitation on corporate power and not
a positive prohibition; hence, a loan to an officer was ultra vires and not illegal. See
Pelletier, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 134, 150 (1967);
Note, Bank Not Liable for Requiring a Corporate Client To Commit an Ultra Vires
Act-TBCA 2.04A By-Passed, 20 Sw. L.J. 861 (1966); Note, Corporation Denied
Recovery of Corporate Funds Used by Officer in Payment of Personal Debt, 43 TEXAS
L. REV. 796 (1965).5 7 TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.29(c) (Supp. 1972); cf. id. art. 21.49-1, S
4(a)(1) (material transactions by insurers within holding company system to be
"fair and equitable"); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-7, 581-10 (1964)("fair, just and equitable" standard for registrations by coordination and qualification).
The language seems to codify the fairness rule, already recognized by the Texas courts as
the prevailing standard when managerial conflicts of interest arise. See, e.g., International
Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963); Popperman v. Rest Haven
Cemetery, Inc., 162 Tex. 255, 345 S.W.2d 715 (1961); Tennison v. Patton, 95 Tex. 284,
67 S.W. 92 (1902). See also Hamilton & Shields, supra note 14, at 94; Lebowitz, Director
Misconduct and Shareholder Ratification in Texas, 6 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 17 (1953); Lebo-
witz, Recent Decisions on Fiduciary Duties to Corporations, 2 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON
CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSINESS LAW, May 1963, at 1; Pelletier, supra note 56; Com-
ment, The Interested Director in Texas, 21 Sw. L.J. 794, 801 (1967). The Texas view is
in accord with the majority of jurisdictions. See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 465 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
HENN].
5 See generally Bayne, The Fiduciary Duty of Management: The Concept in the Courts,
35 U. DET. L.J. 561 (1958); Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1049 (1931); Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Con-
trol, 65 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1966); Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Israels, Are Corporate Powers Still Held in Trust?, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1446 (1964); Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Cor-
porate Morality, 22 BUs. LAW. 35 (1966); Sealy, The Director as Trustee, 1967 CAME.
L.J. 83; Tarver, Arrogance of Corporate Power: A Study of the Evolution of the Fiduciary
Duty Owed by Management to the Corporation or Its Shareholders, 42 TUL. L. REV. 155
(1967).5 9 Cf. Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965); Inter-Continental
Hotel Corp. v. Moody, 411 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App-Houston 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
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that tax a primary source of revenue from business sources." Nonprofit cor-
porations organized to provide housing and care for the elderly were specifically
exempted from the franchise tax."' A more limited revenue measure effected a
substantial increase in the filing fees for filing documents with the Secretary of
State under the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act."
Two minor changes were made in the laws governing the corporate structure
of state banks. One clarified the present prohibition against bank stock held
by the bank itself in a fiduciary capacity or otherwise being voted or counted
for quorum purposes, by specifying that the prohibition does not apply when
the voting rights to the stock are vested in a person or party other than the
bank." The other increases from three to fifteen days the notice that must be
given the State Banking Commissioner whenever more than ten percent of the
outstanding shares of a state bank are being transferred." Another amendment
to the Banking Code enables national and private banks, as well as state banks,
to utilize the services of employees or stockholders who are notaries in taking
acknowledgments or proofs of written instruments in which the bank has an
interest, by removing any question of the notary's disqualification arising from
a possible conflict of interest because of his employment or stock ownership.'
A similar exemption from disqualification was made for notaries employed
by or owning stock in corporations having more than 1,000 shareholders; pro-
vided the notary-stockholder owns no more than one-tenth of one percent of
the outstanding shares." Unfortunately, these piecemeal changes leave the
validity of acknowledgments taken by notaries who are employees or stock-
holders of nonbanking institutions or corporations with 1,000 shareholders
or less in the same uncertain state which the legislature itself recognized exists"
in the present decisional law.6"
"
0Ch. 292, art. 3, §§ 1-2, [1971) Tex. Laws 1199. For the period ending Apr. 30, 1972,
the additional tax is 45.45% of the regular tax payable; after May 1, 1972, the additional
tax increases to 54.54%.
O1 Ch. 414, §§ 1-2, [1971) Tex. Laws 1553.
"
2 TEx. REv. Ciw. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a (1970). The fee for filing the limited part-
nership certificate was increased from $25 to an amount equal to I of 1% of the partner-
ship contributions, but no less than $100 and no more than $2,500. Ch. 501, 5 1, [1971)
Tex. Laws 501. New fees are imposed for filing an amended certificate not calling for addi-
tional contributions ($100) and cancellations ($25); an amendment providing for addi-
tional contributions has the same filing fee as the original certificate. Id. § 2, at 501.63 Ch. 483, § 1, [1971) Tex. Laws 1690, amending Texas Banking Code, TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-402 (1959).
-Ch. 482, § 1, [1971] Tex. Laws 1689, amending Texas Banking Code, TEx. REv.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-401 (1959).
65 Ch. 325, S 1, [1971) Tex. Laws 1282, amending Texas Banking Code, TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-509a (1959).
" Ch. 594, § 1, [1971) Tex. Laws 1953 (codified at TEix. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6602a (Supp. 1972)).
"7Ch. 594, § 2, [1971) Tex. Laws 1953 (emergency clause reciting "the fact that there
exists some question as to the present authority of employees and stockholders with minor
stockholder interest to take acknowledgments in the normal course of business activities of
the corporation").
6'The general rule in Texas is that one who is financially or beneficially interested in a
transaction is disqualified from taking an acknowledgment concerning the transaction. Phil-
lips v. Brazosport Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 366 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1963). The extent to which
a pecuniary and beneficial interest exists is usually determined on a case-by-case basis, de-
pending basically on whether the interest is direct or indirect. As a consequence, Texas de-
cisions on the subject are not always consistent. See Comment, Notaries: Qualifications and
Disqualifications, 14 BAYLOR L. REv. 299 (1962).
In the corporate field an acknowledgment taken by an ordinary employee who is paid
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Finally, enabling legislation permitting the creation of state business develop-
ment corporations was passed, " presumably, after thirteen years, to gain the
benefit of favorable provisions of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958."'
The federal law allows the Small Business Administration to loan funds to
such companies to match those borrowed from their institutional members to
finance business development.7' At the time the federal legislation was passed
about half the states had such companies or were considering permitting their
creation."' Typically the business development corporation lends money to small
businesses being established or relocated in the state and derives the funds loan-
ed from various financial institutions, such as banks or insurance companies,
which normally comprise its membership, on the basis of an agreement pledg-
ing the member institutions to supply funds on call on a pro rata basis. Under
the Texas Act any financial institution can become a member and make loans
to the corporation."a The corporation may be organized under either the TBCA
or the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act."' Since at least twenty-five persons
on a salary basis or whose income is not directly affected by the transaction involved is gen-
erally sustained against an attack that the instrument acknowledged or proved is invalid
because of the employer's interest in the underlying transaction. Anderson v. Pioneer Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, 163 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1942), error ref.; United Say.
Bank v. Frazier, 116 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1938); Red River Nat'l Bank v.
Latimer, 110 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1937); Colthar v. Dickens Nat'l
Farm Loan Ass'n, 56 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933), error dismissed; Seth-
man v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 55 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1932), error
dismissed; Cory v. Groves-Barne Lumber Co., 325 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1930); Creosoted Wood Block Paving Co. v. McKay, 241 S.W. 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1922), error ref. On the other hand, if the notary is also an officer or director of
the corporation interested in the transaction, the acknowledgment or other proof of the in-
strument in question will be treated as void. Sharber v. Atlanta Nat'l Bank, 130 Tex. 296,
109 S.W.2d 1042 (1937) (vice president); W.C. Belcher Land Mortgage Co. v. Taylor,
212 S.W. 647 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919), judgment adopted (dictum); Towery v. Plain-
view Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 72 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934), (general man-
ager); First State Bank v. Stubbs, 48 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1932)
(cashier); Montgomery v. Heath, 283 S.W. 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1926), af'd
in part, 291 S.W. 855 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927), holding approved (officer in both
grantor and grantee corporations); Workman's Mut. Aid Ass'n v. Monroe, 53 S.W. 1029
(Tex. Civ. App. 1899), error ref. (director and attorney); Bexar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Heady, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 154, 50 S.W. 1079 (1899), error ref. (secretary); Miles v. Kelley,
16 Tex. Civ. App. 147, 40 S.W. 599 (1897) (managing agent). The status of a notary
who is only a stockholder and not a director or officer is less certain. Although the rule is
sometimes stated that a stockholder is not qualified to take an acknowledgment of an instru-
ment to which his corporation is a party or has a beneficial interest, in nearly every instance
the stockholder involved was also an officer. Only one Texas case really supports the state-
ment, and it may be doubtful authority because the notary there was both a stockholder in
the building and loan association which made the loan secured by a deed of trust and the
general manager and stockholder of a lumber company to whom the proceeds of the loan
were paid. Towery v. Plainview Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, supra. See Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1529
(1927). Cf. Phillips v. Brazosport Say. & Loan Ass'n, supra, holding that the fact that one
of the associates signing articles of association for a building and loan association took the
acknowledgments of the 51 other associates did not invalidate the association's charter.
69 Ch. 853, § 1-13, [1971) Tex. Laws 2601 (codified at TEX. REV. CIrV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528g, §§ 1-12 (Supp. 1972)).
"
0 Pub. L. No. 85-699, tit. V, 72 Stat. 696 (1959); 15 U.S.C. §§ 695, 696 (1971).
71 H.R. REP. No. 2060, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1958), reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. SERV., 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3678, 3685 (1958).
71/d. at 17.
3 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528g, § 5(a) (Supp. 1972). A financial institution
is defined as any banking corporation, trust company, building and loan association, gov-
ernmental agency, insurance company, or related corporation, partnership, foundation, or
other institution primarily engaged in lending or investing funds. Id., § 1 (3).
141d., § 2(b).
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are needed to form the corporation, incorporation is expressly made subject
to the provisions of the Texas Securities Act."5
II. MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATIONS
Triangular Mergers. Some important changes in the TBCA were made during
the 1971 legislative session to facilitate use of the so-called "triangular" or
"three-way" merger. The primary impetus for the legislation, sponsored by the
State Bar's Committee on Revision of Corporation Laws, as noted earlier,76
came from changes made in the Internal Revenue Code in 1968 and 1971
recognizing such mergers as tax-free reorganizations." The TBCA revision
demonstrates again the magnetic pull of the Internal Revenue Code in con-
forming state business associational statutes into its own patterns of regulation.
Prior to 1968 a parent corporation (P) desiring to acquire another cor-
poration (T) through an exchange for P's stock, but preferring to have T taken
over by one of its subsidiaries (S), " faced an anomalous situation if it wanted
the reorganization treated as a nontaxable transaction. Although its stock as
a parent corporation could be utilized in two of the three basic forms of ac-
quisition recognized as taxfree reorganizations under section 368 of the Internal
Revenue Code,"" i.e., the type B stock-for-stock acquisition" or the type C stock-
-5d', § 2(a).
7" See note 4 supra.
" Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law, State Bar of Texas, Report of
Committee on Revision of Corporation Laws, 34 TEX. B.J. 519 (1971).
78 One reason might be to avoid the necessity of having a shareholders' meeting to ap-
prove the acquisition if the merger route were followed. Cf. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 5.03 (1956). Another could be the desire to insulate P from liability for unexepected
or potential liabilities of T incurred before the acquisition.
79 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368. The section defines six types of reorganization given
taxfree status. The first three deal with corporate acquisitions; the last three with essentially
internal combinations and separations, recapitalizations, or mere changes in identity, form,
and place of organization. All six are commonly identified by the order in which they are
listed in § 368(a) (1). Reorganization has a broad meaning in tax law, being used to cover
a variety of corporate readjustments, rather than being limited to a restructuring necessitated
by financial adversities, which is the more usual connotation of the term in corporation law.
B. BITTKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 14-4 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as BITTKER & EUSTICE].
The term "taxfree" is, of course, not completely accurate. It means essentially that recog-
nition of gain or loss in a transaction given that status will be postponed until the securities
received through one of the specified exchanges are ultimately disposed of. To that end the
basis of the property or securities surrendered in the taxfree exchange is carried over to the
property or securities received. However, in some instances a taxpayer may receive, in addition
to stock, cash or other property known as "boot" upon which he will be taxable immediately.
The reason given for the special treatment of these exchanges and similar exceptions to the
general rule requiring recognition of all gains and losses is the assumption "that the new
property is substantially a continuation of the old investment still unliquidated; and, in the
case of reorganizations, that the new enterprise, the new corporate structure, and the new
property are substantially continuations of the old still unliquidated." Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1
(1957).
The reorganization provisions of § 368 have meaning only in relation to other sections
of the Internal Revenue Code, such as § 354 (nonrecognition of gain and loss in exchanges
of securities), § 356 (nonrecognition of gain or loss in exchanges of property for stock or
other securities), §5 356, 357 (treatment of "boot" and liabilities in reorganization ex-
changes), §§ 358, 362(b) (substituted basis rules in reorganization exchanges), §§ 381,
382 (treatment of carry-over of net operating loss, profits, earnings, and other tax attributes
to a successor corporation). BITTKER & EUSTICE 14-9. There are also certain judicially im-
posed requirements that must also be satisfied, such as a continuity of interest, a proper
business purpose, the step-transaction doctrine, and continuity of business enterprise. See
notes 103-06 infra. See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE 55 14.01-.57; A. CHOKA, BUYING,
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for-assets transaction,"' P's shares could not be employed in an A-type statutory
SELLING, AND MERGING BUSINESSES 119-60 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as CHOKA);
J. CHOMMIE, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 492-525 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
CHOMMIE]; D. KAHN, BASIC CORPORATE TAXATION 115-75 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
KAHN); J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 20.81-.99 (rev. ed. 1965)
(hereinafter cited as MERTENS); Fox & Fox, Corporate Acquisition and Mergers, 13 BUS.
ORGANIZATIONS §§ 4.01-.07 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Fox & Fox); Galvin, Corporate
Reorganizations-Some Current Developments, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 421 (1964); Sinrich &
Baller, Payment in Buyer's Stock-Tax-Free Acquisitions of Business-The Tax-Free Re-
organization, in 1 BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS: PLANNING & PRACTICE 463 (J. Herz & C.
Bailer eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Sinrich & Baller].
"
8 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (B):
The acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its
voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a
corporation which is in control of the acquiring corporation), of stock of an-
other corporation if, immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring corpora-
tion has control of such other corporation (whether or not such acquiring cor-
poration had control immediately before the acquisition).
The stock-for-stock transaction is the simplest of all the recognized forms of acquisition
and is frequently used by public corporations to take over closely held enterprises. Sinrich
& Bailer 469; see Taft, Acquiring the Closely-Held Corporation, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1144 (special ed. 1970). But from the standpoint of the consideration that can be used for
an acquisition, it is the most limited since only voting stock of either the acquiring company
or its parent, but not both, can be used. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (1955). The requirement
is strictly construed, and the payment of even a small amount of cash to shareholders of the
acquired corporation will cause the acquisition to be treated as a taxable transaction even
as to shareholders who only received stock. Turnbow v. Commissioner, 368 U.S. 337 (1961).
For a criticism of the Turnbow decision see Toll, Transfers of Boot in Stock-for-Stock Ac-
quisitions, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1347 (1968). However, cash can be paid in lieu of fractional
shares. Mills v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 321 (5th Cit. 1964). Also, subscription or stock
rights, warrants, stock options, and rights under stockholder agreements do not constitute
voting stock and cannot be employed. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.354-1 (e) (1955). It is necessary,
too, that the acquiring corporation have control of the acquired company after the trans-
action. Control is defined in section 368(c) to mean the ownership of at least 80% of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80% of the
total of all other classes. This has been interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service to mean
that the acquiring corporation must obtain at least 80% of each class of nonvoting shares
and not just 80% of the total of such shares. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 115-16.
However, it is not necessary for the requisite percentage of shares to be obtained in a single
exchange. The shares may be acquired in a series of transactions taking place in a relatively
short period of time, such as 12 months. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (1955). This is some-
times referred to as a "creeping acquisition," and the taking over of control is referred to as
"creeping control." See MacLean, Creeping Acquisitions, 21 TAX L. REV. 345 (1965);
Galvin, supra note 79, at 424. The acquisition will also be recognized despite the fact that
the acquiring company has held a stock position in the acquired company for some time,
and even if the shares had been purchased or obtained through use of nonvoting securities,
provided the time interval is sufficiently long to avoid application of the step-transaction
doctrine. See note 105 infra.
If P desires to effectuate the exchange through S using P's shares, it may either transfer
its shares to S in return for S's shares or some other consideration and then have S make the
exchange with T, or else P may make the exchange directly with T and transfer the acquired
stock to S. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (2) (C); see CHOKA 125. See generally
BITTKER & EUSTICE 5 14.13; CHOMMIE 502; KAHN 162; MERTENS § 20.89; Fox & Fox
§ 4.03.8 1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (C):
The acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its
voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a
corporation which is in control of the acquiring corporation), of substantially
all of the properties of another corporation, but in determining whether the
exchange is solely for stock the assumption by the acquiring corporation of a
liability of the other, or the fact that property acquired is subject to liability,
shall be disregarded.
The exchange of voting stock-for-assets acquisition is probably the most time-consuming of
the various merger techniques because of the paperwork involved in drafting bills of sale,
deeds, and the like, but remains popular when privately held enterprises are being taken over
because, unlike a statutory merger, the purchasing corporation is not obligated to assume all
or any of the selling corporation's liabilities. Sinrich & Baller 471. Another difference is that
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merger or consolidationd' of S and T. The situation was not critical because P
usually only the shareholders of the selling corporation must vote to approve the transaction,
rather than the shareholders of both corporations in the instance of a merger. Compare
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10 (Supp. 1972), with id. art. 5.03.
To qualify as a taxfree reorganization, "substantially all of the properties" of the selling
corporation must be acquired. How much property must be transferred to come within the
meaning of the phrase cannot be precisely determined. Instead, "the nature of the properties
retained by the transferor, the purpose of retention, and the amount thereof" should all be
considered. Rev. Rul. 57-518, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 253. For an advanced ruling the IRS
takes the view that the assets transferred must represent at least 70% of the fair market
value of the gross assets and at least 90% of the fair market value of net assets held by the
transferor immediately before the transfer. Rev. Proc. 34, § 3.01, 1966-2 CUM. BULL.
1232-33; see Commissioner v. First Nat'l Bank, 104 F.2d 865 (3d Cit. 1939) (86% meets
"substantially all" test); Arctic Ice Mach. Co., 23 B.T.A. 1223 (1931) (68% does not
meet test). While normally the selling corporation will dissolve after the sale, distributing
the purchasing corporation's shares in liquidation, it may decide to continue in operation as
an investment company. However, "the substantially all" test is more likely to be strictly
construed as to any assets it retains. BIrrKER & EusTicE 14-42.
In contrast to a B-type reorganization and despite the statutory language first quoted
limiting the consideration for the acquisition to solely for voting stock, the acquiring cor-
poration may give other consideration or "boot" if it acquires all of the assets and the prop-
erty acquired for voting stock has a fair market value which is at least 80% of all of the
property of the selling corporation. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 5 368(a) (2) (B). Since in a
C-type reorganization it is the selling corporation that receives the stock in exchange for its
assets, it will be taxable on any "boot" received unless it distributes the "boot" to its share-
holders who will then be taxable. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 361(b) (1); KAHN 169.
However, in calculating "boot," any liabilities assumed by the transferee or to which any
assets acquired are subject must be included (although disregarded to determine if the
acquisition is solely for voting stock). As a consequence, very few C-type reorganizations
will involve payment of "boot" because normally the liabilities assumed or to which the
acquired assets are subject will exceed the 20% limit. Sinrich & Baller 471. Also, unlike
the B-type situation, if the acquiring corporation owns any stock in the selling corporation
at the time of the exchange, the transaction will not qualify as a C-type reorganization be-
cause the consideration is deemed to be not solely for voting stock of the acquiring com-
pany, but also for the stock of the acquired company, which would be treated as a taxable
liquidation distribution, unless the value of the stock being reacquired can be fitted into the
20% boot exception. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cit.
1959). For a discussion of the Bausch & Lomb doctrine and methods of avoiding it see
BITTKER & EUsTIcE 14-115; Fox & Fox § 4.0413] [e).
A triangular stock-for-assets exchange, in which P desires to have S acquire T's assets,
can be handled in several ways and still qualify as a C-type reorganization. P can exchange
its stock for T's assets and then transfer them to S, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
368(a) (2) (C), or P can issue its own stock to S in exchange for S's stock and then have
S use P's stock to acquire T's assets; or in the second situation S might then transfer T's
assets to one of its own subsidiaries. BITTKER & EUSTICE 14-49. There is a danger in the
second situation, however, in that the basis to S for P's stock given to it may be zero, in
which event when S transfers P's stock to T for T's assets, there may be a taxable gain. For
this reason the first procedure is the one generally followed. CHOKA 127. See generally
BIT7KER & EUSTICE 5 14.14; CHOMMIE 502; KAHN 168; MERTENS § 20.90; Fox & Fox
S 4.04.
" Section 368 (a) (1) (A) defines "reorganization" to include "a statutory merger or con-
solidation." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 5 368. Because the simple statement contains none of
the qualifying language used in connection with B- and C-type reorganizations, the A-type
merger is the most flexible and liberal of the taxfree reorganizations. For example, the
acquired corporation does not have to transfer substantially all its assets as in the C-type
"practical" merger. Stock used to effectuate the merger by the acquiring corporation need
not be voting stock as in types B and C; any combination of voting or nonvoting stock is
permissible. Moreover, a considerable amount of cash, property, or debt securities may be
given the shareholders of the nonsurviving corporation, although taxable to them as "boot."
However, the continuity-of-interest test will still apply, see note 103 intra, but may be
satisfied if the shareholders of the disappearing corporation receive at least 50% of the value
of the total amount of stock of their corporation outstanding at the time of the merger.
Rev. Proc. 34, S 3.02, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 1233. Even before the 1968 and 1971 amend-
ments permitting triangular mergers, see notes 81, 88 infra, a parent corporation could
transfer assets acquired in a merger to a subsidiary. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a)-
(2) (C). A merger of the subsidiary into the parent, known as an "upstream merger,"
or of the parent into the subsidiary, known as a "downstream merger," may also qualify
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could accomplish the same result in two steps by having T merge into P and
then transfer the assets acquired from T to S without affecting the taxfree
status of the reorganization." Still there appeared to be no reason for treating
a merger differently from the other forms of reorganization in which the par-
ent's stock was permitted to be used without tax consequences simply because
the parent preferred having its subsidiary employ that form of combination as
the means for handling the acquisition. In 1968 Congress decided to correct
the divergency by adding a new subparagraph (D) to section 368(a) (2) of
the Internal Revenue Code, permitting a corporation to acquire another in a
taxfree statutory merger by giving in exchange for the stock of the acquired
company the stock of the acquiring company's parent instead of its own."
Suppose, however, that for business or legal reasons P would rather have T
continue as a separate corporate entity and, therefore, wants S to merge into T
on a taxfree basis, and not vice versa. If P were willing to use solely its voting
stock to effect the exchange and not resort to cash or other consideration, this
sort of merger could qualify as a B-type taxfree reorganization.' Conversely, if
P had acquired even a small amount of T's stock for cash before the merger
of S into T, taxfree treatment would be doubtful." On the other hand, if the
newly authorized hybrid A-type merger87 could be employed, then both non-
voting stock of the parent can be used and a certain amount of other consider-
ation or "boot" can be paid.88 Unfortunately, the 1968 change was so worded
that only a forward merger of T into S could qualify under the new provisions
and not the reverse merger of S into T." ' In 1971 Congress decided to rectify
this situation too, frankly acknowledging there was no reason why a merger
in one direction (S into T) should be taxable, while a merger in the other
direction (T into S) was not."' A new subparagraph (E) was added to section
368 (a) (2), which recognizes the taxfree status of reverse triangular mergers
taking place after December 31, 1970, whenever voting stock of a parent is
as an A-type reorganization, although an "upstream" merger with an 80% owned subsidiary
will be governed by the nonrecognition provisions of § 332. BITTKER & EUSTICE 14-110.
See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE 5 14.12; KAHN 160; MERTENS § 20.88; Fox & Fox
§ 4.02.
83 S. REP. No. 1653, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
"Act of Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-621, § 1, 82 Stat. 1310, amending INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (2) (D), also amending § 368(b), defining the term "party to
a reorganization" to include the parent corporation in the forward triangular merger.
" Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 144. If the terms of the merger are that the
stock of T is changed into stock of P, minority shareholder interests are eliminated except
for appraisal rights as dissenters. Cf. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 5.11-.13 (Supp.
1972). This is referred to as a "forced 'B' reorganization," Dailey, Federal Income Tax Con-
sequences, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONs 209, 218 (J. McCord ed. 1969), or a "reverse
B" merger. Sinrich, Payment of Purchase Price in Stock-Tax-Free Reorganizations, in How
To HANDLE ACQUISITIONS IN THE CURRENT MARKET 143, 153 (R. Needham ed. 1971).
8S. REP. NO. 91-1533, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); see note 77 supra.
8 So characterized in BIrrKER & EUSTICE 14-50.
88 The merger of T into S in exchange for stock of P, so long as no stock of S is used,
is given the same taxfree recognition as the more conventional merger of T into P; i.e.,
non-voting stock or other securities can be used and up to 50% of the consideration paid
can constitute "boot." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (2) (D). See note 79 supra.
8Section 368 (a) (2) (D) refers to the transactions as one in which the acquired cor-
poration, T, is merged into the acquiring corporation, S.
1°S. REP. No. 91-1533, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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used in exchange for the controlling stock of the acquired corporation into
which the parent's subsidiary has been merged.91
It is against this background that the changes made in the TBCA to accom-
modate the triangular merger must be examined. In all, three amendments were
necessary. Two are virtually identical in language and amend the procedures
spelled out for mergers and consolidations, respectively." Under the former
TBCA provisions a triangular merger was precluded because in whatever plan
of merger or consolidation the constituent corporations adopted, the shares
converted under the plan had to be for securities or obligations of the corpora-
tion surviving the merger or the new corporation resulting from the consolida-
tion. Thus, by implied exclusion neither the securities or obligations of another
corporation nor any other consideration, such as cash, could be used." As
changed, in language taken almost verbatim from the Delaware General Cor-
poration Law," the plan of merger or consolidation is to specify the manner and
basis of converting shares of the constituent corporations into shares, rights,"'
or other securities or obligations of the surviving or new corporation, and:
[If any shares of either merging corporation are not to be converted solely
into shares, rights, other securities or obligations of the surviving [new] cor-
poration, the cash, property, shares, rights, other securities or obligations of any
other corporation which the holders of such shares are to receive in exchange
for, or upon conversion of, such shares and the surrender of the certificates
evidencing them, which cash, property, shares, rights, other securities or obli-
gations of any other corporation may be in addition to or in lieu of shares,
rights, other securities or obligations of the surviving [new] corporation."
As a consequence, if P now wants to acquire T, a Texas corporation,"' but de-
91Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-693, 84 Stat. 2077, amending INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 36 8(a) (2) (E), also amending § 368(b) to include the parent corporation in
the reverse triangular merger in the term "party to a reorganization."
iCh. 276, §§ 2, 3, [19712 Tex. Laws 1173, amending TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN.
arts. 5.01B(4), 5.02B(4) (Supp. 1972).
"In limiting the conversion of shares into "shares or other securities or obligations" of
the surviving or new corporation, the TBCA tracked the wording of then § 65 and 66 of
the Model Business Corporation Act. 3 ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 65, 66
(1960). The model act was extensively revised in 1969; the equivalent provisions are now
§§ 71 and 72. As amended, the two sections presently permit the conversion of the shares
of the constituent corporations "into shares, obligations or other securities" of the surviving
or new corporation "or of any other corporation or, in whole or in part, into cash or other
property." 2 ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §§ 71, 72 (2d ed. 1971).
"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (Supp. 1968).
' The inclusion of "rights" of the surviving or new corporation into which shares may
be converted is new. The term was not listed in either arts. 5.01B(4) or 5.02B(4) of the
TBCA, nor is it found in the Delaware provision except in reference to rights or securities
of any other corporation, along with cash or property, which may be used in addition to or
in lieu of shares or other securities of the survivor or successor. Although the term "secur-
ities" as used in the amended TBCA and Delaware provisions is probably broad enough to
encompass rights, the phrase was probably added to be in harmony with the inclusion of
rights of another corporation as a separate category of consideration for conversion of shares
in a merger or consolidation. The Texas Securities Act does not specifically mention rights
in its detailed definition of a "security" or "securities." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
581-4 (1964); the Federal Securities Act of 1933 does. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964).99 Ch. 276, §§ 2, 3, [1971] Tex. Laws 1173 (emphasis added).
" If either T or S is a foreign corporation, use of the triangular merger may depend on
whether such a merger can be effected under the laws of the state of its incorporation. From
the standpoint of the domestic corporation, TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.07 (1956)
permits the merger or consolidation of Texas and foreign corporations. If P is a foreign
corporation, too, there may be a question whether its stock or securities meet the terms of
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sires to have it merge with S, another Texas corporation, or have T and S con-
solidate to form a new subsidiary, X, the shareholders of T may receive P stock
or securities or obligations in addition to, or, as is more likely for tax reasons,98
in lieu of the stock of S or X. The reverse merger of S into T is also covered;
for by using the phrase "either merging corporation," emphasized in the lan-
guage just quoted, shares of the surviving corporation (T), as well as the
merged corporation (S), may be converted into stock or other securities or
another corporation (P) as part of the plan of merger.
Despite the sweep of the two amendments which seemingly allow just about
any kind of consideration to be given the shareholders of the corporations being
merged or consolidated, some definite limits remain. For example, under fed-
eral tax law to qualify for the forward merger allowed in section 368 (a) (2)-
(D) three specific tests must be met: (1) S must acquire substantially all of
the properties of T;0 (2) the transaction must be one that would have quali-
fied as a type A reorganization if T had been merged into P instead;' and
(3) no stock of S' can be used in the transaction."' Similarly, for the reverse
merger allowed in section 368(a) (2) (E) to be given taxfree treatment (1)
T must hold substantially all of the properties of itself and S (other than stock
of P distributed in the transaction), and (2) the shareholders of S must ex-
change an amount of stock sufficient for control' 3 for voting stock... in P.'" In
being the "shares, rights, other securities or obligations of any other corporation" as used
in amended arts. 5.01B(4) and 5.02B(4) (emphasis added), in view of the definition of
"corporation" in art. 1.02A(1) as meaning a domestic corporation and not a foreign cor-
poration. Arguably, art. 5.07B (1) may contain language broad enough to allow the securities
of a foreign corporation to be used. But if T and S are both Texas corporations, then art.
5.07 would not be applicable even if P were a foreign corporation. This is because tech-
nically P is not the corporation being merged or consolidated, although in reality it is a party
to the combination.
00 To gain taxfree recognition for the forward triangular merger "no stock of the acquir-
ing corporation [S or X] is [to be] used." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (2) (D).
Of course, in the reverse merger situation no shares of S could be used for the conversion
since T, and not S, is the surviving corporation.
0 This is essentially the same requirement for a C-type reorganization. INT, REV. CODE
of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (C). See note 78 supra.
100 It is not clear whether this requirement means that the triangular merger will not be
given recognition if for some reason state law precludes a merger of T into P, or whether
the cbntinuity-of-interest doctrine, see note 103 in/ra, must have been satisfied if such a
direct merger had taken place. See BITTKER & EUSTICE 14-52; Ginsburg, Acquisitive Re-
organizations, in TAX FREE REORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
43 (1969).
101 While stock of S cannot be used, see note 95 supra, the stock of P that is exchanged
need not be voting stock, unlike the B-, C-, and reverse-merger-type reorganizations. More-
over, a certain amount of "boot" can be paid to T's shareholders consistent with the con-
tinuity-of-interest doctrine. BITTKER & EUSTICE 14-52.
1'02 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (2) (D). See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE
14.15; Ginsburg, supra note 100, at 36; Levin, The New Subsidiary-Merger Statute and
Other Current Problems in Acquisitions, 47 TAXES 779 (1969); Lowenstein, "A" Reor-
ganizations: Technical Requirements for Compliance Under the New Law, 30 J. TAXATION
169 (1969); Shores, The Role of the Subsidiary in Corporate Reorganization, 18 DRAKE
L. REV. 175 (1969); Sinrich & Bailer 477; Walsh & Gerard, Planning Possibilities in Using
Parent's Stock in a Corporate Acquisition, 30 J. TAXATION 168 (1969).
11 "Eighty percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to
vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of all shares of all other classes of stock
of the corporation." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 5 368(c).
"'This is similar to the requirement for a B-type stock-for-stock reorganization, except
that 20% of the shares can be acquired for other consideration as in type C.
'0' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (2) (E). See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE
14.15; Flyer, An Analysis of the New A Reorganization: Its Operation and Planning Po-
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either instance the completed merger must satisfy the various judicially or regu-
latory-imposed tests of continuity of interests,' business purpose,"' step trans-
action," ' and continuity of business enterprise.' While in addition to stock
tential, 35 J. TAXATION 30 (1971); Seno, The Reverse Triangular "A" Merger, An Im-
portant New Reorganization Tool, 49 TAXES 296 (1971); Sinrich, supra note 85, at 152.100 The continuity-of-proprietary-interest test seeks to assure that from the standpoint of
the shareholders of the acquired corporation, the transaction given taxfree treatment is a re-
organization which in essence is no more than a mere change of legal form in which busi-
ness is done, and not in reality a taxable sale of their stock. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co.
v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933). To that end, the shareholders of the transferor
corporation must not only retain a continuing proprietary interest in the enterprise taking
over their corporation, but such interest must also comprise a substantial portion of the con-
sideration they receive in the exchange. Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189
F.2d 332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)
(1955). Basically this means in a triangular merger situation that the shareholders of T
must receive some equity interest in P, although cash or nonvoting preferred can also be
used. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935); John A. Nelson Co. v. Hel-
vering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935). The Internal Revenue Service requires for advance ruling pur-
poses that the shareholders of the acquired corporation (T) receive shares of the acquiring
corporation (S) or its parent (P) equal in value to at least 50% of the value of all of T's
stock formerly outstanding. Rev. Proc. 66-34, § 3.02, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 1233. The share-
holders of T are considered as a group to satisfy the 50% requirement; thus, some share-
holders can receive all cash and others stock only. Id. Since in B- and C-type reorganizations
the primary or sole consideration must be voting stock of S or P, these forms implicitly
meet the continuity-of-interest test. The test, therefore, has its primary significance in A-
type mergers or consolidations or the hybrid triangular mergers. However, if the shareholders
of T have a prearranged plan to sell their S or P shares immediately after the acquisition,
or in the event that a substantial number of sales take place shortly thereafter, then what-
ever the form of reorganization, its taxfree status may be endangered. Cf. Rev. Rul. 66-23,
1966-1 CUM. BULL. 67; see BITTKER & EUSTICE 14-22. See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE
5 14.11; CHOMMIE 503; KAHN 145; 3 MERTENS § 20.59; Brookes, The Continuity of In-
terest Test in Reorganization-A Blessing or A Curse?, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1946); Baker,
Continuity of Interest Requirement in Reorganizations Re-examined--The Hickok Case,
N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 761 (1960); Fox & Fox § 4.05(3); Maxwell, Continuity
of Interest in Recapitalizations and Mergers, 40 TAXES 1003 (1962); Sinrich & Bailer 485.
"I It is essential that the reorganization be for a valid business purpose and not a scheme
having no economic reality devised principally for tax avoidance, or which abruptly departs
from normal reorganization procedures, or is sham or illusory. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1 (c)
(1955). In short, the transaction cannot be one "'masquerading as a corporate reorganiza-
tion." Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935). However, in evaluating the nontax-
avoidance motives of the participants, the business purpose of the shareholders as well as
the corporation involved can be considered. Parshelsky's Estate v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d
14 (2d Cir. 1962). On the other hand, absence of a tax-avoidance motive does not of itself
show the existence of a business purpose. Cf. Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184 (9th
Cir. 1965) (a § 355 case). See generally BITTKER & EusTIcE 14-98; 3 MERTENS §§
20.55-.58; Bittker, What Is "Business Purpose" in Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 8TH INST. ON
FED. TAX. 134 (1950); Fox & Fox § 4.05[1]; Lipnick, Business Purpose and Income
Taxes: From Gregory to Goldstein, 46 TAXES 698 (1968); Michaelson, "Business Purpose"
and Tax-Free Reorganization, 61 YALE L.J. 14 (1952).
'The step-transaction doctrine requires that in evaluating the taxable or nontaxable
nature of a given event, such as a reorganization, all the steps taken by the parties be ex-
amined to determine its true nature. The doctrine is found throughout income tax law, and
in particular may operate to create or deny tax-exempt status to a given reorganization.
BITTKER & EuSTICE 14-102. The process of integrating a series of related transactions can
occur in a number of contexts. For example, in a C-type reorganization in which substan-
tially all of the transferor's assets must be acquired, a disposition of some of the assets by
the transferor shortly before the exchange may defeat the tax-exempt status of the latter. See,
e.g., Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
605 (1938); Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 73; BITTKER & EUSTICE 5 14.52.
Similarly, a B-type reorganization may not be recognized if shortly before a stock-for-stock
exchange, the acquiring corporation purchased some of the acquired corporation's stock for
cash; thus, defeating the solely for voting stock requirement of S 368 (a) (1) (B). Wintrub,
Graichen & Keidan, Tax Aspects of Corporate Acquisitions in Conglomerate Mergers and
Acquisitions: Opinion & Analysis, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1114, 1118 (special ed. 1970).
Conversely, a series of acquisitions of the acquired corporation's stock solely for voting stock
of the acquiring corporation will qualify for B-type treatment once the requisite 80% of
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of P, cash, property, or other securities constituting taxable "boot" can be used
without destroying the taxfree status of the triangular reorganization, the tax
consequences arising from the receipt of boot by T's shareholders may well be
such as to dictate using either a completely taxable form of reorganization"' or
a type B reorganization' instead.
Another significant limitation is found in the third of the TBCA changes
adopted, which amends article 2.16A, stating that shares are deemed to be
issued when the legal consideration for their issuance has been paid to the
corporation, by adding "or to a corporation of which all of the outstanding
shares of each class are owned by the corporation."1' As a consequence, to use
a triangular merger in Texas in which T is to be merged into S in exchange
for P's stock, S must be a wholly owned subsidiary of P, even though for pur-
poses of section 368, eighty percent control would suffice."' Nevertheless, the
the acquired company's shares have been obtained in determining if the acquiring corpora-
tion is in control "immediately after" the final acquisition. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (c) (1955).
The step-transaction doctrine can also be used to convert one form of reorganization into
another, e.g., in a B-type stock-for-stock acquisition the acquired corporation is immediately
liquidated under the same plan of reorganization. The Service views the transaction as a
direct acquisition of assets for stock which must satisfy the requirements of § 368(a) (1) (C).
Treas. Reg. § 1.382(b)-1(a)(6) (1962); Rev. Rul. 67-274, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 141.
To date, the Service has not published a comprehensive statement of its position on step
transactions, Sinrich & Baller 489, and there is no universally accepted test for application
of the doctrine. BITTKER & EUSTICE 14-102. See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE 14-101;
CHOMMIE 500, 518; KAHN 147; 3 MERTENS §§ 20.161-.166; Fox & Fox S 4.05[4]; Hob-
bett, The Step Transaction Doctrine and Its Eflect on Corporate Transactions, 19 TUL. TAX
INST. 102 (1970); Jacobs, Supreme Court Further Restricts the Step Transaction Doctrine,
29 J. TAXATION 2 (1968); Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations,
N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 247 (1953).
' "Requisite to a reorganization under the Code [is] a continuity of the business enter-
prise under the modified corporate form. ... Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955). Hence,
if the acquiring corporation completely terminates its business activity or interrupts it so
that continuity is broken, the transaction is more properly a taxable liquidation rather than
a reorganization. BITTKER & EUSTICE 14-100. The continuity-of-business test is met, how-
ever, if the acquiring corporation carries on some business, even if not the same as that car-
ried on before the reorganization. Rev. Rul. 63-29, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 77. See generally
BITrKER & EUSTICE 14-100; CHOMMIE 505; 3 MERTENS § 20.54; Fox & Fox § 4.05[2);
Tarleau, "Continuity of the Business Enterprise" in Corporate Reorganization and Other
Corporate Readjustments, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 792 (1960).
1*A taxable form of reorganization or acquisition can occur in several ways. It may be
one that does not meet the requisites of any of the tax-free forms of reorganization recog-
nized in 5 368, in which event a taxable asset acquisition will be treated under the liquida-
tion rules. BITTKER & EUSTICE 5 14.57. More likely the transaction will either be one in
which the stockholders sell all their holdings to the acquiring company for cash or consid-
eration other than stock, or else the assets of the corporation being acquired will be sold
on a similar basis either by the corporation or by the shareholders after distribution to them.
If the business being sold is unincorporated, the transaction will be taxable in any event
since the tax-free reorganization provisions apply only to transfers by corporations or cor-
porate shareholders. Upon a sale gain or loss is recognized, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §5
61, 165(a), 1001, and the purchaser generally gains a new basis for the stock or assets
bought. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1012. A taxable transaction may have advantages to the
acquiring corporation if, for example, the seller's basis for its assets is lower than the pur-
chase price or if the seller does not want to dilute its stock ownership; similarly, the selling
corporation or its shareholders may want to deduct unrealized losses, or may have a high
basis for their stock, or would prefer cash rather than stock of the acquiring company. Fox
& Fox 5-4. See generally Fox & Fox 5-1 to -38; Ness, Taxable Transactions, in 1 BUSINESS
AcQUISITIoNS: PLANNING & PRACTICE 181 (J. Hertz & C. Baller eds. 1971); Wintrub,
Graichen & Keiden, supra note 108, at 1121.
" The problem of "boot" is avoided in a B-type reorganization since the exchange must
be solely for the voting stock of S or P. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (B).
1"Ch. 276, § 1, [1971] Tex. Laws 1173 (emphasis added).
'1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(c) defines control for the reorganizations covered
by § 368 as 80% ownership. See note 103 supra.
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reason for confining the triangular merger to a 100-percent ownership situa-
tion is understandable in view of the constitutional problem a triangular mer-
ger raises.
Article XII, section 6 of the Texas Constitution forbids the issuance of stock
or bonds except for money paid, labor done, or property actually received, and
makes all fictitious increases of stock and indebtedness void. The constitutional
provision insofar as stock is concerned is further codified in TBCA article
2.16A, which adds that shares may not be issued until the full consideration
fixed as provided by law has been paid. The problem these provisions present
in a triangular merger is obvious. In the ordinary merger of T into P whatever
shares of P's stock that are used to effect the merger are paid for in effect by the
assets of T which P actually receives as a result of the merger. But if T merges
into S solely or partially in exchange for P's stock, the consideration for the
issuance of P's stock, i.e., T's assets, is received not by P but by another entity,
S, even if it is one wholly owned by P. In theory at least P and T are separate
corporate entities and normally will be so regarded in Texas law.114 Therefore, if
P issues its stock and receives nothing directly in return, it can be argued that
its action violates the constitutional requirement that stock not be issued for
property unless it is "actually received." The requirement is one rather strictly
interpreted by the Texas courts," as in a case decided during the survey period
setting aside a substantial issuance of stock paid for by $10 in cash and an
executory sublease contract subject to a primary condition remaining unful-
filled at the time the stock was issued on the grounds that valid consideration
had not passed in the form of "property actually received." '
If the transaction is viewed realistically, however, there is no doubt that P
and its shareholders gain the same economic benefit from P's shares being
issued to' have T's assets acquired by a wholly owned subsidiary as they would
if the same shares were employed to consummate a direct merger of T into P,
or to effect an exchange for controlling shares in T so that T can thereafter be
merged into S. To the extent T's assets have any worth at all, it is obvious that
S's acquisition of them will necessarily enhance the value of one of P's assets,
114 Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968); Thompson
v. Sinkler, 295 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1956), rev'd on other grounds,
356 U.S. 326 (1958); State v. Swift & Co., 187 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1945), error ref.; see Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 979, 991 (1971).
111 United Steel Indus., Inc. v. Manhart, 405 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966),
error ref. n.r.e. (stock issued for property not actually received cancelled). See also Fulton
v. Abramson, 369 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963) (issuance of stock for in-
terest in nonexistent partnership improper, but stockholder estopped against creditors to re-
sist paying for stock as unpaid stock subscription); Rowan v. Texas Orchard Dev. Co., 181
S.W. 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1915), error ref. (shareholders who paid nothing
for stock liable to creditors); Houston Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Swain, 114 S.W. 149 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1908) (officer liable for fraud in issuing and paying for shares with forged
securities); cf. Champion v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 887 (5th Cit. 1962) (stock paid for
with check when maker has insufficient funds not validly issued).
11' Vermilion Parish Peat Co. v. Green Belt Peat Moss Co., 465 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1971), error ref. n.r.e. The sublease given as consideration for the issue of
40% of the corporation's shares was subject to a provision that it was not to become effec-
tive until the corporation received $600,000 in cash or its equivalent as capital contribu-
tions. But cf. Cole v. Adams, 92 Tex. 173, 46 S.W. 790 (1898), which holds that an ex-
ecutory contract is valid consideration for a stock issuance. However, the facts show the con-
tract in Cole was later performed, which may explain the difference in result even though
the validity of consideration should be tested as of the time the shares are issued.
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i.e., its stock investment in S, even though the appreciation in value as a result
of the merger may not be realized until S is sold or liquidated. But even if not
immediately realized, the increase in worth of this asset of P ought to have
sufficient tangibility to be regarded as property received within the meaning
of the constitution. Furthermore, from an accounting standpoint P's invest-
ment in S would surely have to be written up to offset the increase in its capi-
talization resulting from the issuance of the shares to T because of the under-
lying assets S has obtained. Why should not the same gain constitute considera-
tion paid to P for the issuance of its shares?"'
117 Whether enhancement in property value will constitutionally support the issuance
of stock to reflect the appreciation is not clear in Texas. In support of the argument made in
the text see Cole v. Adams, 92 Tex. 173, 46 S.W. 790 (1898) (on certified question an-
swering that retained earnings as well as option and executory contract would support issu-
ance of stock, but not passing on contention that increases in value of land purchased by
corporation before stock issued would also constitute proper payment therefor). But cf.
Cole v. Adams, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 507, 49 S.W. 1052 (1898) (same facts, refusing to
recognize appreciation in value of property and franchises as a valid part of consideration
for which stock was sold, although giving credit for retained earnings). See also Pacific
Am. Gasoline Co. v. Miller, 76 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934) (intangible
assets comprising going-concern worth and future earning capacity, among other assets, valid
consideration for issuance of stock and debt securities; and so long as some value was present,
securities were not "fictitious issues" proscribed by TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 6).
There are authorities, however, indicating that stock cannot be issued on the basis of
an appreciation in asset values. See Cole v. Adams, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 507, 49 S.W. 1052
(1898); Adams v. Farmers Gin Co., 114 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1938)
(rejecting argument that purported undistributed dividend in an amount equal to value of
land on which gin stood and proceeds of fire insurance on destroyed gin which had been
"loaned back" to corporation by all stockholders could be considered stock dividend, be-
cause nothing had been paid nor property received for such stock); Houston Cemetery Co.
v. Drew, 36 S.W. 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), error dismissed (dictum). See also TEX.
ATT'Y GEN. OP. No. V-1520 (1962), ruling on the basis of the three cases-just cited that
TEX. CONST. art. XII, § 6 prohibits a corporation from issuing capital stock as a dividend
based on the appreciated value of the corporate assets. Cf. Dealers Granite Corp. v. Faubion,
18 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1929) (enhancement of value of assets does not
constitute "net profits" of business, as used in contract, from out of which plaintiff was to
be paid for property transferred to corporation). For divergent views on whether under
re-TBCA statutes an increase in the value of assets would have supported payment of any
knd of dividend, see 2 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS 324, 328, 331 (1942) (in-
dicating it would), and Rain, The Fund Available For Corporate Dividends in Texas, 26
TEXAS L. REV. 273, 292 (1948) (indicating it would not, relying in part on the Dealers
Granite Corp. case).
On the other hand, the TBCA seems to permit the declaration of stock dividends on the
basis of asset revaluation. See TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 2.38A(3) (permitting stock
dividends to be declared and paid out of unrestricted surplus of the corporation); 1.02A(12)
(defining surplus as the excess of net assets over stated capital); 1.02A(10) (defining net
assets as the amount by which total assets, excluding treasury shares, exceed total debts);
and 2.41C (allowing the directors in determining the amount available for any dividend or
distribution to consider the assets at their book value, presumably including any write-up of
asset values that had previously entered on the books) (1956). Nor is revaluation surplus
excluded from the definition of any of the permissible surpluses in the TBCA, as in some
of the corporation statutes of other states, as noted below. Moreover, it can be argued that
even cash and property dividends are now payable when an unrealized gain results from an
asset write-up in view of the deletion of the word "realized" as a modifier of "gains and
losses" in the definition of earned surplus in art. 1.02A(13) when that subsection was
amended in 1967. Ch. 657, S 1, [19671 Tex. Laws 1718; see Amsler, supra note 7, at 59.
Because of the change, the TBCA wording has reverted to the Model Business Corporation
Act's definitions of earned surplus and capital surplus (except for the TBCA's special cate-
gory of reduction surplus), and the draftsmen of the model act were deliberately ambivalent
on the propriety of using revaluation surplus or unrealized gains for dividend purposes. 1
ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 36 (2d ed. 1971). Several of the model act's draftsmen
and other commentators seem to agree that unrealized appreciation may be a legal source for
payment of even ordinary dividends, although not necessarily agreeing on its desirability.
W. CARY, CASES & MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1505 (4th ed. 1969); HENN 652 n.46;
D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 335 (1966); Bugge, Unrealized Appreciation as a Source
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Using the underlying asset value of P's ownership of its subsidiary to sup-
port the issuance of P's shares has an analogy in the Texas cases involving
attempts to pay for shares with promissory notes. Both by statute and case
law a promissory note is not considered property of sufficient quality to be
valid consideration for the issuance of shares." Yet if the promissory note
is secured by a mortgage or deed of trust, the property-received requirement
has been held satisfied, 19 because the land securing and underlying the note
is property that can be appropriated if necessary to satisfy the obligation
given to pay for the issuance of shares. Actually, from the standpoint of
being able to get at the underlying assets if needed to pay off creditors, for
whose benefit the constitutional provision was adopted,' P is in a better posi-
tion than the corporation whose shares are paid for by a secured note. In the
latter situation the corporation must await a default in the payment of the
note before proceeding against the underlying property. But after a triangular
merger P, through its absolute control over its wholly owned subsidiary, can
obtain T's former assets whenever it chooses in several ways. It may dissolve
S,121 for example, or merge with it.1'2 It may have S distribute the assets by way
of partial liquidation" or in the form of a property dividend." True, if S is in-
of Shareholder Distributions Under the Wisconsin Business Corporation Law, 1964 Wis.
L. REV. 292; Carrington, Experience in Texas with the Model Business Corporation Act,
5 UTAH L. REV. 292 (1957); Garrett, Capital and Surplus Under the New Corporation
Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 239, 259 (1958); Gibson, Surplus, So What? The
Model Act Modernized, 17 Bus. LAW. 476 (1962); Hackney, The Financial Provisions of
the Model Business Corporation Act, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1380 (1959); Seward, Earned
Surplus-Its Meaning and Use in the Model Business Corporation Act, 38 VA. L. REV. 435,
440-43 (1952); Note, Cash Dividends Payable from Unrealized Appreciation of Fixed As-
sets-A Reconsideration of Randall v. Bailey, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 632 (1959).
As to the use of revaluation surplus to permit the issue of stock dividends, see 1 ABA
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 925 (2d ed. 1971); R. BAKER & B. CARY, CASES & MA-
TERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1307 (3d ed. 1959); H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 484
(rev. ed. 1946); N. LATTIN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 553 (2d ed. 1971); Bugge, supra,
at 311; Hackney, supra, at 1381. Several state corporation statutes expressly permit use of
unrealized appreciation as a source for stock dividends. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157. 4 1c
(1965); IOWA CODE § 496A.41 (1962); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 21.22 (1963); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 55-49(d), 55-51 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.33(A) (1964). Arkan-
sas and California explicitly bar recognition of unrealized appreciation for stock dividends.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-402 III (1947); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1505 (West 1955).
"'
8TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.16B (1956); Dunagan v. Bushey, 152 Tex. 630,
263 S.W.2d 148 (1953); Kanaman v. Gahagan, 111 Tex. 170, 230 S.W. 141 (1921);
Washer v. Smyer, 109 Tex. 398, 211 S.W. 985 (1919); Thompson v. First State Bank, 109
Tex. 419, 211 S.W. 977 (1919); 2 1. HILDEBRAND, supra note 117, § 283.
"'General Bonding & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 110 Tex. 529, 222 S.W. 961 (1920);
Lumpkin v. Brown, 229 S.W. 498 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921), judgment adopted; Lang-
deau v. Dick, 356 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962), error ref. n.r.e.; Brownfield
State Bank v. Hudson, 73 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Anarillo 1934), error ref.; Pen-
land v. Schramm, 232 S.W. 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1921), error ref.; see I. HILDE-
BRAND, supra note 117, § 283; Comment, Some Problems Raised by Issuing Stock for Over-
valued Property and Services in Texas, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 376, 386 (1962).
" "The term 'property' . . . used in this section of the Constitution . . . means property
readily capable of being applied to the debts of the corporation. As a rule it should be prop-
erty of the kind adapted to the charter uses of the corporation and which it may legally
acquire." Washer v. Smyer, 109 Tex. 398, 404, 211 S.W. 985, 986 (1919); accord, Wood-
son v. McAllister, 119 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 314 U.S. 703 (1941).
"
2
'TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 6.02, 6.03 (Supp. 1972).
122 Id. art. 5.16 provides for the "short form" merger of a 90% owned subsidiary into
the parent without need for a shareholders' vote by either corporation. See Hamilton, supra
note 13.
113 TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.40A (1956).
'
2 4 Id. art. 2.38A(1).
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solvent P's options will be more limited, but the chances are that if P must
liquidate its investment in S to pay off its own creditors, it will be insolvent
too, in which event P and S are likely to be considered a single entity for the
benefit of the creditors of both in view of P's total ownership of S.",
The underlying theme behind the taxfree reorganization provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code suggests another rationale to sustain amended article
2.16A. Following the general philosophy of federal tax legislation of regarding
substance and not form," section 368 treats all the various combinations it
provides for as having essentially the same end result, namely, the acquisition
of one corporation by another, whether the acquiring corporation through use
of its own shares directly obtains the assets or control of the other corporation
or constructively receives them through a controlled corporation. In other
words, P's constructive receipt of T's assets through S has the same taxfree con-
sequences as if P had actually received them. The same reasoning, therefore,
which led Congress to correct its oversight in not making forward and reverse
mergers with subsidiaries taxfree events because in reality the result is the same,
whether accomplished in two or three steps or by using the combinations al-
ready sanctioned," ' should support a realistic interpretation of the new Texas
triangular merger provisions."'
Although until resolved in the courts or by amendment some constitutional
doubts remain that may cloud the use of forward triangular mergers, not all
triangular mergers are affected. Much may depend on the form in which the
merger is cast. For example, P may have nominees create S especially for the
merger, beginning it with a nominal capital, then have T merge into S and
immediately thereafter issue its shares to be distributed to the shareholders of
the merged corporation (who except for the nominees will be the shareholders
of T) in exchange for all of S's shares. Since S's shares will be backed by the
assets acquired from T in the merger, they will have genuine value as property
to support the issuance of P's shares. Another possible solution is for S to
issue additional shares to P based on the value of the assets received from T
in exchange for the shares of P which will then be distributed to the share-
25 See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Stone v.
Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942); Luckenbach S.S. Co.
v. W.R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676 (4th Cir. 1920); cf. Houston-American Life Ins. Co. v.
Tate, 358 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962). See HENN 268; E. LATY, SUB-
SIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 42 (1936); Cataldo, Limited Liability with
One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 473, 500
(1953).
'
2 United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950); Commissioner
v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924); North-
ern Trust Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1968); Foxman v. Commissioner,
352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965); see BITTKER & EUSTICE 1-19; HE.NN 270; Chirelstein,
Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 442 (1968);
Eustice, Tax Problems Arising from Transactions between Affiliated or Controlled Corpora-
tions, 23 TAX L. REV. 451 (1968); Lyon & Eustice, Federal Income Taxation, 36 N.Y.L.
REv. 642 (1961).
127 See notes 80 and 83 supra.
... Some of the analysis of the constitutional problem presented in the foregoing discus-
sion was suggested in a letter from Alan R. Bromberg to John T. Kipp, August 24, 1970,
distributed to members of the Committee on Revision of Corporation Laws. Of course,




holders of T.'" Likewise, the reverse merger recognized by section 368(a) (2)-
(E) can be used, since to be taxfree P must exchange its voting shares for at
least eighty percent of the voting and nonvoting shares of T at the time of
the merger of S into T. Since T's shares should have some book or market
value, they would be considered property received to support the issuance of
the P shares used to make the exchange. Moreover, P would not have to own
all the stock in T, its new subsidiary, because, unlike the forward merger situa-
tion dealt with in amended article 2.16A, the consideration-i.e., the stock of
T being exchanged for P's stock-is being paid directly to P, and not to a
wholly owned subsidiary.
Case Law Developments. Three cases were decided during the survey period,
including an Arkansas decision applying Texas law, which interpret the merger
and sale of assets provisions of the TBCA. In Hochberg v. Schick Investment
Co." a shareholder in a Texas corporation who dissented from its merger into
a Delaware corporation' 3 ' was held not to have timely filed his petition to have
the fair value of his shares determined under the procedures detailed in TBCA
article 5.12. He, thus, became bound by the merger, since the dissent action was
his exclusive remedy in the absence of fraud in the transaction."3 Under article
5.12 a shareholder dissenting to a merger"' and the surviving corporation have
a period of sixty days to try to agree on a fair value for his shares; if they do not,
then either party may file a petition within another sixty days to have the value
judicially determined.34 The plaintiff in the instant case mailed his petition
from Delaware one day before the expiration of the second sixty-day period,
but it was not received by the clerk of the court until several days later. The
shareholder argued that because filing the suit was discretionary, he remained
under the protection of the TBCA even if he had never filed a suit. The court
held, however, that to utilize the dissent remedy the shareholder must file his
suit within the time prescribed by the statute or he is forever barred from
filing such a suit. It further rejected the contention that the statute should be
liberally construed for the protection of the shareholder, stating that even a
liberal construction does not call for abandonment of an orderly procedure
prescribed by the statute granting the remedy."' Although the result seems
somewhat harsh in view of the power given courts under the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure to grant an enlargement," the holding is consistent with the
".. Securities of other corporations are valid consideration for the issuance of stock as
property received under the Texas Constitution. Commonwealth Bonding & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Hollifield, 220 S.W. 322 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920), judgment adopted.
3469 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971).
"' Effected pursuant to TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.07 (1956), providing for
merger or consolidation of domestic and foreign corporations.
"' Id. art. 5.12G.
"The right to dissent to a merger is given in id. art. 5.11A(2).
'"The detailed dissent procedures spelled out in id. arts. 5.12 & 5.13 were somewhat
simplified and the rights of dissenting shareholders more narrowly limited in a series of
amendments adopted in 1967. Ch. 657, §§ 12, 13, [1967] Tex. Laws 1721-23. For a dis-
cussion of the amendments see Amsler, supra note 7, at 62.
S' The court followed a Delaware decision, rejecting the same contention. In re North-
eastern Water Co., 28 Del. Ch. 139, 38 A.2d 918 (1944).
13'Tiix. R. Civ. P. 5, as amended effective Jan. 1, 1971, permitting the court to allow
an act prescribed to be done within a specified time under the rules to be done after the
expiration of the specified period, but only on motion and for good cause shown for the
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view sometimes expressed that the rules cannot enlarge the period prescribed
by statute in which an action must be brought'. and the more specific language
within the TBCA making the remedy conditional on timely filing."'
In the Arkansas case"' a Texas corporation into which its wholly owned
Texas subsidiary had been merged was held subject to the jurisdiction of the
Arkansas court in an action seeking damages caused by construction carried
out by the subsidiary corporation before the merger. The court correctly ap-
plied TBCA article 5.06A(5), making the corporation surviving the merger
"thenceforth ... responsible and liable for all liabilities and obligations" of
the constituent corporations,4 ' noting also that under the TBCA the action
could have also been brought against the nonsurviving corporation even after
the merger.'
In the third decision, " already noted," the sale of substantially all the assets
of a corporation was set aside because, among other reasons, the sale had not
been approved by the requisite vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the
outstanding shares.' Moreover, the shares held by another corporation holding
forty percent of the outstanding stock that had been voted for the sale were
cancelled, because they had been issued for a sublease to explore and extract
peat moss and sphagnum that was not to become effective until $600,000
had been paid in cash or its equivalent into the capitalization of the issuing
corporation-an event which never occurred.
III. TEXAS SECURITIES ACT
A. The rDempsey-Tegeler" Amendment
When a court hands down an egregiously wrong decision, two recourses are
available: (1) appeal to a higher court, if possible; and (2) legislative cor-
rection at the next session of the legislature. Usually the former is the relief
sought; the second is too often fraught with political pitfalls that await even
the most well-meaning efforts to set the law aright. In the wake of a recent
failure to act. See 1 R. MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE 19 (rev. ed. 1965). Apparently
no motion for an extension of time was filed in the instant case.
"' See Fulghum v. Baxley, 219 S.W.2d 1014 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1949) (statute
of limitations).
138 See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.13C (Supp. 1972), which provides that if no
petition asking for judicial determination of the value of dissenting shares "shall have been
filed within the time provided by article 5.12," the shareholder is conclusively presumed to
have approved and ratified the action from which he is dissenting; and id. art. 5.12G, which
states that any shareholder "who fails to comply with the requirements of this Article" is
barred from recovering the value of his shares or seeking money damages. See also Com-
ment of State Bar Committee, 3A TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 96 (Supp. 1972): "Under
this Section the right to payment may be terminated . .. if no petition to determine the
value of his shares is filed within the prescribed time ....
"
9 Teague v. Home Mortgage & Inv. Co., 465 S.W.2d 312 (Ark. 1971).
41TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.06A(5) (1956).
41 Id. art. 5.06G(5), which permits an action against a constituent corporation to be
prosecuted "as if such merger or consolidation had not taken place." Cf. id. art. 7.12, which
allows survival of a remedy against a dissolved corporation if the action is commenced with-
in three years after dissolution, and art. 2.07C of the Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act,
which allows survival of a remedy not barred by limitations beyond even the three-year
period. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.07C (1962).
'41 Vermilion Parish Peat Co. v. Green Belt Peat Moss Co., 465 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1971), error ref. m.r.e.
"~' See note 116 supra.
'"See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10 (Supp. 1972).
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decision by the Beaumont court of civil appeals which effectively gutted the
civil remedy afforded in section 33 of the Texas Securities Act' by excluding
corporations from its application, both routes were followed. Unfortunately,
when too much firepower is brought to bear, an overkill may often result. This
seems to be the consequence of the legislative solution adopted, for in the
process of attempting to meet the issue by defining "person" wherever used
in the Texas Securities Act to include a corporation (with one exception), the
legislature may have raised more problems than it solved. The consequence
is doubly unfortunate because the Texas Supreme Court quickly restored the
civil remedy to full vigor in reversing the Beaumont court without the pos-
sible unforeseen side effects implicit in the legislative change.
The "Dempsey-Tegeler" Case. In Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. v. Flowers'" two
disgruntled purchasers of securities brought an action in Lubbock under section
33 of the Texas Securities Act to recover their purchase money when the se-
curities plummeted in value against Dempsey-Tegeler, two of its salesmen,
and the manager of its Lubbock office, through whom the securities had been
purchased. Dempsey-Tegeler filed a plea of privilege to be sued in Harris
County where its registered agent resided; plaintiffs countered by asserting
that venue could be had in Lubbock County under subdivisions 4, 9, 23, and
30 of article 1995."'1 At the plea of privilege hearing plaintiffs proved they
had purchased the shares through Dempsey-Tegeler and introduced a certifi-
cate by the Securities Commissioner stating that the securities had never been
registered in Texas and that no permit allowing their sale had ever been
granted.' 8 The trial court overruled the plea of privilege, and Dempsey-
Tegeler appealed, contending that no cause of action could be asserted against
it because, being a corporation, it was not subject to the provisions of section
33. Agreeing, the court of civil appeals ordered the transfer of the actions
against Dempsey-Tegeler to Harris County. One judge dissented. "
Section 33.A(1) creates a civil cause of action against "any person" who
offers or sells a security in violation of certain sections of the Act, including
'
4 1 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (1964).
546 Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. v. Flowers, 465 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont),
rev'd, 472 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1971).
14T TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (1964). The subdivisions establish exceptions
to the general venue rule stated in the article that a defendant is to be sued in the county of
his domicile. The subdivisions relied on create exceptions when two or more defendants
reside in different counties (subdivision 4); a crime, offense, or trespass has been committed
(subdivision 9); a corporation is sued (subdivision 23); and a statute expressly prescribes
venue for a particular action (subdivision 30). Under § 16 of the Texas Securities Act non-
resident individuals or foreign corporations which register as Texas dealers must file a con-
sent to be sued in any county in which a cause of action against them may arise or in which
the plaintiff resides. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-16 (1964). Dempsey-Tegeler was
a Delaware corporation.
", Under § 30 of the Act a certificate by the securities commissioner showing compli-
ance or noncompliance with the provisions of the Act by any dealer or salesman is admissible
in any action based on or arising out of the Act as prima facie evidence of compliance or
noncompliance. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-30 (1964).
14'The dissenting opinion by Justice Stephenson relied heavily on a "mischief" or "evil"
approach in deciding that the legislature enacted the Securities Act to protect the public
interest and, therefore, intended that a civil action should lie against a corporation violating
the Act under § 33. His analysis and reasoning are essentially the same as the supreme
court's in its reversal.
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the registration provisions."' As a consequence, a purchaser of unregistered
securities may seek rescission or damages for their sale. The majority of the
court of civil appeals, after examining the different uses of the terms "person"
and "company" in other sections of the Act,"' concluded that the legislature,
by using only the word "person" in section 33 and not adding "company,"
intended that individuals alone, and not corporations or other entities, be held
civilly liable under that section. They relied heavily on the fact that section
29,"' the penal provision of the Act,"' which they regarded as basically parallel
to section 33, also used "person" exclusively. And since corporations are not
generally criminally liable in Texas unless explicitly provided to the con-
trary,' and in light of an administrative interpretation that corporations can-
"°TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33.A(l) (1964).
... A definite deficiency in the Texas Securities Act is the imprecision of its terminology,
which was the primary cause of the whole Dempsey-Tegeler imbroglio. Although § 4.B of
the Act defined "company" to include a "person" before its amendment, "person" and "com-
pany" as well as similar terminology are used disjunctively, conjunctively, or singularly
throughout the Act when it is evident from the context that a single inclusive term would
do. See, e.g., §§ 4.C ("dealer" includes every "person or company"); 4.D ("salesman" in-
cludes every "person or company"); 4.G ("issuer" includes every "company or person"); 5
("company or person" making exempt transaction not deemed a dealer; see also various
exemptions in § 5 using singular terms such as "corporation," "company," "issuer," and "ven-
dor" in contexts showing that a multiple meaning was intended); 5.C(1) (isolated sales
by "vendor" not to be for benefit of any "company or corporation"; any "person" acting as
agent for vendor to be registered); 7 (registration of securities by dealer or "issuer"); 8
(consent to service and certificate of good standing to be filed by "issuer" or dealer); 9.A
("company" offering securities may be required to put proceeds of offering in escrow); 10.C
(unlawful for any dealer or "issuer," agent, or salesman to use permit authorizing sale of
securities for sales purposes); 12 (no "person, firm, corporation" or dealer to sell securities
without being registered); 16 (consent to suit in state by every "company" organized in
other states or having its principal office therein and by every non-resident "individual");
22.A (unlawful for any "person" to use advertising except as Act permits); 22.B(1) (after
qualification by notification or coordination, advertising can be used if such "person, com-
pany," dealer or firm has been registered); 23.A (commissioner can suspend sales of secur-
ities after notice to "the issuer, the registrant, and the person" on whose behalf securities are
being sold); 24 (hearing before commissioner by any "person or company" aggrieved by
his order); 28 (commissioner may examine records at office of "concern" in lieu of sub-
poena; commissioner may have access to records of Board of Insurance Commissioners in
connection with application for registration of "person or company"); 29 (various acts made
crimes when committed by any "person"); 31 (nothing in Act to limit liability or prevent
prosecution of any "person or company"); 32 (injunctions authorized against any "person
or company" violating Act or engaged in securities fraud); 33 (civil liabilities stated of any
"person" making offers or sales in violation of Act or in fraudulent manner); 34 (no "per-
son or company" to bring action for commission unless licensed).
"'1TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29 (1964).
... By invoking subdivision 9 of the venue statute, the plaintiffs had to allege that a
crime or offense had been committed in Lubbock County by the sale of unregistered securi-
ties in violation of § 29 of the Securities Act. Since the dissenting opinion in the court of
civil appeals and the supreme court's decision indicate that venue could have been sustained
under either subdivisions 23 or 30, see note 147 supra, resort to subdivision 9 as well as a
ground to defeat the plea of privilege may well have been a tactical error in view of the ma-
jority opinion's preoccupation with § 29 and the general immunity of corporations from
criminal prosecutions in Texas.
"'See Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 60 (1968),
for an excellent treatment of the subject. Professor Hamilton concludes that although it
sometimes is flatly stated that corporations cannot be indicted or tried under Texas' criminal
laws, see 14 TEx. JUR. 2D Corporations § 448 (1960), the law on the matter is far from
certain; nevertheless, it is probable that a Texas corporation cannot be prosecuted for viola-
tion of a criminal statute unless it refers specifically to "corporations" or provides a procedure
for their prosecution. The cases generally cited in support of non-criminal liability are Overt
v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 202, 260 S.W. 856 (1924); Judge Lynch Int'l Book & Publishing
Co. v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 459, 208 S.W. 526 (1919); Guild v. State, 79 Tex. Crim. 603,
187 S.W. 215 (1916); Thompson v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 348 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Waco 1961), error ref. n.r.e., noted in 40 TEXAS L. REV. 1057 (1962); cf. McCollum
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not be indicted or tried for violations of the Securities Act' (of which the
legislature must have been aware when making later amendments to the Act),
it was clear to the majority that "person" in section 29 meant individuals and
no others. A contrary interpretation would invalidate section 29, surely some-
thing the legislature could not have intended. It followed, therefore, that by
using the same word in section 33 in creating a new statutory action just as
section 29 was enacted to create a new penal offense, the legislature must have
intended that both sections be applied alike to natural persons and not artificial
entities.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed in a well-reasoned opinion by Justice
McGee." The court found the parallelism to section 29 unpersuasive, noting
that in other provisions of the Act, especially section 22.A, where "person" is
also used exclusively,"' it was evident that "person" and "company" were used
interchangeably to encompass both individuals and corporations."' More im-
portantly, the high court observed that it is a matter of common knowledge
that most securities firms in Texas are corporations subject to civil remedies
only, and since the purpose of the legislature was to protect the investing
public,"9 a narrow interpretation that would permit corporations to sell un-
registered securities without fear of civil suits would clearly defeat the legis-
lative intent."' Even if penal provisions of section 29 were limited to individ-
uals, an issue the court does not reach,"' . this is no reason why section 33, a
remedial statute which should be given the widest possible scope, 6' should be
v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 241, 305 S.W.2d 612 (1957) (dictum indicating corporation can
be prosecuted for water pollution, but applicable statute specifically applies to corporations,
Act of May 8, 1943, ch. 285, £1943) Tex. Laws 418, repealed 1961, effective Nov. 1, 1962;
see, now, TEX. WATER CODE ANN, §§ 21.551-.553 (1971)). And see Hamilton, supra
note 13, at 93; Hildebrand, Corporate Liability for Torts and Crimes, 13 TEXAs L. REV.
253 (1935).
'TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. C-423 (1965), citing only Texas Jurisprudence for that
aspect of the opinion. See note 154 supra.
1"6472 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1971).
" 
7 As the court noted, § 22.A, the only section other than §§ 29 and 33 to use the word
"person" alone, makes it unlawful for any "person" to advertise securities contrary to the
provisions of § 22; however, subsection B permits advertising after registration by notifica-
tion or coordination under sections 7.B and 7.C if "such person, company, dealer, agent, or
salesman" has been registered under the Act, clearly indicating "person" is used in the Act
in an inclusive sense.
158 See note 151 supra.
1" "[TIhe Securities Act must be made current in order to prevent fraud on the Texas
public .... " Ch. 269, § 40, [1957] Tex. Laws 602 (emergency clause for the present Texas
Securities Act of 1957). And see Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 501, 143 S.W.2d 197,
199 (1940) ("Clearly the outstanding purpose of this Act is for the protection of the pub-
lic . .. from fraud and imposition by those engaged in selling worthless securities."); accord,
Fowler v. Hults, 138 Tex. 636, 161 S.W.2d 478 (1942); Culver v. Cockburn, 127 S.W.2d
328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940), error dismissed, judgment correct.
"'The court applied the general rule of construction found in TEx. REv. CIrv. STAT.
ANN. art. 10(6) (1969): "In all interpretations, the court shall look diligently for the in-
tention of the Legislature, keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil and the remedy."
Thus, in determining legislative intent, the purpose for which a statute is passed must be
looked for. Duval Corp. v. Sadler, 407 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1966); Calvert v. British-
American Oil Producing Co., 397 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. 1965); Board of Ins. Comm'rs v.
Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 150 Tex. 258, 239 S.W.2d 803 (1951); City of Mason v.
West Tex. Uril. Co., 150 Tex. 18, 237 S.W.2d 273 (1951). See generally 3 J. SUTHER-
LAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 41 (3d ed. 1943). But see note 164 infra.
'Because it is "a question not before us." 472 S.W.2d at 115.
162 Board of Ins. Comm'rs v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 150 Tex. 258, 239 S.W.2d
803 (1951); City of Mason v. West Tex. Util. Co., 150 Tex. 18, 237 S.W.2d 273 (1951);
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similarly limited.'" The court then flatly states: "We hold that section 33 of
The Texas Securities Act does apply to corporations as well as individuals."'6 4
Thus, in a single blast from the judicial barrel of the corrective shotgun the
anxieties engendered by Dempsey-Tegeler have been effectively resolved.
Amendment to Section 4.B. The legislative reaction to the lower court's deci-
sion in Dempsey-Tegeler"0 was an amendment to section 4.B, which previ-
ously defined only the word "company," adding "person" as a term to be de-
fined as follows:
Bruner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), discussed in text at notes
189-207 infra.
"aThe court in explaining the incongruities of language within the Act ascribed the
difficulties to the fact that the Act is derived from several sources, noting that § 33 in particu-
lar "was lifted almost verbatim" from § 12 of the Federal Securities Act of 1933, which de-
fines "person" to include corporations. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2), 771(2) (1971). In a sense this
is correct, although the lifting was a little more roundabout than that. Section 33 was one of
a series of amendments to the Act sponsored by the State Bar Committee on Securities and
Investment Banking in 1963, see Kerr, Proposed Amendments to Securities Act of Texas, 25
TEX. B.J. 1025, 1083 (1962); Meer, A New Look at the Texas Securities Act, 43 TEXAS
L. REv. 680, 682 (1965); and as originally drafted was substantially the same as § 410
of the Uniform Securities Act, although a number of changes were made during the process
of enactment which resulted in the present text. Committee Comment-1963 Amendment,
1B TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. 69 (1964). However, the Uniform Act provision was de-
rived in turn from § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1971); hence, the
court's deduction is essentially correct. See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410, Commissioner's
Note subsec. (a) (2); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 4940.01 (1967); 3 L. Loss, supra note 34,
at 1632; L. Loss & E. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 390 (1958). On the section 33 civil ac-
tions in general see Bordwine, Civil Remedies Under the Texas Securities Laws, 8 HOUSTON
L. REv. 657 (1971); Meer, supra, at 701.
164472 S.W.2d at 115. The court also repudiated an alternative basis for the holding of
the court of civil appeals, which had the effect of increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof
in a plea of privilege hearing. Following an earlier decision of its own in Southwestern
Transfer Co. v. Slay, 455 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970), the Beaumont
court held that the effect of the commissioner's certificate of nonregistration, which under
§ 30 of the Securities Act is prima facie evidence of noncompliance, see note 148 supra,
proved only the existence of a prima facie case, which under the Slay holding was insufficient
to defeat the defendant's prima facie right to a transfer under the plea of privilege. The
supreme court held, however, that all the commissioner's certificate shows is that the securities
have not been registered by qualification, notification, or coordination, and that on the record
the plaintiff had proved a cause of action that would have supported a judgment on the
merits. Since no greater burden is placed on the plaintiff in a venue action than in a trial
on the merits, the Slay prima facie rule was expressly disapproved.
... The impetus for the amendment came from the State Securities Board staff after the
Beaumont court's decision in Dempsey-Tegeler with the support of the Committee on Se-
curities and Investment Banking of the Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law
of the State Bar of Texas, which reviewed the proposed bill. That the change was generated
by Dempsey-Tegeler is made evident in the emergency clause of the Act:
The fact that a question has recently been raised in a decision by an Appellate
Court in this State as to the applicability of Section 33 of the Securities Act
to corporations and other entities other than natural persons; the resulting
necessity to confirm that the intent of the Legislature was, and is now, that
Section 33 and certain other sections of said Act should apply to corporations
and other entities as well as to natural persons; . . .create an emergency ....
Ch. 235, § 2, [1971] Tex. Laws 1086. Interestingly enough, although the supreme court
noted the passage of the amendment in its opinion, 472 S.W.2d at 114 n.2, it appeared to
have no bearing on its decision. Instead, general expressions of the purpose of the Securities
Act and general principles of statutory construction were relied upon in determining legisla-
tive intent. See notes 159, 160 supra. The specific declaration just quoted, which confirmed
that the intent of the legislature was and is that § 33 should apply to corporations, was com-
pletely ignored. Perhaps the court felt the need of arriving at its own conclusion as a means
of correcting an erroneous interpretation by a lower court. It may have also wanted to cor-
rect at the same time the lower court's alternative holding that proof of a prima facie case
is not sufficient to defeat a plea of privilege. See note 163 supra.
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The terms 'person' and 'company' shall include a corporation, person, joint
stock company, partnership, limited partnership, association, company, firm,
syndicate, trust, incorporated or unincorporated, heretofore or hereafter formed
under the laws of this or any other state, country, sovereignty or political sub-
division thereof, and shall include a government, or a political subdivision or
agency thereof. As used herein, the term 'trust' shall be deemed to include
a common law trust, but shall not include a trust created or appointed under
or by virtue of a last will and testament or by a court of law or equity. Under
the criminal penal provisions of Section 29 of this Act, the word 'person' shall
mean a natural person.'"
By affirming that corporations and other business entities are governed by
all of the provisions of the Securities Act (except section 29), the amendment,
of course, goes further than the supreme court's holding, which necessarily
was limited to section 33. In that sense the change is a helpful one that dispels
whatever ambiguities future strict constructionism might conjure up as to
whom the Act is applicable. Nevertheless, in the process of expanding the
former definition new uncertainties may have been caused and some policy
decisions appear to have been made that may well necessitate further judicial
construction or legislative action.
First, the inclusion of "a government or a political subdivision or agency
thereof" as a "person" or "company" infers these governmental entities may
not have been subject to the Act before. Yet logically as the issuers of securi-
ties that comprise one of the most common forms of investment in this coun-
try... they should be encompassed within a securities law, and generally are. " '
And although generally exempt from registration procedures, "" there is no
'16Ch. 235, § 1, [1971] Tex. Laws 1085, amending TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
581-4.B (Supp. 1972).
... In 1970 a total of $483 billion in public debt securities were outstanding in the hands
of the public, comprising $301 billion in debt of the federal government, $38 billion of
federal agencies, and $143 billion of state and local governmental units. U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971, Table No. 674, at
441 (92d ed. 1971). During 1970 the federal government issued $14.831 billion in new
debt securities, federal agencies $16.180, and state and local agencies, $17.762 billion, for
a total of $48.773 billion. See id. Table No. 693, at 448.
68 "Person" is defined in the Securities Act of 1933 to include "a government or po-
litical subdivision thereof." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1971). The term is similarly defined in
the UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 401(i).
... The Texas Securities Act exempts both the sale by the issuer of government securities
and the securities themselves. TEx. REV. CIw. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-5.M, -6.A (1964). The
more typical pattern is to exempt only the securities. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 5
3(a) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(2) (1971); UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 402(a) (1).
The federal act seemed to exempt all types of state and municipal bonds from registra-
tion, see H. SOWARDS, supra note 34, at 3-7; however, in 1968 the Securities Exchange
Commission took the position that industrial revenue bonds that are repayable out of funds
generated by private enterprise (usually lease payments for the premises built with the pro-
ceeds of the bonds) would be deemed separate securities within the meaning of § 2(1) of
the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1971), and would, therefore, require registration
after Dec. 31, 1968. SEC Rule 131, 17 C.F.R. § 230.131 (1971); see SEC Securities Act
Release Nos. 4896 (1968) (proposed), 4921 (1968) (adopted), 5055 (1970) (clarifica-
tion of rule with respect to publicly owned and operated airport facilities leased in part to
industrial or commercial enterprise); SEC Rule 3b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-5 (1971). The
SEC's action, as well as the severe limitation on tax-exempt status of such securities enacted
by Congress the same year, was undoubtedly engendered by the phenomenal growth in the
use and public sale of industrial revenue bonds from 1956, when only $1.5 million were
sold and a few states authorized their issuance, to the end of 1967, when over $1 billion
worth were sold and 43 states permitted their issue, with perhaps twice the amount publicly
sold during the interim having been privately placed. By 1968 it appeared that another $2
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reason why their sales should not be subject to antifraud remedies and pro-
cedures, especially when the many variegated forms of local governmental
units and districts which presently issue bonds for public sale are considered. 7°
billion would be sold, thereby seriously threatening the market for all tax-exempt municipal
bonds, already under attack as providing tax loopholes for the wealthy, since the prime bene-
ficiaries of sale of these development bonds were the industrial concerns using the facilities
built with their proceeds. Moreover, the situation became aggravated when individual bond
issues ranging up to $140 million began to appear, sometimes authorized by very small
municipalities; e.g., Wickliffe, Kentucky-$80 million issue; Middletown, Connecticut-
$82.5 million; Crossett, Arkansas-$75 million. See Hendricks, Reconsideration of Industrial
Development Bond Income Tax Exemption, 48 ORE. L. REV. 168, 171 (1969); McDaniel,
Federal Income Taxation of Industrial Bonds: The Public Interest, 1 URBAN LAWYER 157,
158 (1969); Battle Brews Over Tax-Exempts, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 28, 1968, at 66; Wall
Street J., Dec. 4, 1967, at 26, cols. 1-3 (Southwestern ed.).
The limitation on tax-exempt status was enacted as part of the Revenue and Expenditure
Control Act of 1968 and amended S 103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which ex-
cludes interest on the obligations of a state or any of its political subdivisions from gross
income by adding a new subsection (c), which first states the general rule that industrial
development bonds will no longer be regarded as tax-exempt state or municipal obligations
under 5 103(a) (1), but then carves out several exceptions. The amendment applies to all
issues after Oct. 24, 1968, or in the instance of certain previously authorized issues, after
Jan. 1, 1969. Exempted, however, and consequently still tax-exempt are certain specified
bond issues of $1 million or less, others of $5 million or less meeting somewhat stricter re-
quirements, and those regardless of size when the proceeds are to be used for residential
real property for family units, or for facilities for sports events, conventions or trade shows,
various types of transportation, public utility services or pollution abatement, or industrial
parks. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 103(c). The exemptions were slightly broadened in the
Revenue Act of 1971 by liberalizing one of the conditions on use of the $5 million exemp-
tion and expanding the exemption for financing facilities for furnishing water, if available
on reasonable demand to members of the public. Id. The Service has proposed new regula-
tions for the industrial development bond provisions, but to date they have not been adopted.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7 to -12, 36 Fed. Reg. 10953 (1971).
Although small issues and particular types of industrial revenue bonds thus continued to
have tax-free status after 1968, the SEC's position as reflected in rules 131 and 3b-10 re-
mained unchanged with registration still being required for any issues in excess of $300,000
sold publicly on an interstate basis. As a result virtually all new issues after 1968 were either
privately placed or sold via an intrastate offering to avoid the expenses of registration. Bell
& Hinkle, A Guide to Industrial Revenue Bond Financing, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 372, 386
(1970). Perhaps in response to this situation and the incongruity of having a government
security that would normally be exempt under both the tax and securities laws recognized by
one but not the other, in 1970 Congress amended 5 3(a) (2) of the Securities Act and
5 3 (a) (12) of the Securities Exchange Act to exempt from registration essentially the same
categories of industrial development bonds that retained tax-free status under 5 103(c) of
the Internal Revenue Code. See CONF. REP. 91-1037 To EMPLOYMENT SEcuRITY AMEND-
MENTS OF 1970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3646, 3648 (1970). The 1970 amendments have a strange legislative history. They appar-
ently were added as a rider by the conference committee to the Employment Security Amend-
ments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 401, 84 Star. 695 (1970), were deleted (presumably
by inadvertence) by unrelated amendments to the same sections of the 1933 and 1934 acts
in the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 27(b),
28(a), 84 Stat. 1413 (1970), and were restored by a rider to the Investor Protection Law
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 6, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970). The amendments are explained
and the SEC's current position on industrial revenue bonds is set out in SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5103 (1970). As to industrial revenue bonds, see generally Abbey, Municipal
Industrial Development Bonds, 19 VAND. L. REV. 25 (1965); Hendricks, supra, at 168;
McDaniel, supra, at 157; Mumford, The Past, Present and Future of Industrial Development
Bonds, 1 URBAN LAWYER 147 (1969); Note, The Proliferation of Industrial Revenue Bond
Financing: Ban the Bond?, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 289 (1968). Securities law aspects are discussed,
in addition to the sources just cited, in 1 L. Loss, supra note 34, at 563 (Supp. 1969); H.
SOWARDS, supra note 34, at 3-8; Bell & Hinkle, supra, at 385. The articles previously cited
all discuss the tax aspects of these bonds; in addition see 1 MERTENS, § 8.21a, 8.21b; Fox,
Industrial Development Bonds, BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO No. 216 (1969).
.70 Just cursory examination of Moody's Municipal and Government Manual shows that
in Texas alone, in addition to bonds issued by the State of Texas and various state agencies
such as river and turnpike authorities and state educational institutions, debt securities are
also issued by counties, cities, and a variety of junior college, independent school, water
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Yet on this score the Texas Act lacks consistency, assuming the expanded
definition was intended to have the effect it apparently has.
For example, since these governmental entities are to be regarded as per-
sons or companies under the Act, does this not mean they become subject to
the injunctive relief which may be sought by the attorney general under sec-
tion 32 to prevent fraud by "any person or company" in the sale of securi-
ties?1. 1 Similarly, cannot an aggrieved purchaser maintain a civil action against
them based on the civil liability imposed by section 33.A(2) on "any per-
son" who sells securities by fraudulent means?.. In each instance the remedy
applies whether the securities or the transactions in which they are sold are
exempt under sections 5 and 6 or not.'" Moreover, consider some of the in-
teresting procedural problems that may be encountered in trying to enjoin
or sue, for example, an agency of the federal government or of another state,
which are not at all resolved by the new definition.
On the other hand, the much more effective remedy of a cease-and-desist
order by the commissioner preventing advertising or sales of securities that
would work a fraud or not be fair, just, or equitable to purchasers continues
to be hamstrung by the specific exclusion of the sale of governmental securities
from its application. 74 And while admittedly this administrative remedy might
face the same, if not greater, procedural difficulties entailed in proceedings
under sections 32 and 33.A(2) against particular governments or agencies,
at least the commissioner would have power to prevent dealers, agents, or
salesmen from selling any of these securities by false advertising or other fraud-
ulent means.'
Secondly, in a carryover from the old definition, "trust" is defined not to
include a testamentary trust, but presumably covers a private inter vivos trust,
even though the objectives of the two types of trusts may be essentially the
same, unless the latter is excluded by the words referring to a trust created by
a court of law or equity." The wisdom of the exclusion is questionable. Many
testamentary trusts own substantial stockholdings or are created to permit
trustees to control incorporated businesses.'" To the extent a trust estate en-
control, water supply, water improvement, county road, navigation, hospital, levee improve-
ment, flood control, drainage, conservation and reclamation, and municipal utility districts.
MOODY'S MUNICIPAL & GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1971, at 2713.
'
71 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-32 (1964).
... Id. art. 581-33.A(2).
.. Id. art. 581-32 (authorizes injunction whenever any security is being fraudulently
issued, sold, promoted, negotiated, advertised, or distributed, "including any security em-
braced in the subsections of Section 6, and including any transaction exempted under the
provisions of Section 5"); art. 581-33.A(2) (civil remedy against any person fraudulently
offering or selling a security "whether or not the security or transaction is exempt under
Section 5 or 6 of this Act").
14 The commissioner may issue a cease-and-desist order under the circumstances indicated
as to the sale or proposed sale of any security whether exempt or not "except the sale of
securities as defined in subsection A of Section 6." Id. art. 581-23.A. Although regulation
of advertising does not apply to exempt securities or transactions, an exception is made when
the advertising violates the provisions of section 23. Id. art. 581-22.E.
1"Id. art. 581-23.B. For examples of possible fraud by dealers in sales of municipal
bonds see articles in Wall Street J., Aug. 13, 1971, at 16, col. 3; Dec. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 1
(Southwestern ed.).
"I Cf. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 238 (1956) (operation of farm, ranch, or other busi-
ness by personal representative); Connally v. W.H. Lyons & Co., 82 Tex. 664, 18 S.W. 799
(1891); Texas Candy & Nut Co. v. Horton, 235 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
19721
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gages in a distribution of its holdings or participates in securities financing for
controlled businesses, why should it not be governed by the same law applied
to individuals or business entities? Conversely, if the intent is to exclude priv-
ate trusts altogether, but not business trusts, why not use the language of the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Uniform Securities Act, which limit trusts to
those in which the interests of the beneficiaries are evidenced by a security? "
Thirdly, the limitation of "person" in the penal provisions of section 29 to
an individual seems particularly unwise. While this may be the result anyway
under the present state of the law' (although it should be noted the supreme
court refused to commit itself on this point in Dempsey-Tegeler), there remain
the possibilities that the proposed new Texas Penal Code revision,' which
recognizes corporate criminal liability, 8' may be enacted in the near future,
or that the judge-made doctrine, which gives Texas the dubious honor of being
the only state which does not hold corporations criminally responsible, 8'
may be overruled. Why freeze an anachronistic concept into the statutory
law, especially in a statute wherein the crimes defined are so frequently com-
mitted through use of a corporate vehicle?
In sum, the amendment, although needed to correct an unnecessarily cre-
ated loophole in the securities law, has some problems of its own.8 ' In that
sense it is typical of the frequently uncoordinated patchwork that has been
done through the years on a statute which Justice McGee aptly described as
"one something less than a model of lucidity in legislative drafting."'8  The
1950), error ref. n.r.e.; J.P. Webster & Sons v. Utopia Confectionary, 254 S.W. 123 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1923). See generally 5 G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES
§§ 571-79 (2d ed. 1960); 3 A. ScoTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 230.4 (3d ed. 1967); Keenan,
Business Interests in Trust, 108 TRUSTS & ESTATES 162 (1969); Krasnowiecki, Existing
Rules of Trust Administration: A Stranglehold on the Trustee-Controlled Business Enter-
prise (pts. 1 & 2), 110 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 816 (1962); Ward, The Texas Trust Act:
Discretionary Power of a Trustee, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 356, 361 (1962); Comment, Opera-
tion of Business by Trustees, 1967 DUKE L.J. 321.
177 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2); UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 401(i).
178 See note 154 supra.
1'7 H.B. 419, S.B. 250, 62d Tex. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971); STATE BAR OF TEXAS COM-
MITTEE ON REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE, TEXAS PENAL CODE: A PROPOSED REVISION
(Final Draft Oct. 1970); see Keeton & Searcy, A New Penal Code for Texas, 33 TEX.
B.J. 980 (1970).
8'Proposed Texas Penal Code § 7.22, note 179 supra; see Bromberg, Business Aspects
of the Revised Penal Code, 9 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSI-
NESS LAW, May 1971, at 1; Keeton & Searcy, supra note 179, at 985.181 Hamilton, supra note 154.
582 A minor point, perhaps, but there is something circular about a definition that defines
a "person" to include a "person" as the present definition in § 4.B does. Although it cannot
be done without a major overhaul of the Act in view of the varying terms used, see note
151 supra, it would be desirable to use the one word "person" to describe all the possible
categories of individuals and entities the Act should govern. This essentially is the pattern of
the federal legislation and the Uniform Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1968); UNI-
FORM SECURITIES ACT § 401(i). Professor Alan Bromberg suggested the following draft in
a letter to Howard Wolf, March 10, 1971, circulated to members of the State Bar Committee
on Securities and Investment Banking:
(1) The term "person" shall include an individual [a natural person] and
a company.
(2) The term "company" shall include any of the following, whether in-
corporated or unincorporated, whether formed heretofore or hereafter, and
whether formed under the laws of this or any other state, country, sovereignty
or political subdivision thereof: corporation, person, joint stock company,
partnership, limited partnership, association, firm, syndicate or trust (or gov-
ernment or political subdivision or agency thereof).
183472 S.W.2d at 114.
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Texas Securities Act badly needs restructuring, and its terminology cries out
for the kind of harmonization that no number of piecemeal, ad hoc amend-
ments can ever provide. But with the proposed Texas Uniform Securities Act
apparently suspended in the deepest limbo for the foreseeable future,'84 it can
safely be predicted that more Dempsey-Tegelers will come along to add an-
other gray hair or two to the collective head of the Texas securities bar.
B. Other Cases
What Is a Security? The perennial quest of some people to separate others
from their money by inducing them to invest in various business plans or
arrangements glowingly described as sure ways to make money frequently
winds up from the investor's standpoint with not only no money being made,
but the original investment completely lost. In most instances the losers leave
well enough alone-poorer but hopefully wiser about get-rich schemes.
Occasionally, however, hard losers attempt to get their money back through
civil litigation or complaints to law enforcement officials and agencies. In
the absence of specific legislation regulating sales of own-your-own-business
schemes promoted under various franchise, distributorship, or marketing plans,
the only regulatory statutes that seem to offer some judicial redress are the
various securities laws, state and federal. But whenever litigation or prosecu-
tions attacking these plans or schemes are brought under the securities laws,
a threshold question always recurs: Does the transaction involve the sale of
a "security"?
As noted in last year's Survey,"n the Austin court of civil appeals in Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc. v. King. struggled with the issue of whether a cosmetic
manufacturer's sale of distributorships entailed the sale of an investment con-
tract and thus a security as that term is defined in the Texas Securities Act."'
The court finally decided that under the solely-by-the-efforts-of-others test of
"The proposed Texas Uniform Securities Act was drafted by the Committee on Se-
curities and Investment Banking, Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the
State Bar of Texas, and was approved by the Council of the Section and the Board of Direc-
tors of the State Bar as part of the bar's legislative program for the 1969 session of the legis-
lature. See Bromberg, Proposed Texas Uniform Securities Act, 31 TEx. B.J. 1030 (1968)
for a statement of the need and a brief summary of the proposal. The act was introduced as
S.B. 457 and H.B. 838, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (1969), but was opposed by the State Securities
Board and the Administrator of the S.E.C.'s Fort Worth Regional Office for Region 5, and
failed to gain the support of the Texas Investment Bankers' Association. Not surprisingly,
the proposed act failed to pass. Minutes, Meeting of Committee on Securities & Investment
Banking, Jan. 31, 1970.
The Committee's defeat was not total, however, because during the session the State Se-
curities Board revised its famous (or infamous, depending on one's point of view) five-
fourths rule, in reality a Board interpretation of § 7.C(2) and 10.A of the Texas Securities
Act limiting the public offering price of new securities to no more than five-fourths of the
amount paid by promoters and insiders, by permitting a more flexible pricing policy reflect-
ing market conditions for new securities offerings. For critical discussions of the old five-
fourths rule see Bromberg, supra; Meer, supra note 163, at 688. One of the prime reasons
for the proposed Act was to remove the statutory basis for the rule. The new interpretation
and pricing policy are found in the recently compiled Board policies and interpretations
available for the asking from the Board, see note 216 infra, and are discussed in Hamilton,
supra note 13, at 99. In 1970 the Board, with the assistance and advice of the State Bar
Committee, adopted additional interpretations and policies which have helped ameliorate
some of the objections to the present act. These are discussed infra notes 214-71.18 Hamilton & Shields, supra note 14, at 91.
1 8452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
1"TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4.A (1964).
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SEC v. W.J. Howey Co,,' no "security" had been sold. In this past year came
the turn of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to deal with the problem.
In Bruner v. State' 9 the transaction in question involved a marketing plan by
a soap product distributor under which a participant, pursuant to a contract
making him an area director, division manager, district supervisor, or local
dealer (depending on the amount of money he paid), would purchase a
certain amount of soap to be sold at dinner parties given by the company to
persons he invited. Any resulting profit would be shared by the participant
with the company as well as profits engendered from sales made by his in-
vitees or their subsequent dinner guests if they should later purchase partici-
pations in the marketing plan. Bruner was charged with having solicited one
Owens to participate in the plan by a $1,350 payment to the company, thereby
selling Owens an unregistered investment contract and without being a regis-
tered dealer. Resolving the conflicting testimony as to what Owens had been
told against Bruner,'° the jury found him guilty of selling an unregistered
security. The court of criminal appeals reversed on the ground that the agree-
ment in question did not involve the sale of a "security."
The court's opinion, written by Judge Onion, is a scholarly treatment of
the subject that deserves attention. The court first notes that the phrase "in-
vestment contract," found in the Texas Securities Act's definition of a security,
has no precise meaning; consequently, some test must be employed to deter-
mine whether a particular scheme is an investment contract. The test most
commonly used,' both in federal and state decisions,"2 including several in-
1'8328 U.S. 293 (1946).
189 463 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
1"0 Owens testified that he was assured he would not have to sell the soap door-to-door,
but that it could be disposed of through persons he brought to dinner. Two months after
paying his money, he received a warehouse receipt for some soap, although he claimed he
had purchased no merchandise. When he finally tried to get his money back, he first was
given a run-around and on a second visit discovered the company's office was closed and
the phone disconnected. Bruner testified that he had not told Owens he would participate
in the profits of any guests who later invested in the plan. He stated that he had been hired
as a salesman by the company to sell the soap to participants at wholesale in quantities no
less than $300 worth per sale. The participants were then to sell the soap at retail to in-
dividuals or could dispose of it through guests invited to the company dinners. Whatever
profit was made would depend entirely on the amount of soap sold.
191 The Howey case, whose test is referred to here, has more than lived up to the predic-
tion by Professor Loss that it was destined to become the most cited case on the meaning of
an "investment contract" under federal and state securities laws. L. Loss, supra note 34, at
483. Virtually every case and commentary in point decided or written since its formulation
cites or discusses the Howey test, usually at some length. The Bruner case discussed herein
is a good example. See also authorities cited in notes 192-208 infra.
92 The court cites Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (withdrawable capital
share of savings and loan association); Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d
635 (9th Cir. 1969) (distributorship); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange v.
SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961) (secondary deeds
of trust); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S.
925 (1954) (citrus groves); Brewer v. SEC, 145 F.2d 233 (9th Cit. 1944) (whiskey sales
contracts); Darwin v. Jess Hickey Oil Corp., 153 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Tex. 1957) (oil
lease); Gallion v. Alabama Market Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968)
(marketing plan); Georgia Market Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620
(1969) (marketing plan); Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 94 Ohio L. Abs. 357, 199 N.E.2d
120 (App. Ct. 1964) (marketing plan, soft water conditioners); Commonwealth ex rel.
Pa. Secs. Comm. v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428
(1964) (advertising commission agreement). See also Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422
F.2d 1124 (4th Cit. 1970), on remand, 326 F. Supp. 250 (D. Md. 1971) (oil production
payments); Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
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volving distributorships or similar merchandising plans," ' is that enunciated
in Howey; i.e., "whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."'"
But while Howey presents a workable formula,"' it is not an ultimate determi-
nant, as the Koscot holding seems to indicate.'" It is a starting point, rather,
in determining whether a contract, plan, or scheme is an investment contract
under the Texas Securities Act and reflects a principle that is flexible rather
than static in nature. " The agreement alone or the terms used by the parties
to characterize their relationship are not decisive;" instead, all the circum-
stances must be considered to determine the true nature of the transaction.
Put another way, it is the substance of the transaction, i.e., the terms of the
offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the
391 U.S. 905 (1967) (beavers); United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 999 (1965) (inactive distributorship); Roe v. United States, 287
F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961) (oil and gas leases); Mr. Steak,
Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970) (franchise); Lennerth v.
Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (franchise).
'See note 191 supra, passim. See also cases cited in note 201 infra.
"' 328 U.S. at 298.
'"'The Howey test has two basic elements: (1) a common enterprise; (2) profits are
to result solely from the efforts of others. Sometimes another element is added, i.e., (3) in-
vestment of money, this being derived from a somewhat fuller statement by Mr. Justice
Murphy in Howey defining an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act as "a
contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being
immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by
nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise." 328 U.S. at 298, 299.
See Long, An Attempt To Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities
Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 142 (1971). Three years earlier the Court passed up
an opportunity to define the term in a similar case, SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344 (1943), although holding that the sale of assignments in oil and gas leases with
the promoter promising to drill test wells came under the investment contract concept in the
Securities Act of 1933.
The background and historical development of the Howey test are discussed in some de-
tail in Coleman, A Franchise Agreement: Not a "Security" under the Securities Act of 1933,
22 BUs. LAW. 493, 498 (1967); Long, supra, at 146. As might be expected, considerable
gloss on the Howey formula has been added by subsequent decisions and the extensive
commentary on the securities law aspects of the investment contract, especially in regard to
franchising. See discussion in text and authorities cited in notes 197-204 in!ra. Because some
courts tend to apply Howey literally, the formulation has been criticized as being economically
unrealistic in not focusing on the risk of loss of the initial investment in an enterprise with
which the investor is not familiar and over which he has no real control, and for overlooking
investments made in the form of services, as in the marketing plan involved in the instant
Bruner decision. For thoughtful criticisms of Howey and suggested alternative formulae see
Coffey, The Economic Realities of "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula, 18 W.
RES. L. REV. 367 (1967); Long, supra, at 159. See also Note, Regulation of the Franchise
as a Security, 19 J. PUB. L. 105, 124 (1970). Professor Coffey's test was adopted in State
ex rel. Comm'r of Secs. v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971), in
preference to Howey, which was faulted for its weakness in leading courts to analyze invest-
ment projects mechanically and become entrapped in polemics over the meaning of "solely"
from the efforts of others. 485 P.2d at 108.
11' "It is our opinion that the marketing plans of Koscot do not fall within the meaning
of 'Security' prescribed by Art. 581-4.A, for the reason that the investors in such plans do not
depend solely upon the efforts of others for income and profit." Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.
v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531, 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
"' The Court so states in Howey, describing the definition as one "that is capable of
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of
the money of others on the promise of profits." 328 U.S. at 299. Accord, Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967).
'SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352 (1943); Chapman v. Rudd
Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969); SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647, 650
(D.D.C. 1941).
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prospect, and not the form of the arrangement that counts.' " Hence, while
under a strict interpretation of the Howey test any participation by the in-
vestor negates the existence of an investment contract, mere token participa-
tion on his part should not prevent a finding that a security has been sold."'0
Nevertheless, in the instant case it was clear from the agreement and the
facts that Owens was not just a passive investor; whatever profits he made
had to come from his actual and continued participation. The arrangement,
thus, was not an investment contract, and no security was sold.
While the decision in Bruner accords with the probable weight of author-
ity,"' the willingness of some courts, ' administrators,' and commentators"'
109 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943); see Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1127 (4th Cir. 1970); Continental Marketing Corp. v.
SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 805 (1967).2° The court states that it fully agrees with the position taken by the Georgia Supreme
Court in Georgia Market Centers, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620, 623 (1969),
that the Howey definition should not be adhered to "with such strictness that a mere token
participation in an enterprise by the person investing capital would prevent the contract from
being classed as a security." 463 S.W.2d at 213. The issue turns on whether the phrase
"solely from the efforts" of others is to be taken literally. As previously indicated, some
courts do. See note 192 supra. See also, e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324
F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970); Goldsmith v. American Food Services, Inc., 123 Ga. App.
353, 181 S.E.2d 95 (1971); Gallion v. Alabama Market Centers, 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d
841 (1968). As an attorney for the Texas Securities Board is reported to have said, all that
would be needed to defeat the Howey rest if applied literally would have been for the pro-
moter to have required the investor to pick a single orange, thereby participating, even if
in a miniscule way, in creating the fund from which he would have received his investment.
Long, supra note 195, at 145. See Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 347 U.S. 925 (1953), applying the Howey test, but still finding a securities transac-
tion in the sale of citrus groves, even though the contract gave the investor the right to direct
the marketing of his crop by the management company.
"'See, e.g., Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969);
Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970); Gallion v.
Alabama Market Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968); Georgia Market Cen-
ters, Inc. v. Fortson, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.2d 620 (1969); Goldsmith v. American Food
Services, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 353, 181 S.E.2d 95 (1971); Emery v. So-Soft of Ohio, Inc., 94
Ohio L. Abs. 357, 199 N.E.2d 120 (App. Ct. 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Pa. Secs.
Comm. v. Consumers Research Consultants, Inc., 414 Pa. 253, 199 A.2d 428 (1964).
2See, e.g., Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 905 (1967) (beavers); United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 999 (1964) (inactive distributorship); Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 246 So. 2d 631 (Fla. App. 1971) (marketing plan); Florida Discount Centers, Inc.
v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693 (Fla. App. 1969), a/I'd and opinion adopted, 232 So. 2d 17
(Fla. 1970) (marketing plan); State ex rel. Comm'r of Secs. v. Hawaii Market Center,
Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971) (founder-member agreement); State ex rel. Healy v.
Consumer Business Systems, Inc., 482 P.2d 549 (Ore. 1971) (advertising franchise);
D.M.C. of Colorado, Inc. v. Hays, [1961-1971 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP.
70,897 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver, 1971) (marketing plan); People v. Dutch Inns, Inc., No.
41199 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, 1969), and People v. Buffalo Franchise Corp., No.
40939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, 1969) (consent orders by New York attorney general
in franchise cases) [cited in G. GLICKMAN, FRANCHISING § 8.02[21 n.29 (1971); Good-
win, Regulation of Franchising in Non-Antitrust Fields, Particularly in Application of Se-
curities Laws, in PLI, FRANCHISING-TODAY'S LEGAL AND BUSINESS PROBLEMS 293, 305
(L. Ratner ed. 1970)]; John Rich Enterprises, SEC Lit. Rel. 4485 (San Francisco Regional
Office, Nov. 25, 1969) (franchise) [cited in C. ROSENFIELD, THE LAW OF FRANCHISING
286 (1970)]; cf. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13
Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
103See 49 CAL. ATT'Y GEN. OPS. 124 (1967) (franchise); In re Discount Mart Corp.,
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 71,003 (Okla. Secs. Dept. 1970) (founder-member contract); Letter
from Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, to Ben W. Fortson, Jr., Corporation
Commissioner of Georgia, Nov. 14, 1969 [cited in Note, supra note 195, at 121 n.102].
The California Attorney General's opinion posited three hypothetical situations: (1) when
the franchisee participates only nominally in the franchised business; (2) when the fran-
chisee participates actively; and (3) when the franchisee participates actively, but the fran-
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to expand the concept of an investment contract within the framework of
the securities laws indicates a growing concern that a lacuna exists that must
be filled. So long as the courts adhere to the general dimensions of the Howey
formulation, it should not be too difficult for promoters of various franchises
and distributorship plans to tailor their agreements and procedures to avoid
securities regulation. Yet experience shows that often the same sort of people
who were sold the very blue sky itself which led to securities legislation being
passed to protect them are likely to be the ones who succumb to the allure-
ments of unlimited riches through pyramiding distributorship and marketing
plans, which, as the Bruner case illustrates, are difficult to fit into the securities
regulation scheme."° The answer is not a strained construction of the defini-
tion of a security," 6 but legislation regulating all arrangements whereby in-
experienced and uninformed investors are induced to pay for participation in
the distribution of products or services as part of general marketing opera-
tions over which they have little or no control and yet are largely financed by
their own investments.207
chisor needs to secure a substantial portion of his own initial capital from fees from fran-
chisees to provide the goods and services promised. A sale of a security was deemed involved
in situations (1) and (3), but not (2). In situation (3) the franchisee's furnishing of the
franchisor's risk capital was considered a separate business venture from the one in which
he participated. This "risk-capital" test was used by the Oregon Supreme Court to hold that
if a substantial portion of the initial capital that a franchisor uses to commence its operations
is being provided by franchisees, then a security is being sold. "We believe that the 'risk
capital' test is a sound tool to use in analyzing franchising agreements in order to determine
whether or not they need to be registered so as to apprise the investing public of the risks
involved in an enterprise." State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business System, Inc., 482 P.2d
549, 556 (Ore. 1971). The California opinion is further discussed in Augustine & Hrusoff,
Franchising under the Securities Act of 1933 and the California Corporation Code, 44 Los
ANGELES B. BULL. 555 (1969); Comment, Franchise Regulation under the California Se-
curities Law, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 140 (1968).
" For authorities supporting the view that franchising and similar marketing plans can
be subsumed under the securities laws see H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP FOR THE TRUST-
ING 70-76 (1969); Goodwin, supra note 202, at 293; Coffey, supra note 195; Goodwin,
Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise Agreement as a Security Under Securities Acts,
Including lOb-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. LAW. 1311 (1969); Long, supra note 195; Note,
supra note 195; Comment, Franchise Agreement: A Security for Purposes of Regulation,
1970 U. ILL. L. FORUM 130. The only commentator arguing strongly to the contrary is Cole-
man, supra note 195. See generally G. GLICKMAN, supra note 202, at § 14.071l); C.
ROSENFIELD, supra note 202, at 283-88; Knauss, Securities Problems in Franchising, in IN-
STITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE FRANCHISING PHENOMENON 129
(1969); Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1347, 1353(1970); Flynn, The Regulation of Franchise Sales, J. KANS. B. ASS'N 121 (1971); Green,
Regulation of Franchising Under the Securities Laws, 6 GA. STATE B.J. 357 (1970); Com-
ment, Franchise Sales: Are They Sales of Securities?, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 383 (1970);
Comment, Franchise as a Security: Application of the Securities Law to Owner-Operated
Franchises, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 228 (1970); Note, Investment Contracts Under
Federal and State Law, 17 W. RES. L. REv. 1108 (1966).
Oa "The language used by franchise companies often bears a startling similarity to the
jargon of the securities field. It is not uncommon to read of investments, absentee ownership,
yield and promises of security. The life blood of the franchisor is the continuing income
generated by the investments and royalty payments of the franchisees." C. ROSENFIELD,
supra note 202, at 283.
2' As the court in Bruner observed, quoting the same observation made in Koscot Inter-
planetary, Inc. v. King, "not all 'get rich schemes' are a 'security' . . . . If fraud be involved,
redress must be found elsewhere than in the penal provisions of the Securities Act." 463
S.W.2d at 215.
21ISee, e.g., the California Franchise Investment Law, enacted in 1970. CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 10177 (West 1971); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25019, 25212, 31000-31516
(West 1971). The California legislation, which is quite comprehensive, is discussed in G.
GLICKMAN, supra note 202, S 8.031l); Augustine & Hrusoff, California Franchise Invest-
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"Sale to Registered Dealer" Exemption. The relationship between two of the
transaction exemptions in the Texas Securities Act provided the basis for a
decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.08 In
the diversity action the plaintiff sued a Colorado bank and its president to
recover a commission for the sale of stock in a Texas corporation made by
the bank as trustee of an inter vivos trust. The plaintiff had been promised a
commission of $1 per share to find a buyer for the stock, and ultimately
through his efforts the stock was sold through one Texas broker-dealer to
another securities dealer firm. To the defendants' assertion that because the
plaintiff was not a licensed securities dealer, his claim for commissions was
barred under the Texas Securities Act,' " the plaintiff claimed, and was upheld
by the trial court and the Tenth Circuit, that the transactions were exempt
under section 5.H, which exempts sales made to, among others (mostly insti-
tutional investors), "any registered dealer actually engaged in buying and
selling securities. '
The defendants argued, however, that under section 5.C, permitting iso-
lated sales by individual investors not engaged in the securities business, the
ment Law, 46 J. STATE B. CALIF. 50 (1971); Damon, Franchise Investment Law, 2 PAC.
L.J. 27 (1971); and is noted briefly in 9 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANK-
ING & BUSINESS LAW, Jan. 1971, at 6. The text of the law and the implementing administra-
tive rules may be found in PLI, FRANCHISE LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION 283 (R. Need.
ham ed. 1971). See also The Franchise Investment Law, California Commissioner of Cor-
porations Release No. 20-C (Oct. 21, 1970); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 8670 (1972).
Legislation in other states has been more limited. Delaware passed a franchise termina-
tion law prohibiting unfair termination of franchises, ch. 693, [1970) Del. Laws, amending
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, ch. 25 (codified at §§ 2551-57); Florida has enacted a fairly short
statute regulating franchising and distributorships, ch. 71-61, [1971) Fla. Laws 187; and
Massachusetts has a new law regulating muliti-level distributing companies (marketing
plans), ch. 1025, [1971) Mass. Laws 640 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, S
69). An effort was made at the 1971 regular session of the Texas Legislature to make fran-
chising a form of business association to permit the rules of mutual agency and fiduciary re-
sponsibility applicable to all business associations to govern franchising, but the measure
died in conference committee. See Hytken & Pelletier, Doing Business in Texas: A Legal
Briefing for the Incoming Franchisor, 35 TEx. B.J. 23, 32 (1972); Proposed Legislation:
Franchising, 9 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSINESS LAW,
May 1971, at 12. During 1969-1970 two bills were introduced in Congress by Senators Hart
and Williams to regulate franchising, but neither passed. See G. GLICKMAN, supra note 202,
§ 8.04. The Hart bill, to have been known as the Federal Fairness in Franchising Act, is set
out in C. ROSENFIELD, supra note 202, at 313.
" Gerchsheimer v. American Heritage Bank & Trust Co., 437 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir.
1971).
1"0TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-34 (1964). Exempt transactions and sales of
exempt securities are expressly excluded from the bar.
Si8Defendants argued that it had not been shown that the purchasers of the securities
were registered dealers "actually engaged in buying and selling securities" so as to exempt
the transaction under § 5.H; however, the court found the proof sufficient. The quoted lan-
guage has been interpreted to mean that to claim the exemption it must be shown that se-
curities transactions are the main course of business of the registered transferee. Develop-
ment Inv. Corp. v. Diversa, Inc., 393 S.W.2d 653, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1965).
But see § 4.C, which defines a "dealer" to include a person who engages in any transaction
involving the disposition of a security or securities on a full or part-time basis. See also
cases holding that the definition must be interpreted broadly and will cover one engaging
even in a single or isolated transaction. Breeding v. Anderson, 152 Tex. 92, 254 S.W.2d
377, 380 (1953); Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Flournoy
v. Gallagher, 189 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1945); Cosner v. Hancock,
149 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941), error dismissed. When the sale has
been made to a registered dealer and no question is raised that he was not engaged in the
buying and selling of securities, the § 5.H exemption obviously applies. Dunnam v. Dilling-
ham, 345 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961) (sale of options for oil and
gas leases to registered dealer).
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proviso therein that "in no event shall such sales or offerings be exempt
from the provisions of this Act when made or intended by the vendor or
his agent, for the benefit, either directly or indirectly, of any company or
corporation except the individual vendor," '' barred the application of any
exemption, including 5.H, under the Act since the bank was selling the stock
for the benefit of the beneficiaries, who, though individuals, would come
under the Act's definition of "company."'' . Disagreeing, the Tenth Circuit held
that the proviso is limited to the isolated-sales exemption and, therefore, can-
not be applied wholesale to preclude reliance on the other exemptions in sec-
tion 5. The interpretation is sound, for it seems evident the proviso was in-
tended to apply to situations in which a controlling shareholder purports to
sell some of his personal holdings, but in reality intends to use the proceeds
for the issuer."' Otherwise, under the defendants' rejected interpretation every
sale of stock by a fiduciary for the benefit of others would have to be
registered.
C. Administrative Developments
Board Interpretations and Policies. One of the significant administrative
deficiencies of the Texas Securities Act is that it fails to give general rule-
making power to the State Securities Board." Nevertheless, the Board has
been able to make its views known on some matters through the periodic
issuance of Board policies and interpretations."' Recently, the current policies
and interpretations still being followed were assembled and indexed by Act
section numbers, and presently are available for distribution on request."'
Certainly any attorney who does not subscribe to a blue sky law service ought
to obtain a copy not only to gain a perspective on the Board's point of view,
but also for guidance on the meaning of a number of provisions of the Securi-
ties Act that have never been judicially construed.
New Interpretations. In September 1970, several new interpretations of the
Act were adopted by the Board,"' and since they have not been noted in earlier
Surveys, a brief summary of their content is given here.
211 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5.C (1964).
212 Id. art. 581-4.B.
... See Gilchrist & Hanna, Secondary Distribution of Corporate Securities, 13 Sw. L.J.
1, 41 (1959).
"'
4See Meer, supra note 163, at 705; 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,601 (1971). The pro-
posed Texas Uniform Securities Act, § 412.A, would have given the State Securities Board
general rule-making power. See Bromberg, Report on Texas Uniform Securities Act, 7 BULL.
OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSINEss LAW, Apr. 1969, at 6.
21' In 1960 the Texas Attorney General ruled the Board could issue an administrative
interpretation of certain phrases in § 10.A of the Act. TEx. Arr' GEN. OP. No. WW-951
(1960). However, the Board had issued administrative interpretations of the Act prior to
that date, see, e.g., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,631-34 (1971), and has continued the prac-
tice since. The Board also issues statements of policy from time to time; presumably these
are intended to reflect factors that will influence the Board or the Securities Commissioner
in making a specific administrative decision in areas in which because of the range of dis-
cretionary action that can be taken adherence to a definitive interpretation is thought too
constricting on the administrator.
216 Requests should be addressed to the State Securities Board, Post Office Box 13167,
Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711. The Board's interpretations and policies may also be
found in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 55 46,631-52, 46,662-67 (1971).
"'
7 The new interpretations are largely the product of a joint study made by the Securities
Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, and members of the staff of the State Securities
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(1) Excluded Options. Restricted stock options, qualified stock options, or
options granted under an employee stock-purchase plan meeting the require-
ments of sections 421-25 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541' will not
be regarded as "securities" as defined in section 4.A of the Act,"19 nor will the
Board, and the Committee on Securities and Investment Banking of the Section on Corpora-
tion, Banking and Business Law of the State Bar of Texas, and more particularly by a sub-
committee of the Bar group on administrative interpretations of the Act. In the course of
the study existing interpretations and policies were reviewed and special consideration was
given problem areas encountered in the Act's administration or in practice under it that
might be resolved or clarified through additional interpretations or policy statements. Both
the staff and the subcommittee (which soon became almost a committee of the whole) pre-
pared proposed new regulations, and these were reviewed at a meeting in Austin on Aug. 12,
1970, between the Securities Commissioner and members of his staff and the full Bar com-
mittee. The new interpretations and policies were adopted by the Securities Board on Sep-
tember 18, 1970, substantially in the form agreed upon and recommended as a result of the
joint meeting. The Bar committee's proposals are summarized in Report of Committee on
Securities and Investment Banking on Administrative Interpretations of the Texas Securities
Act, 9 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSINESS LAW, Sept. 1970,
at 2 [hereinafter cited as Securities Committee Report on Administrative Interpretations).
2
'8 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 421-25.
219 Despite the interpretation, it is arguable that the stock options specified are covered
in S 4.A by such phrases as "subscription or reorganization certificate" (emphasis added) or
the catch-all "any other instrument commonly known as a security, whether similar to those
herein referred to or not." Admittedly, § 4.A does not explicitly mention a "warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing (securities)" as found in the Securities Act
of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. 5 77b(1) (1971), or in the UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT §
401(1)-language which seemingly covers a stock option. Also, since to attain favorable
tax status these options must necessarily be personal to, and nontransferable by, their grantees
(except in the event of death), an essential characteristic of a security, i.e., negotiability, is
lacking, thus making them something other than the kind of securities which need securities
regulation. See 2 G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE
EXECUTIVE 801 (3d ed. 1962). Moreover, there is respectable authority that a nontrans-
ferable option, which is an incident to a contract for personal services, may not be a security
at all. 1 L. Loss, supra note 34, at 467 (Supp. 1969).
Nevertheless, the very fact that an interpretation is necessary suggests some doubt about
the matter. Considering the broad interpretation courts and administrators give statutory
definitions of a security, see, e.g., note 197 supra, it seems difficult to believe a contractual
right to purchase stock is not another "instrument commonly known as security" within 5
4.A. The fact that an option's transferability is limited should be no different than the re-
strictions imposed on transferability of ordinary stock in a close corporation, see discussion
at notes 354-60 infra, and relates more to contractual limits on the exercise of the right
rather than determining its classification. Vernava, Stock Options: Corporate, Regulatory, and
Related Tax Aspects, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 197, 235-36 (1968). Under the federal securities
laws the factor of nontransferability is not conclusive in determining whether a stock option
is a security. See, e.g., In re Middle South Utils., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 509 (1961) (nontransfer-
able restricted stock option is a "security" within 5 2(a) (16) of Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. 5 79b(a) (16) (1970), defined to include a "warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase" any security); SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-3210
(1947) (nontransferable warrant may be security under Securities Act of 1933); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (stock option a security under Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
SEC rule 16b-3, 17 C.F.R. 5 240.16b-3 (1971) (exempting acquisition of tax-recognized
stock options from § 16(b); if options were not securities, no exemption would be needed).
See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4790 (July 20, 1965), 30 Fed. Reg. 9059
(1965), stating that under specified circumstances, participations in a tax-recognized em-
ployee stock purchase plan may become separate securities requiring registration apart from
the stock to be purchased. Of course, the stock to be acquired under such options or purchase
plans may have to be registered if publicly offered. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.
119 (1953). Corporations which report under 55 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 78m, 78o(d) (1970), may use a short-form registration under Form S-8
for securities to be offered to employees pursuant to certain plans. 17 C.F.R. 5 239.16b
(1971).
But even if a stock option is a security, the securities laws need not apply unless there
is an actual or attempted disposition of it. This suggests a more logical, and indeed a more
accepted securities law basis for the interpretation, namely that the grant of the option in-
volves no sale or acquisition thereof for "value," as that term is used in securities regulation,
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holders of any such options be considered "security holders" or "purchasers
of securities" as used in sections 5.E and 5.1I.2' Although an argument can be
made that the interpretation should be based on a no-sale rather than a no-
security concept,"' the reason for the Board's action is understandable. The
purpose of the interpretation is to eliminate any need for regarding the hold-
ers of such options as persons to whom rights offerings exempted by section
5.E need be made, or having them counted in calculating the extent of the
small private offerings exemption in section 5.1. If options are securities, then
those to whom they are granted would have to be "security holders"; on the
other hand, under either sections 4.A or 4.E, option grantees cannot be "pur-
chasers of securities." Given the unsettled status of option holders under the
Texas Securities Act, the interpretation should prove useful, whatever its
antecedents should properly be.
(2) Investment Advisers. Unlike federal legislation..2 and some state securi-
ties laws, ' the Texas Securities Act does not directly regulate investment
advisers except for an oblique inclusion of one "rendering services as an
investment adviser" in the definition of "dealer" in section 4.C. The gap has
been filled to some extent by a new interpretation which defines "investment
adviser" as including every person or company who for a fee engages in the
business of advising the public on the value or advisability of investment in,
purchase, or sale of securities, or who for compensation and as part of a
regular business issues analyses or reports on securities."'4 Exceptions are made
for banks, lawyers, accountants, broker-dealers, and publishers giving invest-
ment advice incidental to their main activities. A person or company fitting
since the grantee receives the option as an incident of his employment and not because of
an investment decision on his part. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 34, at 673; Bromberg, Texas
Exemptions for Small Offerings of Corporate Securities, 18 Sw. L.J. 537, 544 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Bromberg, Exemptions for Small Offerings); Dean, Employee Stock
Options, 66 HARe. L. REv. 1403, 1448 (1953); Vernava, supra, at 237-39. It would ap-
pear more appropriate, therefore, to say that the granting of the options does not involve a
sale under 5 4.E, especially since that section expressly includes "an option for sale" within
the definition of "sale" or "offer for sale" to mean every disposition or attempt to dispose
of a security for value. However, while there may not be value in a securities law sense,
there must be some assurance of continued service to the corporation to provide adequate
consideration for the awarding of such options from a corporate law standpoint, see HENN
493, and, needless to say, such option or purchase plans must be properly authorized in the
first place. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.22D (1956).
For general discussions of various employee compensation plans involving corporate
securities, including restricted or qualified stock option or purchase plans, see G. WASH-
INGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, supra, at 795-847; Dean, supra, at 1442; Hyde, Employee Stock
Plans and the Securities Act of 1933, 16 W. REs. L. RE. 75 (1964); Kelly & Green, Ap-
plication of Section 16(b) of the Securities and [sic] Exchange Act of 1934 to Insiders'
Transactions Under Employee Stock Option Plans, 17 Bus. LAW. 402 (1962); Vernava,
supra, at 231-90 (an excellent treatment of the subject); Wheat, Securities Regulation As-
pects of Employee Stock Options under the 1964 Revenue Act, U. So. CAL. 1965 TAX
INsT. 151.
220Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 2, at I-A(2) (Sept. 18, 1970),
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,647 (1970).
'21 See note 219 supra.
222 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 55 80b-1 to -21 (1971).
2 5 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE 55 25009, 25230-37 (West Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121 , §5 137.2-11, 137.8D (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, 55 32(m),
33, 34, 41, 44(b) (1965); cf. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 5 401(f).
'2 Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 3, at I-A(3-4) (Sept. 18, 1970),
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,648 (1970).
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the designation must register under section 12 as "an investment adviser,"2 '
and employees and agents of such persons or companies who are employed,
appointed, or authorized to give investment advice, i.e., investment analysts,
must be registered as salesmen or agents under the Act.2
(3) Rights Offerings. Section 5.E exempts securities offerings made by an
issuer to its existing security holders so long as no remuneration or commis-
sions are involved except for a stand-by commitment. Holders of convertible
securities and nontransferable warrants are expressly included in the category
of existing security holders; under the Board's interpretation this excludes
holders of transferable warrants."" Moreover, the offering does not have to
be made to all the existing security holders of an issuer or to all the holders
of a class or series of securities."u
(4) Small Offerings. Among the transaction exemptions recognized by the
Texas Securities Act, surely the small offering exemptions spelled out in
section 5.I. rank among the most important. The 5.1 exemptions are some-
what involved and have been exhaustively analyzed by Professor Alan Brom-
berg in a definitive study" written shortly after their substantial amendment
in 1963." l In essence they exempt (a) sales up to thirty-five security holders,
(b) sales pursuant to certain employee stock option plans, and (c) sales to
no more than fifteen persons per year. In the few years since their adoption
several questions concerning their meaning have arisen, some engendered by
litigation," changes in federal legislation,"2 the language of the statute it-
222 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-12 (1964) refers only to registration of dealers
and others selling securities and makes no mention of registration as an investment adviser.
The Board has prescribed a form, however, for application for a license as a general securities
dealer or investment adviser for corporations and partnerships. 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
42,011 (1971).
" iTheinterraation is intended to remove any doubt that a securities analyst employed
by a registered dealer who engages in research or investment advisory activities is a salesman
or agent who must register as provided in § 12. Securities Committee Report on Administra-
tive Interpretations 4.
227 Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 5, at I-A(6) (Sept. 18, 1970),
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,649 (1970). Under the interpretation of § 4.A discussed in note
219 supra, grantees of restricted or qualified stock options or options granted under an em-
ployee stock purchase plan meeting the requirements of INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 421-25
are also excluded as security holders.2
'Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 5, at I-A(6) (Sept. 18, 1970).
3 BLUa SKY L. REP. 5 46,649 (1970). An offering to less than all the holders of a class
or series may involve a problem of preemptive rights of shareholders to acquire unissued or
treasury shares being offered unless such rights have been limited or denied in the articles
of incorporation. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22C (1971); see 1 I. HILDEBRAND,
supra note 117, at 565-75; N. LATTrIN, supra note 117, at 493-500.
12 1TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5.1 (1964).
"
0 Bromberg, Exemptions for Small Offerings.
231 Ch. 170, § 4, [1963] Tex. Laws 474. The amendments provided a badly needed ex-
emption for private placements that did not exist under the prior law (except for sales to
certain institutional investors and registered dealers) once the corporation reached 35 share-
holders. Comment, lB TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. 17 (1964).
'
2 See note 239 infra.
' The reference in § 5.1(b) to an "employees' restricted stock option" was quickly out-
dated by changes made in the Revenue Act of 1964, which virtually limited restricted stock
options to those granted before 1964 and recognized two other kinds of options, qualified
stock and those granted pursuant to an employees' stock purchase plan. INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 422-24; see note 219 supra; Bromberg, Exemptions for Small Offerings 543. See also
discussion in text accompanying note 265 infra. Shortly after adoption of the federal legis-
lation, the Board adopted an interpretation, effective May 22, 1964, construing "restricted
stock options" as used in S 5.I(b) to include qualified stock purchase options and em-
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self, and administrative procedures; while others have been suggested by
commentators' and practitioners.s" The Board has attempted to resolve some
of these by informal interpretations or informal practice.' Now, most of
the questions are answered in a new, comprehensive administrative interpreta-
tion of section 5.I," as the following analysis indicates.
(a) Public Solicitation or Advertisements. The exemptions granted in sec-
tion 5.1 are all conditioned by an initial proviso that to be exempt the sales
thereunder must be made "without any public solicitation or advertise-
ments." In 1965 this language was interpeted by the Beaumont court of
civil appeals in Tumblewood Bowling Corp. v. Matise to mean that any
use of a pamphlet or brochure to aid in the sale of securities would be deemed
advertising and defeat the use of the exemption."o Although criticized for
misconstruing the law, misunderstanding the nature of advertising, and
ignoring the purpose of the small offering exemption," ' the Tumblewood
case remains the only judicial construction of what constitutes an advertise-
ment and seemingly bars use of any written informational material in con-
nection with a small offering. On the other hand, the statutorily prescribed
content of the notice that must be filed under 5.1(c) in conjunction with a
fifteen-persons-a-year offering (to which the "advertisements" language also
applies) requires that "reasonable information concerning the plan of busi-
ness and the financial condition of the issuer" be furnished to prospective
purchasers. It seems difficult to believe this means only orally communicated
information. And by the same token, what does "without any public solicita-
tion" mean? Although sensibly interpreted by the courts," does the phrase
ployees' stock purchase plans under the Internal Revenue Code. 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
46,637 (1970).
For example, in counting the 35 persons under S 5.1(a) or the 15 persons under 5
5.1(c), do husband and wife count as one or two persons if community funds were used
to acquire securities in the corporation? See discussion in text accompanying note 260 infra.
Similarly, in § 5.1(c) purchasers of exempt or registered securities or those who acquired
securities in exempt transactions are not counted in the 15-person limitation. Does this also
apply to securities sold under § 5.I(a) and (b)? See discussion in text accompanying note
264 infra.
235 See generally Bromberg, Exemptions for Small Offerings.
23"See Securities Committee Report on Administrative Interpretations 3.
2'See Bromberg, Exemptions for Small Offerings 541, 544.
*"'Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 7, at I-A(8-11) (Sept. 18,
1970), 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 46,650 (1970).
23 388 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1965), error ref. n.r.e.2old. at 483.
241 See Bromberg, Texas Exemptions for Small Offerings of Corporate Securities-The
Prohibition on Advertisements, 20 Sw. L.J. 239 (1966), for a thorough dissection of the
Tuamblewood case and a thoughtful consideration of its consequences. The case is also criti-
cally noted in 4 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSINEss LAw,
Oct. 1965, at 1.
2' In the Tamblewood case itself the court quite properly held that contacting 250 per-
sons, including a number of strangers, about purchasing stock in a corporation was a "public
solicitation" in the sale of securities. 388 S.W.2d at 483. The court quotes the holding in
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), the leading case on the public offering
concept under the Securities Act of 1933, that to be public, an offering need not be open to
the whole world. However, it did not take note of the other criteria of a private offering
given in Ralston Purina, see note 243 infra, thus leaving open for the time being the ques-
tion whether federal private offering concepts were being incorporated into the Texas law.
(Had the court stopped with the public solicitation holding and not gone on to use its un-
fortunate language concerning advertisements, the opinion would have been a good one;
see Bromberg, supra note 241, at 242). In Birchfield v. State, 401 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1966), evidence showing soliciting letters had been sent to prospects listed in the
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connote a private offering having the same overtones and characteristics
recognized in federal securities law?.4
Houston telephone directory, and that brochures had been shown to each of a number of
persons personally contacted by defendant was held ample to prove a public solicitation had
occurred. Cf. Dean v. State, 433 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (holding the de-
fendant, who had not sought out an investor to whom he sold an unregistered "overriding"
contract in a seat company, and wherein the investor testified he had already made up his
mind to purchase the contract, no advertising was used, and fewer than 35 persons held
such contracts, was entitled to have his defense that the sale had been made without public
solicitation submitted to the jury). Judge Onion quoted extensively from the Tumblewood
and Bircheld cases, presumably with approval. The Dean case is discussed in Hamilton,
supra note 13, at 106. The reported opinion in Dean, handed down after a motion for re-
hearing, replaced an earlier opinion that relied extensively on the federal view that a private
offering should be limited to sophisticated or informed investors or those in close relationship
to the issuer or its principal (in language strikingly similar to that in the Board's current
policy statement concerning § 5.1). The original opinion is discussed in Bromberg, The
Texas Small Offering Exemptions: Purchasers Must Have Investment Intent and Be Sophisti-
cated, Informed or Close Associates of the Issuer, 7 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORPORA-
TION, BANKING & BUSINESS LAw, Nov. 1968, at 6. Although based on a withdrawn opinion,
Professor Bromberg's comments are still quite helpful in light of the Board's statement of cur-
rent policy on "public solicitation or advertisements" as used in § 5.1, which, as the discus-
sion in the text accompanying notes 249-51 infra indicates, leans heavily on federal private
offering criteria and probably was derived in large measure from Judge Onion's first opinion
in Dean. Some of the analyses of the new policy given herein were suggested by Professor
Bromberg's thoughtful commentary.
'The federal private offering exemption is found in § 4(2) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1971), exempting "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering" from the registration and prospectus requirements of § 5. Over the years
these few words have been fleshed out by judicial and administrative interpretations to
establish what has been up to quite recently a wholly subjective standard dependent essen-
tially on the circumstances of each case.
Some of the dimensions of the exemption were initially given in an early opinion of
the Securities Exchange Commission's General Counsel stating that among factors to be con-
sidered were: (1) the number of offerees and their relationship to each other and to the
issuer; (2) the number of units offered; (3) the size of the offering; and (4) the manner
of the offering, and suggesting, (and thereafter taken as a rule of thumb) that an offering
to no more than approximately 25 persons would presumably not involve a public offering.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10952 (1935), FED. SEC. L. REP.
2740 (1971). In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), however, the Supreme
Court expressly rejected any test based on the number of offerees, emphasizing instead that
the exemption should depend on whether the class of persons affected needed the protection
of the Act unless able to fend for themselves or have access to the kind of information that
would have been provided in a registration statement. 346 U.S. at 125, 127. The "fend-for-
themselves" criterion has been equated with an inquiry into the sophistication of the in-
vestor; whether this alone will suffice if the sophisticated investor does not possess or have
access to the proper type of information is not certain. The Commission and some courts
regard the access to information test as paramount irrespective of sophistication, see, e.g.,
Gilligan, Will & Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 34-5689 (1958), aff'd sub nom.
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959);
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 850 (1967). But other opinions indicate sophistication alone, particularly in the in-
stance of institutional investors, may be enough. Value Line, Inc. v. Marcus, FED. SEC. L.
REP. 5 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1965); cf. Fuller v. Dilbert, 244 F. Supp. 196, 206
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Righter v. Dilbert, 358 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.
1966); S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED SECURITIES § 4.2 [c] (1971).
The most recent statement by the Commission seems to read Ralston Purina to require both
tests: "The exemption is available for offerings to persons having access to substantially the
same information concerning the issuer which registration would provide and who are able
to fend for themselves." SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5223, at 4 (Jan. 11, 1972), 37
Fed. Reg. at 592 (1972) (emphasis added).
Another important element is derived from the Commission's view that a public offering
is synonymous with a "distribution of a security" as that term is used in § 2(11) of the
Act to define an "underwriter." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1l) (1971). Thus, a person who acquires
a security which overtly has all the earmarks of a private offering under the standards just
set out but who takes it with a view to, or to assist in, its subsequent distribution to the public
will become a statutory underwriter. As a consequence, it becomes important to determine
the private offeree's intent in acquiring the security as to whether he plans to hold it for
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The Securities Board's approach to the problem is to treat "public solicita-
tion" separately from "advertisements" in determining the scope of the 5.1
exemption, although choosing to do so by a statement of Board policy rather
than an interpretation. The policy statement reflects the Board's support of
the view that potential investors in 5.1 transactions have a legitimate interest
in receiving reasonable information concerning the plan of business and the
financial condition of the issuer."'
investment or dispose of it to the public. If the latter proves to be true, the offering becomes
a public one and the private offering exemption is lost to the issuer. Moreover, the offeree
may well lose his exemption under § 4(1) exempting transactions by persons "other than
an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." The need for proving bona fide investment intent leads in
turn to questions concerning how long securities must be held or what change of circum-
stances must occur before a security can be sold consistent with an original investment pur-
pose, and finally to employment of practices such as investment letters and legend stock to
protect the private offering exemption.
In short, the federal private offering standard has been aptly summarized as follows:
(1) The group of persons to whom the offering is made available must be
limited in number and must have some sort of relationship to the issuer either
by prior association or by bargaining ability so as to be able to obtain com-
prehensive information about the issuer. . . . (2) The persons who have pur-
chased the securities in such non-public offering must acquire the securities
as ultimate purchasers, not as conduits to other beneficial owners or subsequent
purchasers. Each original purchaser's conduct and state of mind must not make
him an "underwriter" as defined in section 2 (11) i.e., the exemption will be
lost if his purchase was "with a view to . . . distribution [of the] . . .
security.
Meer, The Private Offering Exemption under the Federal Securities Act-A Study in Ad-
ministrative and Judicial Contraction, 20 SW. L.J. 503, 513 (1966).
The Commission's position has been comprehensively restated in a release issued in 1962
on "Non-Public Offering Exemption," SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4552 (1962), 27
Fed. Reg. 11316 (1962). However, the release must now be read in light of the very recent
adoption of the new letter stock rules which will permit limited resales of privately acquired
securities under prescribed conditions after two- or five-year holding periods and an accom-
panying release expressly rejecting the "change in circumstances" factor in determining in-
vestment intent for securities acquired after the effective date of the rules, April 15, 1972.
SEC Securities Act Release Nos. 5223-26 (Jan. 11, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 590-600 (1972);
FED. SEC. L. REP. No. 405, Special Report (Jan. 11, 1972); see note 252 infra. The change
in policy of no longer regarding a "change in circumstances" as a viable factor in determining
whether a person acquiring a security in a private offering is an underwriter is set out in
Release No. 33-5223, supra, at 2-3.
The federal private offering exemption is discussed extensively in securities regulation
writings. See generally S. GOLDBERG, supra note 243; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECtJR-
ITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 368-72, 392-400 (2d ed. 1968); L. Loss, supra
note 34, at 653-96 (Supp. 1969); PLI, S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS
AND IN UNDERWRITINGS (C. Israels ed. 1962); H. SOWARDS, supra note 34, at §5 4.01-.02.
A helpful statement of the operation and deficiencies of the then current private offering
doctrine is given in the famous "Wheat Report." SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A
REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS
152-247 (1969) (reprinted in S. GOLDBERG, supra note 243, appendix at 3-168). Other
useful treatments are Bahlman, Concept of Statutory Underwriter, in PLI, CONTROLLING
STOCKHOLDERS AND OTHER INSIDERS 35 (G. Duff ed. 1971); Katz, Secondary Distributions
and Brokers' Transactions, in PLI, supra, at 105; Owen, The Private Offering and Intra-State
Exemptions Under the Securities Act of 1933, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SE-
CURITIES LAW 165 (H. Wander & W. Grienenberger eds. 1968); Gadsby, Private Placement
of Convertible Securities, 15 Bus. LAW. 470 (1960); Meer, supra; Orrick, Non-Public
Offerings of Corporate Securities-Limitations on the Exemption under the Federal Securities
Act, 21 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1959); Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazard for the Un-
wary, 45 VA. L. REv. 869 (1959); Note, The Investment-Intent Dilemma in Secondary
Transactions, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1043 (1964) (reprinted in SELECTED ARTICLES ON FED-
ERAL SECURITIES LAW, supra, at 145). Other articles are listed in S. GOLDBERG, supra
note 243, appendix at 179; HENN 585-86 n.20.
'" Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 7, at I-A(8) (Sept. 18, 1970),
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,650 (1970).
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As to "public solicitation," the 5.1 exemption will not be lost if the offers
for sale or sales are made to:
sophisticated, well-informed investors or to well-informed investors who have
a relationship with the issuer or its principals, executive officers, or directors
evincing trust between the parties (namely close business associations, close
friendship, or close family ties), and who acquire the securities as ultimate
purchasers and not as underwriters or conduits to other beneficial owners or
subsequent purchasers."
Use of a registered dealer should not affect the exemption if all the other
requirements of a 5.1 transaction are met.
The obvious question posed by the policy statement is when or how a
prospective investor attains the requisite state of being "sophisticated" or "well-
informed"? The answer given is that in determining sophistication the in-
vestor's financial capacity, general knowledge of investing, and practical ex-
perience and skill in making investments will be considered. Similarly, he
can become "well-informed" when provided printed material that fairly and
factually sets out the plan, history, and financial condition of the business,
"including material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading."'
As to "advertisements," the term would not include printed material used
to make an investor "well-informed," thus repudiating the constricting in-
terpretation in the Tumblewood case. 4" Emphasis is to be placed on how
printed material is used and on efforts made to limit the number of copies
and distribution, with the suggestion being made that an appropriate warning
of possible violations of the Securities Act if used be placed on the front
in large type.'
Aside from dispelling the doubts created by the Tumblewood case on the
use of printed materials in small offering situations, the most significant aspect
of the policy statement is the requirement seemingly laid down that to qualify
under any of the three 5.1 exemptions, the offeree or purchaser must be (1)
well-informed and either (2) sophisticated or (3) in a close relationship to
the issuer or its principals or managers, and if the securities are purchased,
(4) they must be taken with an investment intent.
Requisites of this sort invite comment. Initially it should be noted that
while the information and investment intent requirements can be found in
the fifteen-person-a-year exemption of 5.I(c), there is nothing in the language
of the other two exemptions to indicate these requisites apply to them unless
it can be said they are subsumed under the phrase "without any public solicita-
tion" in the proviso at the start of section 5.1, as is the implication from the
policy statement. In that sense the policy expression may be going beyond
legislative intent in creating the first two exemptions. The thirty-five-security-
24.5 d.
25Id. at I-A(9). The Board's policy is not quite the same as the SEC's present view,
which indicates every private offeree must be both sophisticated and well-informed. See note
243 supra.1 Tumblewood Bowling Corp. v. Matise, 388 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1965), error ref. f.r.e.; see note 241 supra.
248 Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 7, at I-A(10) (Sept. 18, 1970),
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,650 (1970).
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holder exemption imposes a purely quantitative test, and the employee stock
option plan exemption deals with a particular category of purchasers. Neither
is conditioned on the sophistication, state of mind, knowledge, or relationship
of the security holders or optionees that come under its terms.24
Secondly, by limiting the relationship criteria to those who have a close
association evincing trust with the issuer or its principals, executive officers,
or directors, persons who come by their information through a close or con-
fidential relationship with a well-informed associate, i.e., by an association
two or three steps removed, seem to be eliminated. It is not clear how this
can be squared with the result in Dean v. State,' which indicated that an
indirect associate can claim the benefit of the thirty-five-man exemption.
Thirdly, the requirement that those acquiring securities under any of the
three exemptions must do so as ultimate purchasers may mean that to assure
that the exemption will not be lost the whole panoply of protective devices
that fetter the disposition of privately acquired shares under the federal law,
such as transfer restrictions, investment letters, and the like,"' will have to
249 In this regard, Professor Bromberg's admonition, in his article on the Texas small
offering exemption, against relying too greatly on the subjective federal private offering
tests in interpreting the essentially numerical and objective standards set out in § 5.1 are
worth repeating:
Specificity in the small offering exemptions has been an overwhelming wish
of blue sky lawyers in general and of the members of the State Bar Committee
who drafted section 5.1 in the form passed by the legislature. In recognition of
this deliberate choice of specificity in the face of the federal precedent, it is
proper to draw on the federal analogy only to the extent that is consistent with
the objective, numerical character of the state provision. There is no reason to
import all the nebulous features which complicate and confuse the federal
exemption.
Bromberg, Exemptions for Small Offerings 558. But see J. MOFsKY, BLUE SKY RESTRIC-
TIONS ON NEW PROMOTIONS 27 (1971) contending that from a policy standpoint, the
identity of the offerees should be more important than their numbers.
250433 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), discussed in note 242 supra. Dean had no
control position with the issuer, but was active in securing parts for its product. His contact
with the investor was arranged by a "double" first cousin of the investor whom he later
married.
25 To afford the issuer in a private placement some protection against loss of the federal
private offering exemption it has become customary to require private purchasers to give
so-called investment letters stating their intention to hold the security purchased for invest-
ment and not with a view to distribution (and leading to stock issued under such circum-
stances to be called "letter stock"). However, the SEC takes a dim view of the efficacy of
these letters, regarding them essentially as self-serving and conclusory declarations. Opinion
of General Counsel, SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-1862, at 2 (1938), 11 Fed. Reg.
10962 (1946); Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-3825,
at 7 (1957); Non-Public Offering Exemption, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, at 3
(1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11316 (1962). Much more effective and consequently more highly
regarded by the Commission are restrictive legends placed on certificates (hence the term
"legend stock") and adoption of stop-transfer procedures designed to prevent sales of pri-
vately-placed securities unless registered subsequently or an opinion of counsel given that
an exemption from registration will permit their transfer. S. GOLDBERG, supra note 243,
§5 2.6, 2.7; SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223, at 15 (Jan. 11, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 591,
596 (1972) (notice of adoption of rule 144); Use of Legends and Stop-Transfer Instruc-
tions as Evidence of Non-Public Offerings, SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5121 (Dec.
30, 1970), 36 Fed. Reg. 1525 (1971). Restrictions on transfer, however, raise problems
under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-204; TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 8.204
(1968), and encounter occasional judicial hostility. See, e.g., Ling & Co. v. Trinity Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 470 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971), error granted (decided
after this survey period, but striking down restrictive legend on stock of a stock brokerage
firm).
On the general problems of letter or legend stock see S. GOLDBERG, supra note 243, 55
2.5-.7; C. ISRAELS & E. GUTTMAN, MODERN SECURITIES TRANSFERS 404-08 (1967); 1
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be employed even in small corporations with only a handful of passive in-
vestors. And this at a time when the Securities Exchange Commission seems
to be shifting towards more objective criteria for determining investment
intent."
These reservations aside, the policy statement must still be viewed as a
sensible document incorporating reasonable safeguards for the use of 5.1
exemptions that may well be read into the law anyway, if the construction of
the federal private offering exemption provides any guide." For example,
since the statute places no limit on the nunber of offerees who may be con-
tacted in the thirty-five-security-holder situation,"4 it is difficult to see how
anyone falling outside the category of investors named in the statement can
L. Loss, supra note 34, at 665-73 (Supp. 1969); Israels, Current Problems of Securities
Underwriters and Dealers, 18 Bus. LAW. 27, 85-89 (1962); Israels, Some Commercial
Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA, L. REv. 851 (1959), reprinted in SELECTED ARTI-
CLES ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW, supra note 243, at 125; Israels, Stop-Transfer Procedures
and the Securities Act of 1933-Addendum to Uniform Commercial Code-Article 8, 17
RUTGERS L. REV. 158 (1962), reprinted in SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAW, supra note 243, at 231; Kennedy, Case of the Scarlet Letter or the Easy Way Out on
"Private Offerings," 23 Bus. LAW. 23 (1967); Shea, A Practical Look at the Securities Laws,
Restrictions on Sales by Owners of Unregistered Stock, 43 U. DET. L.J. 572 (1966).
"'As indicated in note 243 supra, on Jan. 11, 1972, the SEC adopted its long awaited
rules on privately acquired and control securities that grew out of the recommendations of
the "Wheat Report." In the process the Commission adopted several new rules and forms,
repealed and amended others, and issued several interpretative releases, but the focal point
of its action was the promulgation of rule 144, effective Apr. 15, 1972, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144
(1972). SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5223, Jan. 11, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 591 (1972).
In brief, rule 144 permits a limited resale of a "restricted security," defined as one acquired
directly or indirectly from an issuer or control person in one or a series of private transac-
tions, after a two-year holding period provided adequate public information is available con-
cerning the issuer and proper notice of the sale is filed with the SEC on a prescribed form
144. The availability-of-public-information requirement is satisfied if the issuer is subject
to the reporting requirements of §§ 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m, 78o(d) (1971), or information equivalent to that specified in SEC rule 15c2-
11(a)( 4 ), clauses (1)-(14) & (16), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1971), is publicly avail-
able. (Rule 15c2-11 became effective Dec. 13, 1971, and is directed at market-making in
inactively traded securities and spin-offs of shell corporations. SEC Securities Act Release
No. 34-9310 (Sept. 13, 1971), 36 Fed. Reg. 18641 (1971)). Rule 144 is quite detailed
and is set out and explained in full in Release No. 5223.
In a companion move the SEC also adopted a new rule 237, 17 C.F.R. 5 230.237 (1972),
permitting a noncontrolling security holder of an issuer who cannot meet all the conditions
of rule 144 to sell a limited amount of his security (up to a maximum of $50,000), pro-
vided he has held the security for 5 years or longer, it is sold through a negotiated transac-
tion and not through a broker or dealer, and an appropriate notice of the sale is filed with
an SEC regional office on a prescribed form 237. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5224
(Jan. 10, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 590 (1972).
Other action taken included: (1) amendments to regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-
230.262 (1971), broadening the availability of that regulation to provide a means for non-
controlling investors in small businesses to resell their restricted securities, SEC Securities
Act Release No. 33-5225 (Jan. 10, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 599 (1972); amendments to forms
10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1971), and 10-Q, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (1971), requiring
specified information be furnished relating to the issuance of unregistered securities in re-
liance on exemptions. SEC Securities Act Release Nos. 34-9442 to -9443 (Jan. 10, 1972),
37 Fed. Reg. 600, 601 (1972); (2) rescission of rules 154 and 155, 17 C.F.R. 55 230.154,
230.155 (1971), SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 591
(1972); and (3) publication of a release warning that failure to inform a purchaser of a
security in a private placement of the circumstances under which he is required to take and
hold the security and the limits on its resale may entail a violation of the antifraud provisions
of the securities laws, including 5 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1971),
and § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1971), and rule lOb-5 thereunder,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971). SEC Securities Act Release Nos. 33-5226, 34-9444 (Jan. 13,
1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 600 (1972).
' See note 243 supra.
254TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5.1(a) (1964).
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be approached without some public solicitation or advertising being involved.
Even if they can, any written material they are shown ought to meet the stand-
ards prescribed. In short, much of what is provided for probably does no more
than prudent counsel already require when relying on these exemptions."
A problem remains, however, whether a sale to one who is neither sophisti-
cated nor related to the issuer or its insiders and yet has been "well-informed"
by reading a prospectus or brochure meeting the prescribed standards will
defeat the exemption, as the policy statement seems to infer. Arguably, if
such a person is not in the prescribed relationship, any solicitation of his
purchase would almost have to be public, but then so might the solicitation
of a sophisticated investor. The only answer that comes to mind, and perhaps
not a very good one, is that the policy statement is simply that, a matter of
Board policy, and not a mandatory construction of section 5.1 exhausting
all the exemptive possibilities." The same can probably also be said con-
cerning the application of the sophisticated standard to participants in em-
ployee stock option plans, although it is likely that employees who benefit
from such plans should be able to meet the relationship test." ' As to the
indirect associate problem raised by the Dean case, "' that decision may be the
exception that proves the rule, or, more traditionally, a case that should be
confined to its peculiar facts. The parties in the Dean transaction were friends
and relatives, yet because Dean was not himself an insider there was not the
assurance that what he knew or communicated could be counted on. Despite
their close relationship, the investors still testified against him. A line has to
be drawn somewhere, and it seems reasonable to limit its application to inves-
tors who are in a position to obtain information and rely in confidence on
what they are told or given.
Finally, the investment stock requirements should present no real problem
to the vast majority of corporations that come under the thirty-five-security-
holder exemption since the chances are strong no public market for their
securities will exist. If there is a market, as might well be true in the employee
stock option and fifteen-person-a-year exemption situations, it then becomes
desirable in any event to impose adequate safeguards to prevent the section
255 See Bromberg, Exemptions for Small Offerings 548; Securities Committee Report on
Administrative Interpretations 3: "It is submitted that this interpretation is consistent with
the public interest designed to be protected by the statute and with the practice of reputable
and informed persons who engage in transactions in which an exemption under Section 51
is claimed."
256The Bar committee suggested an interpretation of "public solicitation or advertise-
ments" that would have included the following statement: "The foregoing interpretations
are not intended to be exclusive. Other forms of offers do not necessarily constitute public
solicitation or advertisements." Securities Committee Report on Administrative Interpretation
3. By adopting a policy statement instead of an interpretation, the Board might well have
felt the statement was understood and, therefore, unnecessary.
257 But not necessarily. In the leading case of SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119
(1953), which defined the scope of the federal private offering exemption, see note 243
supra, an employee stock purchase plan was made available to any of 7,000 employees who
on their own initiative inquired into purchasing their employer's stock. Over 400 employees
purchased stock in two successive years, including foremen, clerical assistants, and trainees.
Despite the argument that all such persons were key employees, the Supreme Court had
little difficulty finding a public offering had been made. It is unlikely employees of the sort
described in Ralston Purina would satisfy the close business association test embodied in the
Texas policy statement.
... See notes 242, 250 supra.
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5.1 exemptions from being utilized as covert means of effecting a public dis-
tribution. The exemption will certainly be lost if those acquiring securities
form any part of the link in the selling process in transactions that violate
the Act."
(b) How To Count. In determining the number of persons to be counted
for the 5.1 (a) or 5.I(c) exemptions, some uncertainties arise. For example,
does a trust estate count as one security holder or must all the beneficiaries
be counted? Similarly, what about the husband and wife when community
funds have been used to purchase the security? Are they counted as one or
two? The interpretation, 6 ' reflecting past administrative practice,"1 considers
the husband and wife as one if the shares are bought from community prop-
erty or are held by them as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety. Similarly,
an express trust, partnership, or corporation counts for one unless organized
specifically to hold the issuer's securities, as in the instance of a voting trust.'"
(c) Sales to Nonresidents. Again, in counting to thirty-five in section 5.1 (a),
all security holders of the issuer are counted no matter where they reside or
where they acquired the securities. Similarly in counting to fifteen for section
5.1(c), prior sales to nonresidents and sales to Texans outside the state are in-
cluded.""
(d) Exclusion of Other Exemptions. In counting to fifteen, section 5.1(c)
excludes purchasers of securities "exempt under other provisions of this Section
5." Does this also exclude the exemptions in 5.1(a) and 5.I(b) so that if the
corporation has just completed sales to say thirty stockholders under 5.I(a)
and sold to another five optionees under 5.I(b), it still may sell to another
fifteen immediately under 5.I(c)? The interpretation says no; these other ex-
emptions are not excluded.'" Consequently, in the example given twelve months
must elapse before 5.1(c) can be used.
(e) Employee Stock Option Plans. Section 5.I(b) speaks in terms of "em-
ployees' restricted stock options" recognized in the Internal Revenue Code.
However, in 1964 the Internal Revenue Code was changed to limit such op-
tions to those granted before 1964 and substituted somewhat stricter "qualified
stock option plans" and "employee stock purchase plans." In another slight
stretching of statutory language, the reference made in 5.1(b) is interpreted
"Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 629, 291 S.W.2d 704, 708 (1956); Dean v. State, 433
S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Smith v. Smith, 424 S.W.2d 244, 250 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1968).2"Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 7, at I-A(10) (Sept. 18, 1970),
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,650 (1970).
261 See Securities Committee Report on Administrative Interpretations 4; Bromberg, Ex-
emptions for Small Offerings 542.2 2 1d. at 541.
263Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 7, at I-A(10) (Sept. 18, 1970),
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,650 (1970). Although the interpretation reflects the position
of the Board concerning inclusion of persons outside the state and transactions consummated
outside the state in counting for the 15-person exemption, § 5.1(c), some members of the
Bar committee felt this part of the interpretation might be invalid because it gives extra-
territorial application to the Act in a manner that might be federally unconstitutional. Cf.
UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT § 402 (b) (9), which exempts offers to no more than 10 persons
made within the state.
1"Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 7, at I-A(11) (Sept. 18, 1970),
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,650 (1970). The interpretation incorporates an earlier version to
the same effect adopted Aug. 6, 1965. 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,639 (1970). See Brom-
berg, Exemptions for Small Offerings 550.
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to include all three categories of plans which meet the requirements of sections
421-25 of the Internal Revenue Code.'" Also, prospectuses or other materials
filed or used under the Securities Act of 1933 for such plans may be employed
without constituting public solicitation or advertising.' "
(5) Market Price of Securities in Secondary Trading Transactions. Section
5.0 permits a registered dealer to engage in secondary trading of publicly held
securities without registration (unless part of an unsold allotment in his hands
as a participant in an underwriting distribution), provided a number of quali-
fications are met, including the necessity as stated in paragraph (3) that the
security be offered for sale "at prices reasonably related to the current market
price of such securities at the time of such sale." This is interpreted to mean the
market price must be supported by a substantial volume of bona fide sales
within or without the state. If there is no going market or only casual sales,
then the dealer claiming the 5.0 exemption must prove to the Commissioner
that the security will have a market price that is fairly determined and can be
justified at the inception with reasonable assurance of an after-market. To that
end, a number of standards are listed both to determine the basis on which the
security's price has been established and to assure that the dealer will make and
maintain an orderly market."'
Another requirement of section 5.0 is that the security either be registered
under the Act or else that specified information concerning the issuer be found
in a recognized securities manual. Certain manuals are named in the statute;...
any others have to be approved by the Commissioner. On September 15, 1971,
the Commissioner recognized Moody's OTC Industrial Manual-1971 as a basis
for exemption under section 5.0 (9) ,"6 an action which should facilitate further
normal secondary trading in less widely held securities by Texas dealers.!"
(6) Broker's Transactions. Section 5.P exempts the execution by dealers of
unsolicited orders to buy securities "where the initial offering of such securities
has been completed." This is interpreted to mean that any nonexempt public
distribution of such securities has been completely sold to the public."'
Oil and Gas Drilling Programs Guidelines. On November 22, 1971, the
State Securities Board adopted a set of guidelines for the registration of oil and
2" Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 7, at I-A(11) (Sept. 18, 1970),
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,650 (1970). The interpretation replaces and expands on an earlier
one similarly construing § 5.1(b) that became effective May 22, 1964. 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
5 46,637 (1970). See also notes 219, 234 supra.
266 Reporting companies under the Securities Exchange Act may use form S-8, 17 C.F.R.
§ 239.16b (1971), to register securities used for tax-favored employee stock option or pur-
chase plans. See note 219 supra.
26'Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 8, at I-A(12) (Sept. 18, 1970),
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 46,651 (1971). The Bar committee's view is that 100,000 shares
or units in the hands of 100 persons or more permits the maintenance of a bona fide public
market. Securities Committee Report on Administrative Interpretations 5.
268 Manuals published by Moody's Investor Service, Standard & Poor's Corporation, and
Best's Life Insurance Reports are specifically named; moreover, the Commissioner may not
revoke or suspend their recognition administratively. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
581-5 (1964).2 6 9TEx. MONTHLY SECURITIEs BULL., Aug. 1971, at 11; 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
46,651.01 (1971).27 Sales must still comply with other provisions of § 5.0. Id.
272 Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 9, at I-A(14) (Sept. 18, 1970),
3 BLUE SKY L. REP. S 46,652 (1971).
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gas drilling programs. The guidelines had been prepared by the Committee on
Oil and Gas Securities of the North American Securities Administrators Asso-
ciation, chaired by Truman G. Holladay, the Texas Securities Commissioner,
and were adopted in principle by that association in October 1971."'2
Oil and gas drilling funds have increased greatly in recent years,"' along with
the growth in numbers of individuals with sufficient wealth to benefit from the
oil and gas tax shelters afforded by such programs7" and still afford to absorb
the considerable losses that often occur. Essentially the programs involve the
sale of interests of participation, usually on a joint-venture or limited-partner-
ship basis, in programs of oil and gas exploration, development, and acqui-
sition."" Although sometimes marketed via the same techniques used to sell
mutual funds, drilling funds are exempt from the Investment Company Act
of 1940."'6 But since they normally require large amounts of capital, participa-
tion interests are usually publicly sold and, hence, must be registered under the
Securities Act of 1933.. and state blue sky laws."
272 The Board's action in adopting the guidelines has not been officially reported, but
they are the same as those adopted in principle by the North American group. The guide-
lines adopted by the latter are found in 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 15 4581-83 (1971).
271 Prior to 1967 programs filed with the SEC never exceeded $100 million; by the end
of 1969 the dollar value of programs filed almost reached $1.7 billion. See SEC Securities
Act Release No. 33-5001, at 4 (Aug. 27, 1969), 34 Fed. Reg. 14125 (1969); Sullivan,
Oil and Gas Investment Programs; A Brief Survey, 26 Bus. LAW. 1027, 1028 (1971).
274There are several tax advantages to participants in the programs, particularly those
in high income tax brackets. These include (1) the right to offset a proportionate part of
intangible drilling and development costs against ordinary income in the year incurred, see
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 263 (c), and, (2) the utilization of the depletion allowance
against income realized from the program, either on the basis of an amount equal to 22%
of the gross income from a particular well (but no more than 50% of the net income) or
by a portion of the "cost" of the oil in the ground, or "cost" depletion, see INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, §§ 612 (cost depletion), 613 (percentage depletion). Many public-investor-financed
programs result in investors being able to gain a current deduction equal to 60 to 80%
of the investment in the program. Ryan, Public Financing of Oil and Gas Ventures, 19 Tu-
LANE TAX INST. 466, 468 (1970). On the tax aspects of oil and gas drilling programs see
generally Bloomenthal, Mineral Exploration Funds, 1968 DUKE L.J. 193, 202-10; Loftin,
Drilling Funds-Seminar: Tax Considerations, 21ST OIL & GAS INST. 236 (1970); Mosburg,
Mechanics of Registered and Unregistered Investor Drilling Programs, 18TH OIL & GAS
INST. 97, 105-07 (1967); Panel Discussion, Income Tax and Securities Law Aspects of In-
vestments in Oil and Gas Drilling Programs, 22 U. So. CAL. 1970 TAX. INST. 745; Ryan,
supra, at 467-88, 499-509.
272Most publicly offered programs are organized as limited partnerships; unregistered
funds are more likely to be partnerships or joint ventures. On the organizational aspects of
oil and gas funds see Mosburg, supra note 274; Ryan, supra note 274, at 469-88; White,
Drilling Funds-Seminar: Structure and Documentation, 21ST OIL & GAS INST. 187, 190,
197 (1970).
"'Investment Company Act of 1940, S 3(c) (11); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (11) (1971).
A serious move was made in 1969 at the instigation of the SEC with the introduction of
H.R. 11995, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), and S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), to
partially eliminate the exemption, but was forestalled on the promise of the SEC and the
industry to come up with plans for effective investor protection within 18 months after pas-
sage of the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, 5 806-6a, ch. 686, § 2, 54 Star.
790 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 80a-2 (1971). H.R. REP. NO. 91-1382, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970); CONF. REP. NO. 91-1631, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 3 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4943 (1970).
27" As most publicly offered programs are limited partnerships, interests in such partner-
ships are of course securities, and since publicly offered they must be registered unless
exempt as intrastate offerings, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(11) (1971), or small enough to qualify
under regulations A or B, 17 C.F.R. 55 230.251-63, 17 C.F.R. 55 230.300-56 (1971). The
form generally used for drilling programs in which the properties are not predesignated is
form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1971). If the program sponsor is offering interests in specific
property, then form S-10 would be used, 17 C.F.R. S 239.17 (1971). On Jan. 19, 1970, the
Commission issued Guide No. 55 for the preparation of prospectuses relating to interests in
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The guidelines adopted by Texas are somewhat detailed and can only be
summarized briefly here." ' They appear to be quite tough, and if applied rigor-
ously, should keep a number of marginally operated or promotion-oriented
funds participations from being publicly sold in the state. For example, any
program with a sponsor lacking substantial experience or qualifications in the
oil and gas industry "will be thoroughly scrutinized," and any promotional pro-
grams will be held contrary to the public interest.!" ° The minimum amount of
funds to be collected to activate the program must be sufficient to accomplish
the objectives of the program, including "spreading the risk," and any amount
less than $250,000 will be presumed inadequate to spread the risk among
public investors."u
There are several other provisions that regulate fund sponsors. They must
be adequately capitalized, must meet the requirements of the Internal Revenue
Service, and have a favorable tax ruling assuring flow-through of tax benefits
to investors, and are required to either purchase a minimum of $100,000 in
participation interests or else be given the privilege of investing at least ten
percent of the amount to be paid in by participants in the program.8" Proceeds
from the sale of units in the program are not to be used to prove up adjacent
properties belonging to the sponsors or their affiliates; if they are, such must
be fully disclosed and justified to the securities commissioner."' A maximum of
twelve and one-half percent of the amount received from the public offering
is allowable to the program sponsor for organizational and offering expenses,
and from this any first year management fee must be paid."" Expenses and
compensation of sponsors must be reasonable; as must their retained interests,
as well as any other combinations of fees, overriding royalty interests, and
working and net profit interests."' Automatic reinvestment of revenues is con-
sidered unfair and contrary to public interest; optional reinvestments are al-
lowed only if full information is given the investor.'" The prospectus must con-
tain a section on conflict of interests, setting out possible areas of conflict and
measures taken to protect the public investor as a result. Any properties trans-
ferred by a sponsor or its affiliate to the program may be at cost if this is uni-
formly done with all the sponsor's programs; otherwise, they are to be transfer-
red at fair market value. If the latter greatly exceeds cost, the fair market value
must be established by qualified independent petroleum engineers. Moreover,
oil and gas programs. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5036 (Jan. 19, 1970), 35 Fed.
Reg. 1233 (1970). For discussions of securities regulation aspects of drilling programs see
Bloomenthal, supra note 274, at 234-39; Mosburg, supra note 274, at 144-75; Ryan, supra
note 274, at 488-98; Shepherd, Drilling Funds-Seminar: Registration and other Regulatory
Considerations, 21ST OIL & GAS INST. 202 (1970); Sullivan, supra note 273, at 1033-38.
' Knapp, Blue Sky Laws: State Regulation of Drilling Programs, OIL DIGEST, Dec.
1970, at 13, 14.
2 The summary given is topical and does not necessarily follow the sequence of the
guidelines. When cited infra the reference is the Roman numeral and letter assigned a par-
ticular guideline.









any contracts for drilling or other services must be at prices no higher than
those normally charged in the same area in arm's-length transactions. "7
The minimum purchase in the program may not be less than $5,000, which
is also the minimum investment by a participant that must be paid within
twelve months from the date the program commences."' Assignments of in-
terests are similarly limited. If assessments are allowed, limits must be placed
on them, and sales commissions are not allowed thereon. 8' No representations
are to be made that program interests are readily marketable. If such interests
are to be repurchased, the program sponsor or affiliate is unconditionally obli-
gated to repurchase a specific dollar amount each twelve months in cash under
a formula to be fully disclosed in the prospectus.!"
Brokers and dealers who handle the programs must be paid on a cash com-
mission basis. Broker-dealers must also take steps to be sure that participations
are sold only to investors for whom such interests are suitable. The determina-
tion of suitability is to be based on the prospective investor's financial capacity,
net worth, and income tax bracket, after a reasonable inquiry into his financial
condition and other relevant factors. 91 Finally, all sales are to be made by and
through a prospectus that must also accompany or precede any supplementary
materials used; in turn, supplementary materials must be approved by the com-
missioner beforehand."2 The prospectus must contain all material facts neces-
sary for the public investor to make his investment decision and for the com-
missioner to make a finding after examination."
Volume of Registration. During the fiscal year ending August 31, 1971, regis-
trations processed by the State Securities Board totalled 1.237 billion dollars,
the fourth consecutive year the billion-dollar mark was exceeded. The total
number of registration applications processed was 1,446. Of the dollar amount
almost 220 million dollars represented original applications for the sale of
securities by Texas companies. In addition, there are now over 10,000 persons
licensed to sell securities in the state.H
IV. DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY
During the survey period there were the usual quota of cases raising the fun-
damental issue whether the corporate entity should be disregarded to hold
287 Id. IV-G. Also, sponsors and affiliates cannot be exonerated from liability for losses
caused by gross negligence or wilful or wanton misconduct. Id. II-I.
"' Id. II1-A. If the minimum to activate the fund is not attained, there must be a pro-
vision for the return of all paid subscriptions. Id. IV-D.
289 Id. III-B.
29 Id. IV-F. If the interests tendered exceed the annual repurchase amount, the interests
to be repurchased must be selected by lot. Valuation of the interests are to be made by
qualified independent petroleum engineers annually.
291 Id. III-D.
... Id. IV-I. The prospectus must contain information concerning the nature of the busi-
ness organization to be employed, the sponsor's history of operations, maximum and mini-
mum amounts sought, a tabular representation of interests that indicates sharing of costs
and expenses as well as sharing in distribution of revenues, provisions for repurchase of
participations, statements of conflict of interest, and an account of how the proceeds are to
be used.
'"TEx. MONTHLY SECURITIEs BULL., Aug. 1971, at 1.
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shareholder-owners liable for obligations incurred through their corporate busi-
ness. From a quantitative standpoint, as past Surveys show,"' disregard cases
seem to recur more frequently than almost any other kind in corporation law."
One reason is fairly obvious: Faced with the unpalatable prospect of obtaining
judgment against a corporate defendant not able to respond in damages, it is
natural that an aggrieved plaintiff seeks to hold accountable those for whose
benefit the enterprise was operated, especially when they alone are able to pay.
The dilemma that the disregard doctrine poses to a court is equally obvious:
Unless businessmen have some assurance their personal wealth can be shielded
from the debts and obligations of their incorporated business ventures, the
prime attribute of limited liability, which makes the corporation a preferred
device for doing business and attracting capital investment, would become
meaningless. The solution, as in other areas of law where competing interests
and expectations must be reconciled, lies in striking a proper balance on use
of the corporate entity. The only difficulty is that judges and lawyers alike ob-
fuscate the needed balancing with colorful rhetoric and conclusory rationaliza-
tions which frequently conceal the significant elements that weigh in reaching
a just result.
A survey such as this is not the place to examine in depth the seeming per-
vasiveness and confusing applications of the disregard doctrine, particularly
since an excellent and perceptive treatment of the subject by Robert Hamilton
has just appeared."' Professor Hamilton's basic thesis is that the nature of a
corporation is not a static concept, but varies from case to case, depending on
the issues to be resolved. The traditional terminology Texas courts employ to
"pierce the corporate veil" by labeling the corporation the "alter ego" or "in-
strumentality" of its individual or corporate shareholders states results at best
and at worst obscures analysis of the controlling factors which should be articu-
lated, but seldom are. Moreover, many Texas disregard cases could have been
resolved by application of conventional tort, contract, or agency theories with-
out invoking postulates based on the conceptual nature of the corporation."
Yet, granting there may have been noncorporate grounds for decision in
some of these cases, one wonders whether a court that uses the artificial per-
sonality of the corporation as a premise from which to reason would apply the
determinative rule of contract, tort, or agency law any less mechanically. Agen-
cy principles in particular are just as obscure in revealing the policy behind
their formulation as the disregard doctrine. 9' Since that jural relationship we
call a corporation is a constant in all these disputes, why cannot the bounds
on doing business in corporate form as a means of providing limited liability
. See Amsler, supra note 7, at 100; Amsler, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 59, 71 (1968); Hamilton, supra note 13, at 108; Hamilton & Shields,
supra note 14; Pelletier, supra note 56.
.. Professor Pelletier noted that from 1960-1967 at least 39 Texas cases involving the
question of disregard of the corporate entity had been reported. Pelletier, supra note 56, at
141.
297Hamilton, supra note 114.
211 Id. at 281-83.
219 See E. LATTY, INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 189 (1951) (Chapter
Nine: Policy Choices Behind Linguistics in Agency Law); F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE
LAw OF AGENCY 96, 237 (4th ed. by P. Mechem 1952); Seavey, The Rationale of Agency,
29 YALE L.J. 859 (1920), reprinted in W. SEAvEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 65 (1949).
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be set within the framework of the same body of law that creates the relation-
ship in the first place, even if it must be done on a case-by-case basis? There
then is no necessity to resort to other doctrine. It simply becomes a matter of
subjecting the privilege of separate capacity and responsibility to specific equi-
table limits when needed to prevent abuse of the corporate shield if used illegal-
ly, fraudulently, or unfairly under the circumstances of a particular case.
Perhaps this explains why judges and lawyers, although probably aware
that use of the corporate fiction has its conceptual limits if they stop to think
about the matter, instinctively resort to the time-worn, but resounding, expres-
sions and pejoratives that abound in the disregard cases. Predictably, the whole
subject will continue being "enveloped in the mists of metaphor," as Justice
Cardozo so aptly expressed it many years ago."® Still it would be well to also
remember his accompanying admonition: "Metaphors in the law are to be nar-
rowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it. '
Alter Ego Cases. Several decisions handed down during the survey period ex-
emplify attempts to use the illusory alter ego concept" as justification for dis-
regard; the results, however, were mixed.
In Professional Beauty Products, Inc. v. Jay"' the alter ego rationale was
successfully invoked by an employee to preclude his being enjoined from vio-
lating a covenant-not-to-compete with his former beauty supply house employ-
er. The employee had been assigned a territory with the understanding that he
was to receive commissions on all sales made to customers of the employer in
that area. He claimed the employer had breached the employment contract by
setting up a discount beauty supply corporation which through lower prices
siphoned off much of his sales volume and reduced his commissions. The dis-
count corporation had officers and shareholders in common with the employer
and was managed by the latter pursuant to a management contract. Agreeing
with the finding that the discount corporation was the alter ego of the employer,
the court held the establishment of the discount operation, insofar as it affected
the employee, breached his employment contract and gave the employer un-
clean hands, thus, barring legal and equitable relief.
The case presents some difficulties because it appears that the discount oper-
ation was set up to meet competition and not specifically to diminish the em-
ployee's income. Establishing another corporation to engage in a different type
300Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
301 Id.
"2 The "alter ego" pejorative is frequently employed in situations in which the sole or
controlling shareholders ignore corporate formalities and amenities, use the corporation as
a vehicle for their own personal ventures, commingle corporate funds or property with their
own, or incorporate in an obvious effort to avoid preexisting contractual liabilities, defraud
creditors, or statutory policy. See, e.g., American Petroleum Exch. v. Lord, 399 S.W.2d 213
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1966), error ref. n.r.e.; Westwood Dev. Co. v. Esponge, 342
S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961), error ref. n.r.e.; Five Star Transfer &
Terminal Warehouse Corp. v. Flusche, 339 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1960),
error ref. n.r.e.; Irish v. Bahner, 109 S.W.2d 1023 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937), error
dismissed; Bond-Reed Hardware Co. v. Walsh, 193 S.W. 1148 (Tex. Civ. App.-San An-
tonio 1917), error ref. See generally N. LAT'TIN, supra note 117, at 86.
0 463 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970), discussed in Hamilton, supra
note 114, at 1003.
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of business activity or to segregate a specific operation is quite common. Cer-
tainly the fact that two corporations have officers and shareholders in common
does not in itself justify treating one as the alter ego of the other. 4 Whether
the management contract was a critical factor is difficult to assess. It is likely the
result would have been the same had the discount operation been conducted
by essentially the same people in unincorporated form or without the manage-
ment contract. This suggests that the court simply regarded the two businesses
as part of a single enterprise whose acts harmed the employee."' 5 On that basis
the case was easily resolved by applying elementary principles of contracts
and equity. Yet because another corporation was used as the instrumentality,
the disregard doctrine provided a useful peg on which to hang the result.
On the other hand, in Paine v. Carter" a somewhat reverse twist on the
alter ego formulation was encountered because of a jury finding that the sole
shareholder was the alter ego of the corporation rather than vice versa." The
reversal of roles turned out not to matter because estoppel precluded the issue
being raised in the first place.
The action was brought by Paine who had cosigned and ultimately had to
pay the $20,000 balance of a $30,000 note given by Bartlett to a Houston
bank to purchase shares in the corporation. Bartlett had formed the corporation,
Artex Construction Company, along with Carter and two others to engage in
road construction in Argentina. Carter apparently furnished most of the finan-
cing for Artex. Because of poor progress on the Argentine road projects the
shareholders began to quarrel, culminating in litigation between Bartlett and
Carter. Their suit was settled by a contract signed by Carter, Bartlett, Artex,
'"Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Tex. 1968); Hub-
bard v. Capital Southwest Corp., 448 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969);
Thompson v. Sinkler, 295 S.W.2d 508, 513 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1956), error ref.
n.r.e., rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 365 U.S. 758 (1958);
State v. Swift & Co., 187 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945), error ref.; Texas
Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Smith, 130 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939),
error dismissed, judgment correct.
s "The fact that separate corporate entities were formed which represent different de-
partments of the integrated but single business enterprise does not affect the question, be-
cause the court must look beyond the corporate form to the purpose of the unified organiza-
tion, and to the officials who are identified with that purpose." State v. Lone Star Gas Co.,
86 S.W.2d 484, 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 304 U.S.
484 (1938). See also note 314 infra.
301469 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
307 Defendants contended that there is no law in Texas holding that an individual can
be the alter ego of the corporation instead of the reverse. The court's response was that while
it made little difference in the outcome, some cases have so held, citing Gill v. Smith, 233
S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1950), error ref. n.r.e.; Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v.
Moxley, 157 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1941). See also Gulf Reduction
Corp. v. Boyles Galvanizing & Plating Co., 456 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1970) (see text at note 313 intra); Lybrand v. Miller-Lybrand Co., 75 S.W.2d 286,
287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934): "[T]he stockholders are but the alter ego of the
corporation and its fictional existence cannot be made the excuse for bringing a suit or as-
serting a right which all the stockholders are estopped from asserting." If logically applied,
the reverse alter ego doctrine would make the corporation accountable or responsible for, or
possibly in some instances the beneficiary of, any act of a shareholder performed in his in-
dividual capacity. But if the corporation is to be bound, surely ordinary agency principles of
authority, apparent authority, or ratification should suffice to make it liable. If it is a matter
of satisfying individual creditors, the shares in the corporation can always be levied upon.
Nevertheless, the reverse doctrine illustrates the willingness of courts to restructure a fact
situation and recast the parties to accomplish a desired result whether in the process the cor-
porate entity is allowed to play its intended role or is removed instead from the stage.
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and others whereby Bartlett severed all his connections with Artex, Carter be-
came the sole shareholder, paid $10,000 on Bartlett's note to the bank, and
agreed to pay on the balance of the note $1 for every $6 from moneys Artex
made available to Carter from the Argentine contracts whether by way of re-
payment of advances and loans, dividends, dissolution, salary, or otherwise.
Artex was ultimately dissolved without anything more being paid on the $20,-
000 balance on the note. Having paid the balance, Paine sued to enforce the
contract as the assignee of Bartlett's rights therein.
The evidence showed that Artex had not only lost a great deal of money on
the Argentine projects, but lost all of its construction equipment as well when
converted in Bolivia by a fellow joint adventurer in Artex's Argentine venture.
Carter alone lost over 2 million dollars in advances and loans, and Artex on
dissolution owed another $1,750,000. The jury found that all that Artex had
received from the Argentine government after the contract was signed was
$2.01. Relying on another finding that Carter was the alter ego of Artex, Paine
argued that Carter should have paid Artex's debt from whatever moneys Artex
received regardless of expenses owed or incurred. The court regarded the jury's
alter ego finding as immaterial, because having chosen to contract with Artex
and Carter in their separate capacities with full knowledge of the corporate
structure and with the contract itself calling on Carter to assume full owner-
ship of the corporation, Bartlett, and consequently the plaintiff, would be es-
topped to claim Carter was the alter ego of Artex.
The holding is eminently sound and demonstrates again the reluctance of
the Texas courts to allow a person who elects to contract with a corporation
fully aware of its financing and shareholder ownership to avoid the conse-
quences and risks of his voluntary choice of obligors and contractual arrange-
ments by incantation of alter ego or the other litany of the disregard doctrine."
Surely if anyone is to be bound by his selection of parties with whom to con-
tract, as between the corporation and its sole shareholder, it ought to be the
president of the corporation who has full knowledge of its affairs.
The alter ego argument was raised in two other cases, but in somewhat
different contexts. In Sargent v. Highlite Broadcasting Co.""' the Austin court
of civil appeals refused to allow a corporation, which it characterized as a sham,
to avoid a contract for its sale on grounds that proper corporate formalities had
not been observed in authorizing the sale."' Although neglect to follow the
prescribed procedures for corporate governance is sometimes a factor in dis-
3"8 See Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968) (by im-
plication); Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 195, 284 S.W.2d 340, 351 (1955); Mn-
chen v. Van Trease, 425 S.W.2d 435, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968),
error ref. n.r.e.; George v. Houston Boxing Club, Inc., 423 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967), error ref. n.r.e.; Blond Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v.
Funk, 392 S.W.2d 586, 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965); Associates Dev. Corp.
v. Air Control Prods., Inc., 392 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965), error
ref. n.r.e.; Radio KBUY, Inc. v. Lieurance, 390 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1965); Atomic Fuel Extraction Corp. v. Estate of Slick, 386 S.W.2d 180, 190 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1964), error ref. n.r.e.
a°466 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971).




regard cases,"" there is ample authority to bind a corporation, whether sham
or real, to informally approved transactions"" without having to talk, as the
court did, in alter ego terms. In the other case,"'1 a creditor who recovered
judgment against an insolvent corporation, but was denied recovery against
its shareholder for conversion, was barred by res judicata from suing the share-
holder again on an alter ego theory. Even if the corporation were the alter
ego of the defendant shareholder, which the court found it not to be, that fact
alone does not create a cause of action against the shareholder; it is simply a
basis for holding the individual for a cause of action that would otherwise
exist only against the corporation.
Parent-Subsidiary Cases. The disregard doctrine is often raised in cases in-
volving the parent-subsidiary relationship with occasional success. At times
elementary justice seems to demand that a business as a whole be held respon-
sible for obligations incurred in carrying on part of its enterprise,"" rather than
to allow various layers of limited liability to be interposed through use of mul-
tiple corporations and, thus, thwart creditors of one of the segments of the
business. Nevertheless, dividing a business into separate corporate units con-
... This factor is seldom articulated, but is obviously present in cases that talk of the sole
or controlling shareholder treating the corporation as his alter ego. See, e.g., Manney v. Texas
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 407 S.W.2d 345, 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966) (by implica-
don); American Petroleum Exch. Inc. v. Lord, 399 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1966), error ref. n.r.e.; Evans v. General Ins. Co. of America, 390 S.W.2d 818, 822
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965) (dictum); Westwood Dev. Co. v. Esponge, 342 S.W.2d
623, 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961), error rel. n.r.e.; Bayou Drilling Co. v.
Baillo, 312 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958), error ref. n.r.e. (by implication);
Fruth v. Gaston, 187 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945), error ref. w.o.r. (by
implication). See also Hamilton, supra note 114, at 990 n.41, commenting on the difficulty of
listing such cases even though the informality factor is a most significant consideration in
alter ego or other disregard cases.
Professor Hamilton is critical of the use of the alter ego rationale when corporate in-
formalities or confusion of personal and corporate funds have occurred, since neither may
relate to the real issue of liability in tort or in contract. True, the shareholders may justly
complain of such actions, but to allow creditors to take advantage of such deficiencies is to
give them a windfall. For a recent, well-reasoned decision refusing to disregard the entity
for the benefit of creditors when these elements were present, see Sutton v. Reagan & Gee,
405 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966), error ref. n.r.e., discussed critically
in Pelletier, supra note 56, at 144; cf. Texlite, Inc. v. Wineburgh, 373 S.W.2d 325 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1963), error ref. n.r.e. See generally N. LATrrr, supra note 117, at 69.
"'See Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515, 519-20, 348 S.W.2d 517, 519-20 (1961); Aran-
sas Pass Harbor Co. v. Manning, 94 Tex. 558, 562-63, 63 S.W. 627, 629-30 (1901); Sutton
v. Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966), error ref. u.r.e.;
cf. Caldwell v. Kingsberry, 451 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970), error ref.
n.r.e. But see Curtis v. Pipelife Corp., 370 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1963) (applying Delaware law).
" Gulf Reduction Corp. v. Boyles Galvanizing & Plating Co., 456 S.W.2d 476 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970).
... The notion of using the disregard doctrine to construct a single entity responsible for
the acts of its incorporated parts was developed in Berle, supra note 34, although suggested
earlier in E. LATrY, supra note 125, at 212-20. See, e.g., NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361
U.S. 398 (1960); Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Hartford Steam
Serv. Co. v. Sullivan, 26 Conn. Super. 277, 220 A.2d 772 (1966); Walkovszky v. Carlton,
18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966). See also Hamilton, supra note 114, at 985. Texas
cases illustrating the enterprise approach include Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Miskell, 424 S.W.2d
482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968), error ref. n.r.e.; Houston-American Life Ins. Co. v.
Tate, 358 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962); State v. Lone Star Gas Co., 86
S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 304 U.S. 224 (1938);
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Texas R.R. Comm'n, 77 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1934).
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trolled either through a holding company or common ownership is part of
our economic way of life, so that here too disregard is the exception and
not the rule."' So long as proper formalities are observed and a genuine effort
is made to avoid commingling the affairs of the constituent corporations, their
separate entities (and responsibilities) will be respected.' 6
For example, in a federal district court decision applying Texas law 1 the
lessor of a truck terminal successfully sued the lessee truck company, a truck
system which later acquired all the truck company's stock and guaranteed
performance of the lease, and a freight company to whom the terminal was
subleased, for damages to the terminal during the lease period. The case
turned on the respective liabilities of the three defendants. Among its argu-
ments the truck company contended that its erstwhile parent had exercised
such domination and control over it that it was just a tool or instrumentality of
the parent which was, therefore, the real party in interest. Although finding
for the truck company on other grounds, the court rejected the disregard argu-
ment. The parent company would not be held liable as the primary obligor
on the lease, it said, inasmuch as the truck company had been maintained,
operated, and managed as a separate entity. Undoubtedly a significant factor,
of which the court took note, was the fact the truck company had operated in
the terminal independently for eight years before its acquisition by the truck
system.
On the other hand, when the intercorporate relationship is used to defraud
creditors, work an inequity, or evade statutory or public policy, the courts will
not hesitate to consider the interrelated corporations as one or hold the parent
liable.'18 As has been suggested, the results are frequently cloaked behind terms
branding the subsidiary the instrumentality, dummy, puppet, tool, or agent of
the parent, without revealing the primary reasons for invoking the doctrine,
although the agency analogy may be appropriate if the subsidiary actually
represented the parent in the transaction.
Two cases decided during the survey period dealing with the Sunday closing
8"'See Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1968); Hub-
bard v. Capital Southwest Corp., 448 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969); Thomp-
son v. Sinkler, 295 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1956), error ref. n.r.e., rev'd
on other grounds sub noma. Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 365 U.S. 758 (1958); State v. Swift& Co., 187 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945), error ref.; Texas Pac. Coal & Oil
Co. v. Smith, 130 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939), error dismissed, judgment
correct; State v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 263 S.W. 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1924),
error ref. See generally HENN 258; N. LATTIN, supra note 117, at 100; E. LATTY, supra
note 125; Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALIF. L.
REV. 12 (1925); Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Cor-
porations, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 473, 487 (1953); Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1102 (1971)
(liability of corporation for contracts of subsidiary).
16 Both the Texas Supreme Court in Bell Oil and the Austin court of civil appeals in
the leading State v. Swift & Co. cases, note 315 supra, quote approvingly from Douglas &
Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193,
196-97 (1929), setting out four standards for keeping business units from being assimilated.
See Hamilton, supra note 114, at 992; Note, Corporations-Piercing the Corporate Veil,
23 Sw. L.J. 384 (1969).
31" Freight Terminals, Inc. v. Ryder System, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
38 E.g., Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Miskell, 424 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1968), error ref. n.r.e.; Houston-American Life Ins. Co. v. Tate, 358 S.W.2d 645, 656 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1962); Hamblen v. Horwitz-Texan Theaters Co., 162 S.W.2d 455, 457(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1942); Continental Supply Co. v. Forrest E. Gilmore Co., 55
S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1932), error dismissed.
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laws illustrate the refusal of the Texas courts to allow the corporate device to
be employed to circumvent prohibitory legislation.1 ' Both concerned the same
multicorporation discount chain and its efforts to avoid the impact of the Texas
statute prohibiting sales of certain merchandise on consecutive Saturdays and
Sundays . . by setting up a separate corporation to nominally operate the dis-
count stores on Sunday."2 ' The corporation was named, appropriately enough,
Sundaco, Inc. It had been organized a few days before a restrictive amendment
to the blue law became effective,2 ' shared officers and shareholders in common
with the parent of the discount chain, and utilized the same employees of
various stores in the chain. Under the arrangements between Sundaco and
some of the individual stores, each week Sundaco would lease the retail
premises from one minute before Saturday midnight to Sunday midnight, and
at the same time purchase all the merchandise on hand at the beginning of
the period with the option to the lessor to repurchase the goods on hand at
midnight Sunday, an option always exercised. The goods sold or repurchased
were never inventoried, and the retail sales were made by employees who
worked for the chain the remainder of the week. Despite the argument that
Sundaco was a separate entity distinct from its lessors and suppliers, both the
Waco and Eastland courts of civil appeals had no difficulty affirming injunc-
tions issued against all the corporations concerned from violating the Sunday
closing law on the ground that the defendants in essence were operating the
same business at the same place by the same employees. The arrangement
was deemed a subterfuge, and Sundaco itself was found, in the usual oppro-
brious terms, to be the alter ego, agent, conduit, and tool of the chain, be-
cause, as the Eastland court typically put it: "[Clourts will look through the
form to the substance of the relations between corporations and will disregard
the fiction of corporate identity if it is used to circumvent the statute or as a
mere tool or business conduit." ' ' Without arguing the wisdom of the Sunday
closing laws and with the issue of their unconstitutionality seemingly fore-
closed,2 4 it is difficult to conceive of any court permitting the underlying
3" Clark's Texas, Inc. v. Stewart, 466 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971), error
ref. n.r.e.; Sundaco, Inc. v. State, 463 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970), error
ref. n.r.e.320 TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 286a (Supp. 1972).
"' The chain's efforts to stay open on Sundays have led to considerable litigation in addi-
tion to the cases cited in note 319 supra. See State v. Cook United, Inc., 469 S.W.2d 709(Tex.), modifying 463 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971); State v. Cook
United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1971), rev'g 455 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1970); Suttle v. State, 457 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970); State v.
Sundaco, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969), error ref. n.r.e., appeal
dismissed, 397 U.S. 591 (1970).
a
2 Ch. 39, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 79, repealing ch. 15, § 4 (a), [1961] Tex. Laws 38.
The repealed section allowed the purchase of any of the items forbidden to be sold on a
consecutive Saturday or Sunday if the purchaser would certify in writing that the purchase
was for an emergency to protect health, welfare, or safety of human or animal life or limb.
Some discount stores opening on Sunday prepared certificate-of-necessity forms, which their
Sunday customers would almost invariably sign. The practice was upheld by the Texas Su-
preme Court in State v. Shoppers World, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1964), which held
that the seller was not obligated to determine if the purchasers signed such certificates in
good faith. With the repeal the Sundaco device seemed to be the only alternative left to try
(short of repeal of the closing law itself).
.23 463 S.W.2d at 532.
"'The constitutionality of the Texas Sunday (and Saturday) closing law, TaX. PEN.
CODE ANN. art. 286a (Supp. 1972), has been specifically upheld. State v. Spartan's Indus-
1972]
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policies which support such legislation to be flaunted by a legalism as patent
as the one employed here."n
Even so, not every prohibition mandated by public policy is necessarily free
from erosion, even when found in constitutional form. This is suggested by
another of the disregard cases, this time in the field of banking. In Bank of
North America v. State Banking Board" a Houston bank attempted to enjoin
the issuance of a state bank charter to a new competitor on several grounds,
including an assertion that the new bank was in reality a branch of a much
larger downtown Houston bank in contravention of the Texas Constitution,
which bans branch banking.2" The plaintiff alleged that of the 30,000 shares
in the new bank, 11,740 were being taken by the law firm that represented
the downtown bank with another 2,800 shares subscribed to by some of the
downtown bank's officers and employees, showing that as a matter of law the
new bank was being organized "as an adjunct, instrumentality, or agency" of
the larger bank.
Affirming the trial court's refusal to grant a temporary injunction, the
Austin court of civil appeals rejected the plaintiff's inferences and conclusory
arguments. As to the law firm, the court observed that the bank was also
represented by two other firms, and to explain the large stock purchase took
notice of the fact that law firms sometimes invest in stock of their corporate
clients. Of the 2,800 other shares, 1,000 were being taken by the officer of
the larger bank who was to become president of the new bank. Although a
member of the law firm was a director of the big bank and solicited sub-
scriptions to the new bank, this in itself did not prove that he was acting in
behalf of his firm's client. Nor were the facts that the new president might
consult his former employer or that it would become the main correspondent
of the new bank deemed conclusive.
tries, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. 1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 590 (1970); Ralph
Williams Gulfgate Chrysler Plymouth Inc. v. State, 466 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1971), error ref. n.r.e.; Levitz Furniture Co. v. State, 450 S.W.2d
96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969), error ref. n.r.e.; State v. Sundaco, Inc., 445 S.W.2d
606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Easdand 1969), error ref. n.r.e., appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 591
(1970). In general such legislation has been held constitutional. See, e.g., Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
35 For other Texas cases supporting the disregard doctrine when statutory regulation or
policy is being evaded through use of the corporate fiction see Sapphire Homes, Inc. v. Gil-
bert, 426 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968), error ref. n.r.e. (usury laws); Bene-
ficial Fin. Co. v. Miskell, 424 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
(loan company regulation); Manning v. State, 423 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1967), error ref. n.r.e. (insurance regulation); Houston-American Life Ins. Co. v. Tate, 358
S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962) (usury and insurance regulation); State v.
Lone Star Gas Co., 86 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935), error ref., rev'd on other
grounds, 304 U.S. 224 (1938) (utility company regulation); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Texas R.R. Comm'n, 77 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1934) (transportation regu-
lation); Williams v. Freeport Sulphur Co., 40 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1930) (shareholder's inspection rights); Lee v. Galena-Signal Oil Co., 8 S.W.2d 1051 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1928) (receivership statutes). See generally N. LATTIN, supra note
117, at 79-83.
311468 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971).
a12TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 16. The constitution says simply: "Such (bank] shall not
be authorized to engage in business at more than one place which shall be designated in its
charter." The prohibition is reiterated, but in much more expansive terms in TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903 (Supp. 1972).
[Vol. 26
19721 CORPORATIONS
Although the court's opinion was undoubtedly correct on the basis of the
record before it, the result hardly squares with the realities of banking in
Texas. Overtly, the prohibition against branch banking has led to a prolifer-
ation of unit banks in Texas, more so than in any other state.5" Nevertheless,
there is considerable informal affiliation through the strong correspondent
banking system by which the very largest banks in the state have established
networks of correspondent banks from which they derive large deposits."'
Another phenomenon is the prevalence of chain banking based either on con-
trol of two or more banks by an individual or group of individuals through
common stock ownership or on direct ownership by a usually large, metro-
politan bank of no more than 24.9 percent of the stock of each of several,
usually smaller, suburban banks.' Thus, at the end of December 1971 there
were at least 124 bank chains in Texas containing 434 banks, accounting for
thirty-six percent of the total banks in the state and fifty percent of the de-
posits." Other Texas banks are more formally controlled by one-bank hold-
ing companies that grew in number from forty in 1968 to ninety-one in late
1971 and hold roughly a third of the deposits in metropolitan areas." The
most recent development, and the likely wave of the future, has been the
growth of multibank holding companies, spurred by the Bank Holding Com-
pany Amendments of 1970.' By the end of 1971 seven such companies had
321 1971 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF U.S., Table No. 663, at 435; Finance: Texas Banks
Make a Bid for the Big Time, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 4, 1971, at 60 [hereinafter cited as BUS.
WEEK]. There are more than 1,200 unit banks in Texas. Of these, 530 are national banks,
again the largest number in the country. 1970 COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY ANN. REP.
186.
'2' Bus. WEEK 62.
"Id. See also Kelly, Bank Structure-Consolidation of Banks Reshaping Texas Markets,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS Bus. REV., Jan. 1, 1972, at 3 thereinafter cited as
Kelly). Prior to the adoption of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, see
note 333 infra, companies owning 25% or more of the stock of two or more banks had to
register as bank holding companies; hence, many large banks kept their direct ownership in
smaller banks to less than 25%, resulting in chains composed of a large metropolitan bank
and so-called "24.9 percent" affiliates. Id. at 3.
" Id. See also Bus. WEEK 62.
"'2 Kelly 5.
"Pub. L. No. 91-607, §§ 101-06, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970), amending 12 U.S.C.
S5 1841-49 (1970). The 1970 amendments made several significant changes in the bank
holding company law. Among the more important were: (1) Inclusion of one-bank holding
companies and partnerships within the coverage of the 1956 Act so as to make them sub-ject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; under the
former law two or more banks had to be controlled; (2) expansion of the control concept
under the old law from the power to vote 25 % or more of the voting shares, or ability to
control the election of a majority of the board of directors, to giving the Board of Governors
authority to determine that an organization is a bank holding company if it directly or in-
directly exercises a controlling influence over the policies and management of a bank. There
is presumption of noncontrol if less than 5% of the voting securities can be voted; (3)
limiting the permitted scope of nonbanking activities to those closely related to the business
of banking. As a result of the amendments, many large Texas banks that formerly held
24.9% or less interests in other banks, see note 330 supra, are now applying to become
multibank holding companies to formalize their preexisting relationship, since they un-
doubtedly exercise the requisite controlling influence over their affiliates. See Kelly 3.
On federal bank holding company legislation see generally PLI, THE NEW BANK HOLD-
ING COMPANY ACT OF 1970 (R. Needham ed. 1971); Blaine, Registered Bank Holding
Companies and the One-Bank Holding Company, 26 BUS. LAW. 9 (1970); Edwards, The
One Bank Holding Company Conglomerate: Analysis and Evaluation, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1275 (1959); Panel Discussion, Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 39 ABA ANTITRUST
L.J. 432 (1970); Comment, Approaches to Regulation of One-Bank Holding Companies,
55 VA. L. REV. 952 (1969); Legislation Note, Bank Holding Company Act Amendment of
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been formed or approved and another sixteen applications were pending
before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 4 If approved,
a total of seventy-one Texas banks representing a twenty-two percent share
of all deposits in the state would become part of multibank holding company
systems.5"
The legal dimensions of these patterns of banking organization and affilia-
tion remain to be fully measured. As the Austin court pointed out in the
Bank of North America case, the no-branch-banking provision had not been
judicially construed before, the only rulings on the subject being several at-
torney general's opinions.' In its decision the court set out the substance of
the most comprehensive of these"' without deciding that it necessarily stated
the law. The attorney general's report extrapolated a state policy from the
constitutional provision that prohibits one bank organizing another and then
dominating it to such an extent that it becomes a branch operation. On the
other hand, the constitution does not preclude common stock ownership, and
that fact alone shows no violation unless the shareholders of one bank acquire
a controlling interest in another for the purpose of so operating the controlled
bank as an instrumentality or agency of their other bank." The attorney gen-
eral's opinion reflects, of course, the basic elements of the disregard doctrine.
And while the absence of judicial construction until Bank of North America
suggests general satisfaction with the status quo, the advent of, and reactions
to, the holding company movement as well as recent bank scandals may yet
prove that that decision marked the end of the lull before the storm, both
legislatively' " and judicially.
Other Disregard Cases. The remaining two disregard cases reflect some of the
variety of circumstances in which the doctrine can be involved. In Knebel v.
1970, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (1971); Note, Banking-Recent Enactment of Federal
Legislation Regulating One Bank Holding Companies, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 473 (1971).3 4 Kelly 5.
m5Id. at 4; see Bus. WEEK 60.
6 See TEX. Arr'y GEN. Op. Nos. M-273 (1968), M-82 (1967), WW-41 (1958),
WW-159 (1957), V-1046 (1950).
1 The opinion referred to was really a 38-page study submitted by the attorney general
to the State Banking Board on Aug. 18, 1952, as a background report, not a formal opinion.
As a consequence it is not found in the Attorney General's Opinions nor is it indexed in C.
MARTIN, TWENTY-FOUR YEAR INDEX AND TABLES TO THE OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF TEXAS 1947-1970 (1971). However, the report can be obtained from the
office of the attorney general in Austin upon request.
." The language is taken from the attorney general's report referred to in note 337
supra. Most of the study is devoted to a consideration of the authorities on disregard of the
corporate entity especially in instances in which the corporate entity is used to evade public
policy. See note 325 supra.
21' The Bank Holding Company Act expressly reserves power to the states to regulate
banks and bank holding companies as they see fit, 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1971), and this would
seem to include the power to prohibit the formation of bank holding companies. See Whit-
ney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411 (1965). However, §
1846 does not necessarily mean that state imposed restrictions on branch banking auto-
matically become applicable to bank holding companies. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Board
of Governors, 451 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that the Federal Reserve Board did
not err in determining formation of multibank holding company in Arkansas was valid
despite that state's prohibition against branch banking). Arkansas has now passed specific
legislation prohibiting the creation or expansion of multibank holding companies. No. 47,
SS 1-9, [1971) Ark. Acts 188.
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Capital National Bank' the court ignored the incorporation of a one-man
business to carry out the testamentary intention of the owner. Knebel exe-
cuted a will at a time when he was the sole proprietor of a soft drink bot-
tling company, leaving fifty-two percent of his residual estate to ten individuals,
one of whom was designated as "my general manager," and each of the other
nine as "my employee." Three years before his death Knebel incorporated the
business both for tax reasons and to give four of his employees an interest in
the business. However, he continued to operate the business as before and
directed the new employee-shareholders in their work as he always had. After
his death his coexecutor brought a declaratory judgment action to construe
the will, contending that since the business had been incorporated when
Knebel died, he had no employees and, hence, the bequest failed. The court
wisely held that while it would not hold the corporation was not bona fide, it
would not permit the technicality of its existence to defeat Knebel's obvious
intention to benefit "his" long-term employees.
In the other case,341 this time involving the sole shareholder of two cor-
porations who was sued as a guarantor along with one of his corporations on
an account, the defendants were unsuccessful in an argument that a payment
that the defendant corporation had made for goods supplied to the other cor-
poration should be credited to the defendant corporation's account because it
was paid by mistake. The court refused to allow a set-off or find unjust enrich-
ment in view of the fact that the payment had been made by the bookkeeper
for both corporations pursuant to general instructions given by the sole share-
holder. The latter's ownership of substantially all the shares of both corpora-
tions provided consideration for the payment, even if the bookkeeper did mis-
takenly pay a draft drawn on one corporation out of the funds of another.
V. SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENTS
The great bulk of corporations organized in Texas each year are closely
held enterprises, which are for all practical purposes incorporated proprietor-
ships or partnerships. In the instance of the latter it is understandable that the
several persons associated together in corporate form would like the same
protection against outsiders being admitted into the business that partnership
law affords. 4' The delectus personae" safeguard cannot be attained in the
corporation, however, without some concrete action being taken. Frequently
this takes the form of restrictions on transferability of shares that the corpora.
tion imposes in its articles or bylaws, or that arise from agreements among
some or all the shareholders, and sometimes the corporation, that give the
contracting parties the right or option to acquire stock that might otherwise
be disposed of to others. But not all agreements among shareholders need
340469 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
"Pacific Molasses Co. v. Graves, 451 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970),
error ref. n.r.e.
" "No person can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the
partners." Texas Uniform Partnership Act § 18(g), TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b
(1962).




be for this purpose. Some may seek to establish or assure control; others to
provide buy-out arrangements in the event of disagreement or deadlock. All,
of course, are contracts, and when disputes arise concerning their meaning or
application, the issues can often be resolved in the same manner as any other
contracts case, despite their corporate context. This was largely true of the
rather large number of cases dealing with shareholder's agreements decided
during the survey period, only one of which raised any significant question
concerning the validity of such arrangements under corporate law.
Buy-Out Arrangements. A potential hazard in the close corporation, and one
that should be anticipated and provided for, is the possibility of dissension
among the shareholder-associates. The operation of any partnership type of
business is necessarily based on a close working relationship among the par-
ticipants in the enterprise, and, given the frailties of human nature, such rela-
tionships can be easily soured for a variety of reasons ranging from petty an-
noyances to incompatability to outright knavery. If the business is a prosperous
one, the resulting discord can wreck everyone's investment. One solution is to
provide a buy-out arrangement whereby the dissatisfied party can require his
shares be purchased by the others or be given an option to purchase theirs.
Such arrangements are quite common when the shareholdings are evenly di-
vided. 4
In a case ' involving a buy-out agreement between two owners of all the
stock of a poultry packing company, the issue turned on whether the dissatis-
fied shareholder's notification to the other of his desire to buy out the latter's
shares was an unconditional offer. Under the shareholder's agreement a party
not satisfied with the manner in which the business of the corporation was
being conducted was to notify the other in writing of such fact and state the
cash price he was willing to sell his stock for or buy the stock of the other.
The defendant wrote the plaintiff that to accomplish business objectives he
needed full ownership and offered to buy the plaintiff's stock, indicating,
however, that certain matters would have to be negotiated. The negotiations
were not successful, but thereafter the plaintiff wrote the defendant saying
that it exercised its option to buy the defendant's stock. The defendant an-
swered withdrawing his offer, and the plaintiff sued seeking transfer of the
shares. The Tyler court of civil appeals reversed a summary judgment for the
plaintiff, holding that the series of letters did not establish a concluded con-
tract. The defendant's offer was conditional and was not prohibited by the
buy-sell agreement.
"4See 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, at § 9.05; W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX
ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 260 (1971) [hereinafter cited as PAINTER)
on use of buy-out arrangements when deadlock and dissension occur. See also Bradley, Stock
Transfer Restrictions and Buy-Sell Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 139, 175; Israels, The
Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L.
REV. 778 (1952); cf. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 7.05.A(1) (b), (3) (1956) (re-
ceivership when directors or shareholders become deadlocked); Note, Arbitration as a
Means of Settling Disputes Within Close Corporations, 63 COLuM. L. REV. 267 (1963);
Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for Intra-Close Corporation Disputes, 56 VA. L.
REv. 271 (1970).
34 Roy Herider Feed Co. v. Modern Feeds of Nacogdoches, Inc., 468 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
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Sometimes buy-out arrangements are made to acquire the interest of a
minority shareholder who would rather have his shares purchased than go
along with an impending change in the corporate set-up. This seems to have
been the situation in a decision construing the provisions of a contract for the
sale of a minority block of stock in a drug store chain.'" Alkire, a minority
shareholder in Dugan Drug Stores, Inc., entered into an agreement with
Dugan, the majority shareholder, and the corporation to sell his shares to the
corporation for $3 per share to be paid by the corporation's $96,000 note,
payable $1,000 per month. The agreement was then supplemented by another
which provided that "in the event all of the oustanding shares of corporate
stock of Dugan Drug Store, Inc. should be sold by J. S. Dugan" for less than
$3 per share, Alkire agreed to a proportionate reduction of the sales price of
his shares "to correspond with the sales price per share received by J. S. Dugan
from a bona fide sale of his controlling interest," provided the consideration
was paid in cash.
Three years later Dugan sold all 275,000 shares of his stock to Mading
Drug Stores. Although nominally paid $390,000 in cash, of that amount
$206,000 was paid immediately to a creditor pharmaceutical manufacturer,
and $184,000 was credited on the corporation's books against Dugan's draw-
ing account to cover his withdrawals from the corporation. Even though
$54,000 remained to be paid on Alkire's note, the corporation, now under
Mading's control, tendered a check for $1,760 in final payment of his note,
claiming that under the proportionate reduction provision no more was owed.
Not surprisingly, Alkire sued.
At the trial the jury found that the provision that "[ijn the event all of the
outstanding shares" in the corporation's stock should be sold by Dugan was
intended by the parties to mean a sale of "all the outstanding shares of stock
owned by J. S. Dugan." Reversing a judgment based on the verdict for the
corporation, the court held that the price-reduction clause would not apply
unless Dugan had sold all the outstanding shares in the corporation. Since the
parties chose their words with care, there was no indication that Alkire agreed
to reduce the consideration he was to receive if all Dugan sold was his con-
trolling interest in the corporation.
Perhaps so, but at the time the documents were executed, 31,600 shares
were owned by persons other than Dugan and Alkire. Since there was like-
wise no indication that Dugan planned to acquire these shares, it is just as
plausible the parties intended to deal only with a possible disposition of
Dugan's controlling shares, especially since negotiations for a sale or merger
of the corporation had been going on at the time. But no doubt the reduction
in consideration was so great that it seemed fairer to give Alkire the benefit
of the questioned construction, even though discrepancy in price is seldom
critical in shareholders' agreements.
47
86 Alkire v. Dugan Drug Stores, Inc., 468 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist
Dist.] 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
4'See, e.g., Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ($80,000 interest
bought for $10,000); Cutter Labs., Inc. v. Twining, 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 34 Cal. Rptr.
317 (1963) ($800,000 worth of stock redeemed for $36,000); In re Estate of Mather, 410
Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963) ($1 share paid under agreement for stock having value of
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Control Agreement. Two cases dealt with agreements among holders of con-
trolling shares in banks and subsequent dispositions or attempts to dispose of
control shares. In Woodrum v. Cowan8 Woodrum, the president of an Abilene
bank, entered into an agreement with Cowan and Jacobsen, who had just pur-
chased a substantial block of stock in the bank, to pool their holdings and
vote the block as a unit so long as the shares remained pledged to a Fort
Worth bank from whom the parties had borrowed the purchase money for
the stock. After four months the parties disagreed and, according to Woodrum,
he was forced to sell his shares to Cowan and Jacobsen, but under a contract
providing that if the latter sold their controlling interest in the bank or
enough stock to amount to fifty-one percent of the outstanding shares to "any
one person, firm or corporation" within the next two years, Woodrum would
receive one-third of their profit.
Five months later Cowan and Johnson sold more than fifty-one percent of
the bank's stock to a group of five Abilene businessmen at a substantial
profit. Woodrum sued to recover his one-third of the profit. The defendants
claimed they were not obligated under their contract with Woodrum because
the sale had not been to "one person, firm or corporation." In response the
court noted that the Abilene group obligated themselves to retain control of
the bank among themselves so long as the funds they jointly borrowed to
finance the purchase remained unpaid. Because they acted as a group in buy-
ing the stock as a block, financing it, and agreeing to maintain control through
the shares acquired, the Abilene group were joint adventurers. Since the Texas
courts regard joint ventures as a species of partnership, " and the purpose of
the agreement with Woodrum was to assure sale of the stock in a single
transaction to realize the enhanced value of control stock," ° the sale to the
Abilene group was quite properly held to be tantamount to the sale to a firm
within the meaning and intent of the contract.
The other case also concerned a pooling agreement among majority share-
holders of a bank that had been entered into to forestall a takeover by an
outsider, but the facts stated must be read in light of those given by the Texas
$1,060); Jones v. Harris, 63 Wash. 2d 559, 388 P.2d 539 (1964) ($325,000 interest pur-
chased for $25,000); see HENN 561; 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, at § 7.06.
' 468 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd and remanded per curiam, 472
S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1971). The supreme court based its action on the fact that Woodrum
had not moved for summary judgment, but the court of civil appeals had, nevertheless,
rendered judgment in his behalf. The only issue the court could consider was whether the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Cowan and Jacobsen. The case was re-
manded for a trial on all the issues, the supreme court indicating it would not decide whether
the court of civil appeals was correct in any of the holdings discussed herein other than
that summary judgment against Woodrum was improvidently granted.
3"E.g., Colonial Refrigerated Transp. Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541, 546 (5th Cir.
1968) (applying Texas law); Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 631, 291 S.W.2d 704, 709
(1956). See generally J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 343; Jaeger, Partnership or
Joint Venture?, 37 NoTRE DAME LAW. 138 (1961); Taubman, What Constitutes a joint
Venture?, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 640 (1956).
31 Although not raised as an issue, the legitimacy of the premium price a control block
of stock commands in light of the fiduciary duties that may be owed by those selling control
to the corporation and the remaining shareholders has been a topic of continuing interest
among the commentators. See, e.g., Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic
illegitimacy, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 215 (1969); Berle, The Price of Controlling Shares, 70
HARv. L. REV. 986 (1957); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1
(1956); Newman & Pickering, Premium for Control, 28 TEX. B.J. 735 (1965). See also
HENN 479 n.5 collecting other authorities.
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Supreme Court in reversing the decision at the close of the year."' As stated
by the court of civil appeals, the agreement in question required any with-
drawing party to give a ninety-day option to the other shareholders during
which time his shares could be purchased at their fair market value."' Later
the president and another director of the bank sold part of their shares to an-
other outsider who wanted control on the assurance that the president would
be kept in office, and both aided in buying stock for the outsider from other
stockholders. Despite the primary objective of keeping the first outsider from
getting control, the agreement had no termination date. Hence, the court was
of the opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to a temporary injunction to
protect his option rights to the stock against what it viewed as an obvious
breach of contract by the president and director."
Stock Transfer Restrictions. Only one case during the survey period dealt with
stock transfer restrictions,"4 and it raised the interesting question of whether
such restrictions retain any validity after the corporation is dissolved. In
Mischer v. Burke.' the bylaws of the corporation had a first option provision
requiring a stockholder desiring to sell his shares to give written notice to the
other stockholders of his intent and his asking price. The other stockholders
or whatever number chose to exercise the option would then have five days
to decide. If the options were not exercised, the stockholder was free to sell to
third parties, but at a price no lower than that stated in the notice. The stock
certificates were duly indorsed with notice of the restriction.
In 1958 Peachey, one of the original directors and officers of the corpora-
"'Wieser v. Manning, 469 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco), rev'd, 474 S.W.2d
448 (Tex. 1971).
"In the supreme court's view there was a serious question whether a presently enforce-
able contract existed at all, if the testimony of the president was accurate. The president
testified that the only document the shareholders signed was a statement: "I hereby sub-
scribe to the pooling of shares owned in Perry National Bank and will sign the formal in-
strument when it is ready for my signature." 474 S.W.2d at 450. The other terms, including
the 90-day option, came from two sheets of paper kept in the bank files which he had gotten
from another banker in the event a formal contract was ever prepared.
"'As stated by the supreme court, the president and director had already sold all but
their qualifying shares to the outsider when plaintiff brought his suit and by the time the
temporary injunction hearing was held, the outsider, who had no knowledge of the agree-
ments, was in control. The trial court's decision that there was no need for the restraint was
well within the exercise of its discretion. Id. at 450.
"'A troublesome case dealing with stock transfer restrictions was decided after the
close of the survey period, but while this Article was being written. It is Ling & Co. v. Trinity
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 470 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971), error granted, and has
drawn such adverse reaction from the corporate bar that it is briefly noted here. In the case
the Waco court invalidated what appears to have been a fairly standard first option restriction
(except for a then-required consent restraint because of Ling's membership in the New York
Stock Exchange) on several grounds, all of them dubious. The restriction was held to be
too cumbersome, not conspicuously noted on the stock certificate despite adherence to the
incorporation-by-reference procedure permitted in TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.19(F)
(1956) (which the court failed to mention), and most importantly, not applicable when
a corporation has more than 20 shareholders. The last ruling, in particular, is a patent mis-
reading of id. art. 2.22, which permits reasonable restraints on transfer in several circum-
stances beyond the 20-shareholder, buy-sell agreement category the Waco court used to limit
all of art. 2.22. Because corrective action may be forthcoming either in the supreme court
or the legislature further comment is deferred until next year's Survey.
" 456 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1970), error ref. n.r.e., dis-
cussed in Comment, Vitality of Restrictions on Transferability of Shares Extinction on Dis-
solution or Life Everlasting, 23 BAYLoR L. REV. 97, 99 (1971).
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tion, but who had been removed from office two years earlier, gave Mischer
a note in payment of a prior debt accompanied by an assignment of his
stock.5 ' In February 1960 after Peachey defaulted on the note, Mischer asked
that the stock be transferred to his name on the corporation's books. In August
1960 the corporation dissolved. The final accounting showed a credit to
Peachey's account of $27,000, which Mischer sought to recover as the assignee
of Peachey's stock interest.
Because the restrictions had been imposed prior to passage of the Texas
Business Corporation Act and the corporation had not adopted the Act before
its dissolution,; the court applied the pre-TBCA law although the result
would likely have been the same under the present law. The restriction itself
was held to be reasonable,358 but once the corporation had been dissolved
there was no longer any need to protect the shares against transferability. On
dissolution the stockholder acquires an equitable interest to receive his dis-
tributive share of the net corporate estate, and in this instance Mischer prop-
erly succeeded to Peachey's distributive rights. While it was true Mischer
obtained his shares during the life of the corporation, no action was taken to
set aside his acquisition. Moreover, a transfer in violation of the restriction is
not void, but simply susceptible to being set aside by the corporation or other
shareholders for whose benefit the restriction was imposed."' Insofar as the
selling shareholder is concerned, his rights in the stock are effectively trans-
ferred.
The decision is sound. Transfer restrictions of the type involved here are
designed to preserve a closeness of association in an ongoing enterprise.'
- Mischer argued that the transaction was a pledge and, therefore, not covered by the
restriction which applied only to sales. However, the court read the assignment to be a sale
or transfer instead of a pledge since Peachey retained no rights in the stock.
" When passed in 1955, the TBCA was not immediately applicable to all business cor-
porations, but only those formed after it became effective or which adopted the Act by fol-
lowing the procedure prescribed in art. 9.14(F). Because the Act made such drastic changes
in the old corporate law, the Bar committee thought it desirable to have a five-year trial
period before the Act became applicable to all corporations in 1961. See Comment of Bar
Committee, 3A TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 421 (1956); Carrington, The Texas Business
Corporation Act as Enacted and Ten Years Later, 43 TEXAs L. REv. 609, 616 (1965); Car-
rington, Experience in Texas with the Model Business Corporation Act, 5 UTAH L. REV.
292, 304 (1957).
3" The court quoted here the famous remark by Holmes that "there seems to be no
greater objection to retaining the right of choosing one's associates in a corporation than in
a firm." Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 479, 63 N.E. 934, 935 (1902). On the need for
reasonable restrictions on transfer see generally 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 11, § 7.06; PAINTER
86; Castle, Restrictions on Transferability of Securities, 7 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON COR-
PORATION, BANKING & BusINEss LAW, Jan. 1969, at 7; Pelletier & Marsh, Incorporation
Planning in Texas, 23 Sw. L.J. 820, 841-43 (1969); 14 Sw. L.J. 106 (1960); 38 TEXAS L.
REV. 499 (1960).
" Cf. Irwin v. Prestressed Structures, Inc., 420 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1967), error ref. n.r.e. (corporation can waive restriction); Comment, supra note 355, at 98
(Texas courts will hold transfer in violation of reasonable restriction voidable unless ex-
pressly made void in the restriction).
... The author of the Comment, supra note 355, argues that a restriction on transfer may
need to remain viable even after dissolution to keep outsiders from participating in the
liquidation process, particularly in view of the limited three-year existence given the dis-
solved corporation in art. 2.07 of the Miscellaneous Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
1302-2.07 (1962), and the right granted a corporation whose period of duration has ex-
pired to revive its corporate existence. Although none of these considerations appears relevant
in the instant case or would justify a different result, they do suggest the need for considering
the impact and consequences of dissolution when drafting transfer restrictions.
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Surely if the remaining shareholders took no steps to preserve their close cor-
poration during its existence, they can hardly complain when a selling share-
holder's transferee asserts his proprietary rights after the desired association has
ended.
VI. OTHER DECISIONS
Problems of Formation. Two of the decided cases seem to fit in this category,
although one was concerned with an ingenious argument that a nonprofit
corporation had been transformed into a business corporation without incor-
poration under the TBCA.
In the first case' 0 two promoters opened a checking account with the de-
fendant bank in the name of their proposed corporation with the signature of
both required. Later in the day the plaintiff promoter was asked by his copro-
moter to execute two checks to pay for property to be acquired by the corpora-
tion. The plaintiff gave him postdated checks, but wrote only the name of the
corporation at the bottom of the checks. The copromoter alone signed the
checks, gave them to the owner of the property, who immediately cashed them.
The plaintiff sued the bank for wrongful disbursement of his funds, contending,
among other arguments, the checks required the signatures of both promoters
and that a corporate resolution authorizing checking had not been filed. The
court held, however, that the two were joint adventurers, each being responsible
for and being bound by the acts of the other, including the withdrawal of
funds. Moreover, because the plaintiff asserted that he alone could withdraw
the money, his fellow venturer should necessarily have the same right. As to
the corporate resolution, the corporation was never formed, and the deposit
remained the property of the joint venturers. And if it had been formed, then
only the corporation would have had standing to complain of the unauthorized
withdrawal.
In the other case" ' shareholders of a country club by a two-thirds vote of
those present voted to sell its property in Houston and move the club else-
where. The vote met the requirements of the Texas Non-Profit Corporation
Act."a The plaintiffs, who were members opposed to the move, contended the
club was a business corporation and that under the TBCA, a sale of all the
assets required approval by the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding
shares,' not just those present at the meeting. They theorized that because the
president and secretary of the club filed a statement in 1960 pursuant to article
9.14(F) of the TBCA requiring corporations not yet subject to the Business
Act to designate a registered agent and office, the country club became con-
verted into a profit corporation. As the court of civil appeals noted, the state-
ment in question was required to be filed with the annual report for the state
franchise tax, but no such reports had been filed by the club. Nor would have
adoption of the Business Act by following the procedure prescribed in article
31 Roland v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 463 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971),
error ref. or.e.
"'Argue v. Golfcrest Country Club, 461 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1970).
353 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-5.09 (1962).3 4TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10 (Supp. 1972).
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9.14 (C) for business corporations to come under the Act have been effective,'
since the TBCA expressly prohibits nonprofit corporations from adopting or
organizing under its provisions."" The only way a nonprofit corporation can
convert into a business corporation is by dissolving and reincorporating under
the TBCA.
Corporate Officers: The President. The role of the president in corporate affairs
has progressed considerably from the days when he was considered just another
director with very limited authority whose primary duty was to preside over
meetings of the board.8" Today in most corporations, both large and small,
the president is the chief executive officer both in fact and in title and possesses
a wide range of implied authority to take action that will bind the corporation,
although the full dimensions of how far he can speak and act in its behalf re-
main to be determined.s8 It should be kept in mind, however, that no matter
how mighty, the president, like other officers, is a fiduciary who must adhere
to the standards of care and loyalty expected of all those who represent others.
If he does not, he may be brought to account either by his corporation or the
shareholders for whose general benefit and profit he is supposed to be working.
And while his conduct even if unauthorized may bind the corporation to third
parties under principles of apparent authority, estoppel, or inherent power of
his position,8" he may at the same time have to make good the ultimate loss
his corporate employer suffers because of his carelessness or misconduct. Some
of these overtones are reflected in three cases decided during the survey period
dealing with activities of corporation presidents.
In the simplest case""° the president's misrepresentations resulted in liability
of his corporation to subcontractors whose claim against the corporation was
asserted after the statute of limitations had run. Although the subcontractors
had filed a mechanic's and materialman's lien against the corporation for work
and materials furnished in reconstructing a drive-in theater, when sued by the
president and contractor to cancel their lien, their cross-action was brought
against the president and their contractor and not the corporation because the
president in his pleadings asserted that the theater property belonged to him.
" See note 357 supra.
3"TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.01(A), 9.14(A) (1956). See also TEX, REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-1.03 (1962).
3"7E.g., Black v. Harrison Home Co., 155 Cal. 121, 99 P. 494 (1909); Wainwright-
West Oils, Ltd. v. Cooke, 103 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1937), error dis-
missed; El Fresnal Irrigated Land Co. v. Bank of Washington, 182 S.W. 701 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1916); see W. CARY, CASES & MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 204
(4th ed. 1969); HENN 439; 2 I. HILDEBRAND, supra note 154, at 598; N. LATTIN, supra
note 117, at 257.
" Cf. San Antonio Joint Stock Land Bank v. Taylor, 129 Tex. 335, 105 S.W.2d 650
(1937); Mr. Eddie, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 430 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968), error
ref. n.r.e. See also commentators cited in note 369 infra, passim.
" See Myers, The Inherent Powers of Corporation Presidents, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 117
(1937); Note, Inherent Power as a Basis of a Corporate Officer's Authority To Contract,
57 COLUM. L. REV. 868 (1957); Note, Inherent Powers of Corporate Officers: Need for a
Statutory Definition, 61 HARV. L. REV. 867 (1948); Note, Authority of a Corporate Presi-
dent To Bind the Corporation by Virtue of His Office, 50 YALE L.J. 348 (1940). The
meaning of apparent authority, estoppel, and inherent agency power in agency law is dis-




Just before the trial, but over two years after the work was performed, the sub-
contractors learned for the first time that the theater company owned the
property and filed an amended cross-action. The court ruled that because of the
president's knowledge of the true state of affairs, the corporation would be
estopped to plead limitations, and he would be held personally liable for his
fraudulent misrepresentations.
The second decision concerned a bank president who executed a $100,000
"take-out" letter or guaranty for the benefit of a long-time customer of the
bank, which the bank later had to make good, but not without being sued
first."' In the action the bank claimed that the president lacked authority to
execute the letter and brought a third party claim against him for his dishonest
and fraudulent act in entering into the guaranty. The evidence showed that
the president had no prior experience with "take-out" letters, but arranged
the deal to accommodate a customer to whom the bank could not make a re-
quested loan because its loan ratio was too high at the time. The customer's
financial statement showed him worth in excess of one million dollars, and he
secured the transaction by an assignment to the bank of property worth $300,-
000. The bank's bylaws gave the president authority to perform the duties
generally performed by bank presidents, and he felt he had authority to handle
the transaction, even though he failed to get approval from the board or loan
committee and indeed kept the transaction secret except from the cashier. Part
of the proceeds of the guaranteed loan was used to pay off the customer's $28,-
000 debt to the bank, and the president received no personal benefit from the
arrangement. The trial court held the bank liable on the "take-out" letter and
found for the president in the bank's third party claim against him.
The Dallas court of civil appeals affirmed, stating that the findings of the
trial court were sufficiently supported by the evidence. More specifically, it
held that the president had not violated article 342-411 of the Banking Code"
in creating a "bill payable" without authorization from the board because the
"take-out" letter was not a bill payable. Moreover, the bank had failed to
prove that the statute was violated; thus, inferring that the president had ample
authority from the bylaws to execute the guaranty. Whether the president had
been guilty of a dishonest or fraudulent act was a matter best left to the fact-
finder. Reading between the lines, it seems evident that the court felt the trans-
action involved no more than the exercise of honest business judgment on the
president's part even though it may have turned out badly for the bank. No
doubt the testimony by one of the bank's attorneys that the president was an
honorable and honest man who was upright in his dealings with him did little
to hurt the president's cause.
The third case is from the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, and forms part
of the ever-continuing Westec story. 7 ' As Judge Wisdom aptly put it, the facts
" Guaranty Bond State Bank v. Tucker, 462 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1970), error ref. n.r.e.
3712TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-411 (1959).
3 3 In re Westec Corp., 434 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1970). Westec was a conglomerate con-
cern whose stock shot up in market value from 4J in 1961 to a high of 67J in April 1966,
before trading in the stock was suspended and the business collapsed in August 1966. See
The Economist, Oct. 8, 1966, at 195; NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 1966, at 78; id., Oct. 10, 1966, at
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out of which the action arose "constitute a prescription for corporate collapse:
loose stock transactions, a corporate acquisition made to placate and benefit
a subsidiary's principal officer, and, allegedly, double payments for an officer's
activities."'"
The case concerned a claim filed in the Westec chapter X reorganization
proceedings by Walker, who was the chief executive officer of Seismic, a
wholly owned Australian subsidiary of Westec, for $383,000 based on breach
of a contract with Westec. The trial court disallowed the claim, finding that
no binding contract had been made, and its judgment was affirmed. The Fifth
Circuit held that Walker had not shown that Hall, the president of Westec,
with whom he dealt, had authority to make the alleged contract or that the
contract was consistent with Walker's fiduciary obligations as a corporate
officer.
The contract in question arose from an investment Walker had made in
Continental, another Australian corporation, to whom he eventually loaned
$43,000 of his own funds to keep it from going under. In order to recoup he
felt he had to get Westec to take over Continental and told Hall that unless
Westec acquired the company and otherwise made it worthwhile for him to
stay he would resign and go into competition with Seismic. He assured Hall
that Continental was a good investment even though it was insolvent. Conti-
nental was acquired, but by Seismic, the Westec subsidiary that Walker headed.
Although Walker's loan to Continental was repaid as a result, he remained
unhappy because he anticipated getting Westec stock in the exchange and
profiting in the rapidly rising market for Westec stock. " He wrote Hall ask-
ing in effect that his minority interest in Continental be bought out and Hall
responded by promising to issue 7,000 shares of Westec for Walker's Continen-
tal holdings. However, the board did not authorize the issue, but did authorize
that an option be given Walker for the same number of shares that he ulti-
mately accepted,"'6 although demanding his 7,000 shares from time to time and
finally suing for their market value of $383,000 as of March 15, 1971.
In his effort to show that Hall had authority to contract and to issue the
7,000 shares to him, Walker contended that a president's actions are presumed
to be within the scope of his authority unless otherwise shown."' The Fifth
95; TimE, Sept. 9, 1966, at 96. The corporation went into bankruptcy reorganization under
chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970), and some of its executives
were convicted of stock fraud for market manipulation and dissemination of false informa-
tion. SEC Litigation Release No. 4125 (Oct. 2, 1968). Some details concerning the reorgani-
zation are given in In Re Westec Corp., 313 F. Supp. 1296 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (trustee
awarded $400,000 for 33-months service; general counsel for trustee awarded fee of
$600,000). The trustee in reorganization has brought a 10b-5 action against 93 defendants,
including a number of banks, securities firms, and an accounting firm for the stock manipu-
lation which ultimately led to Westec's collapse. See Ernst & Ernst v. United States District
Court, 439 F.2d 1288 (5th Cir. 1971).
.74434 F.2d at 197.
" Between Oct. 15, 1965, and Mar. 15, 1966, the market price of Westec's stock sex-
tupled in value. Id. at 199.
876 The trial court found in an alternative holding that Walker's acceptance of the option
constituted a novation, even if a valid contract to pay Walker 7,000 shares had been made.
The finding was upheld as amply supported by the evidence. Id. at 201.
' Despite the Fifth Circuit's rejection of the presumption argument, some authority sup-
ports the view that there is a presumption the president has authority to act within the or-
dinary course of the corporation's business. The few Texas cases so suggesting, however, are
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Circuit rejected the argument, saying that under Texas law one who wants to
hold a corporation on a contract made by an agent must prove his authority
to actY78 Furthermore, the president normally does not have the power to
issue stock. As to apparent authority, because Walker was an insider, he knew
better than to rely on Hall's statement to him since he knew only the board
could issue stock. Nor could Walker claim Westec was unjustly enriched by
the Continental acquisition at his expense. He himself gained by having his
personal debt paid back, and it fell within his duties anyway as manager of
Seismic, for which he was amply compensated, to arrange the acquisition.
The court also found that Walker was breaching his fiduciary duties by
seeking to in effect be paid twice for services he should have been rendering to
his corporation and indirectly to all the shareholders of the Westec enter-
prise. Because of his own interest in the transaction he would have the burden
of showing that the transaction was fair and made in good faith."' Hence, even
if the contract had been made with the board it would have been voidable
unless Walker could have shown that the transaction was a good business
move for his corporation-something he failed to do. On the contrary, he was
guilty of bad faith in promoting an acquisition that would benefit himself.
Receiverships. The TBCA has detailed provisions outlining the manner in
which corporations subject to the Act can be placed in receivership."" The
statutory scheme is an amalgam of the old corporate receivership law " ' and
the involuntary dissolution provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 8'
and contemplates that less drastic procedures must be utilized first unless shown
to be inadequate. Thus, a receiver can be appointed for specific corporate as-
sets'' to rehabilitate the corporation, but only if all other remedies, including
ones upholding the validity of a mortgage signed by a corporate officer. See Ballard v. Car-
michael, 83 Tex. 355, 18 S.W. 734 (1892); Hufstedler v. Sides, 165 S.W.2d 1006 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942), error ref.; Peyton v. Sturgis, 202 S.W. 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1918); Brownwood Ice Co. v. York Mfg. Co., 37 S.W. 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
Dean Hildebrand strongly supported use of the inherent power and presumed authority con-
cepts as bases to hold the corporation liable to third persons who innocently* dealt with the
president or other officers. 2 I. HILDEBRAND, supra note 154, at 610-15. See generally
Schwartz v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 72 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1934); Note, Inherent
Powers of Corporate Officers: Need for a Statutory Definition, 61 HARV. L. REV. 867, 870
(1948).
... Citing Adkins-Polk Co. v. Pate, 11 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1928);
cf. Burns v. Gonzalez, 439 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969), error ref.
n.r.e. (partnership law).
'7 Citing International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963);
Popperman v. Rest Haven Cemetery, Inc., 162 Tex. 255, 345 S.W.2d 715 (1961). The
fairness test used by the court is the standard now generally adhered to by Texas courts when
examining contracts or other transactions with interested or interlocking directors. See Ham-
ilton & Shields, supra note 14, at 93; Lebowitz, supra note 57, at 17; Lebowitz, Recent De-
cisions on Fiduciary Duties to Corporations, BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION,
BANKING & BUSINEss LAW, May 1963, at 1; Comment, The Interested Director in Texas,
21 Sw- L.J. 794, 801 (1967).
380 TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 7.04-.09 (1956); see Leeds, Merger, Consolidation,
Reorganization, and Receivership Under the Texas Business Corporation Act, 3A TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. 490 (1956); Slover, Receivership Provisions of the Proposed Texas Busi-
ness Corporation Act, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 489 (1952).
'
31TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 2293-2318 (1971).
381ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 94-99 (1969); see Slover, supra note 380, setting
out the sources used in drafting the TBCA's receivership provisions.3'8 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.04 (1956).
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the receivership for specific assets, are found inadequate,' and to liquidate the
corporation, but again only if the first two receiverships as well as any other
legal or equitable remedies are not adequate.'
Two cases decided during the survey period had occasion to apply the TBCA
receivership provisions with differing results. In Robinson v. Thompson'
shareholders and directors of AUStralite Corporation sought appointment of
a corporate receiver under subdivisions 3 and 4 of article 2293" and TBCA
article 7.05. The plaintiffs claimed that the corporation was insolvent, that its
assets were being wasted by advance payments of unnecessary salaries in that
no work was being done for the corporation, and that to continue the salary
payments would completely deplete the few remaining assets in a few months
since the corporation had no income. On the facts found, the court had no
difficulty determining that the appointment of a receiver to rehabilitate the
corporation was necessary and that no other remedy could furnish relief.
In Associated Bankers Credit Co. v. Meis'" a corporate receivership obtained
without notice by a plaintiff who was neither a shareholder nor creditor of a
sign company (although apparently a shareholder of the corporation's parent
company) was ordered dissolved, since either a temporary restraining order
or temporary injunction would have provided the plaintiff adequate relief.
The receivership arose as an incident to a suit against the parent corporation
that was alleged to have impaired plaintiff's financial standing and encumbered
large amounts of his assets. The controversy seems to have been the aftermath
of an acquisition of plaintiff's sign company by the defendant parent in a
stock-for-stock exchange. The trial court granted a sweeping injunction, again
without notice, and appointed a receiver to take charge of certain assets of the
sign company. However, the sign company had not been made a party to the
action at the time the receivership was sought, and this too was held to be error.
A corporation whose property is being placed in receivership is a necessary
and indispensable party under rule 39(a).'"
Miscellaneous. Finally, a few other cases dealing with diverse aspects of cor-
porate law are worth mentioning. In Danielson v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.'
a stock subscriber's heirs attempted to specifically enforce a stock subscription
agreement, but were held barred by limitations. The subscription contract was
entered into in November 1955, with the only installment payment being
made then. It expired by its own terms in November 1957, and suit was not
brought until May 1968. The Waco court of civil appeals held that in the
absence of a statute, a stock subscription is governed by the same statute of limi-
tations that applies to contracts in general,"' and that the statute begins to run
when the cause of action on the stock subscription accrues.
'4Id. art. 7.05 (Supp. 1972).
'"Id. art. 7.06.888 466 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971).
uITEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2293 (1971).
3 456 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970).
'
89TEx. R. CIrv. P. 39(a).
38O 461 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970).
3'Tlx. REy. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (1958).
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In W. A. Green Co. v. Cope.. the issue concerned the validity of a default
judgment against a dissolved corporation obtained after service on the Secretary
of State. The action was timely brought under TBCA article 7.12, which per-
mits the survival of a remedy against a dissolved corporation if brought within
three years of its dissolution. Following the Bar committee's comment on ar-
ticle 7.12, that the statute is cumulative of the procedures set out in rules of
civil procedure 29 and 160, the court held that rule 29 should have been fol-
lowed. Rule 29 expressly provides that a dissolved corporation can be served
by service of process on the president, directors, general manager, trustee, as-
signee, or other person in charge of the corporation's affairs at the time of
dissolution. Also, under the TBCA a domestic corporation cannot be served
through the secretary of state unless a registered agent has not been appointed
or maintained or cannot be found."" There likewise were no allegations show-
ing these circumstances had occurred.
The final case39. arose out of the Sunday closing law litigation previously
discussed."' In response to several actions brought by the state to enjoin Sun-
day openings by a discount chain, the several corporate defendants counter-
claimed for injunctive relief against harassment by the multiplicity of such
suits being filed against them. The trial court granted the defendants their in-
junction. On appeal the state contended that because two of the defendants
were foreign corporations not qualified to do business in Texas, they could not
maintain their cross-action. Under TBCA article 8.18 a nonadmitted foreign
corporation transacting a business in the state cannot sue on a cause of action
arising out of such business until it qualifies, but is permitted to defend any
action brought against it.3 " The court held, following New York precedent, '
that defendants could maintain their cross-action since the relief they sought
was essentially defensive in nature. In a somewhat more questionable aspect
of the holding the subject matter of the cross-action was thought not to arise
out of business being transacted in the state and, therefore, would not have been
barred by article 8.18(A) in the first place.
392466 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971).
313 TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.11(B) (1956).
"4State v. Cook United, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), afl'd
and modified on other grounds, 469 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1971).
"'
2 See note 321 supra.396TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 8.18(B) (1956).
" The court cites Warren Trading Corp. v. Kraglan Bldg. Corp., 220 App. Div. 3, 220
N.Y.S. 455 (1927); James Howden & Co. v. American Condenser & Eng'r Corp., 194 App.
Div. 164, 185 N.Y.S. 159 (1920), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 627, 132 N.E. 915 (1921).
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